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Cornell University

Ithaca, New York

CORNELL STUDIES
IN
CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

EDITED BY

BENJAMIN IDE WHEELER, CHARLES EDWIN BENNETT,
AND GEORGE PRENTICE BRISTOL

No. VI

STUDIES IN LATIN MOODS AND TENSES

BY

HERBERT CHARLES ELMER

PUBLISHED FOR THE UNIVERSITY

BY

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY



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
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LATIN MOODS AND TENSES

PART I: The Use of Tenses in Subjunctive Volitive Expressions.

PART II: The Use of Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity.

PART III: The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive.

BY

HERBERT CHARLES ELMER

CORNELL STUDIES IN CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY, NO. VI



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
PREFACE.

While engaged in collecting material for my articles on *The Latin Prohibitive*, I became convinced that erroneous ideas are held by modern grammarians regarding the force of the perfect (aorist) tense of the Latin subjunctive *in all those expressions in which that tense is used of future time*. The present volume owes its existence chiefly to a desire to prove that this conviction was well-grounded. I had not progressed far in the study of the material I had collected before I discovered that, in the expression *aliquis dixerit*, if the common view that *dixerit* is a perfect subjunctive was to be accepted, the tense was out of harmony with what seemed to me the force of that tense in other classes of expressions. This apparent exception to my theory regarding the future uses of the Latin aorist tempted me to doubt the correctness of the prevailing view regarding *aliquis dixerit* and led to the investigation the results of which are embodied in Part III.

I wish here to express my gratitude to Professor C. E. Bennett for his thorough-going criticism of the subject-matter of these Studies, and to both Professor Bennett and Mr. C. L. Durham for the time and labor they have devoted to the reading of the proof sheets.

H. C. ELMER.

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STUDIES IN LATIN MOODS AND TENSES.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

THE following pages are offered primarily in the hope of proving unjust the claims of Latin grammarians that in certain expressions the present and perfect tenses of the subjunctive are used without difference of meaning, and of establishing between these two tenses certain important and clearly-marked distinctions. I emphasize thus the primary aim I have in view in order that my peculiar system of classification may be better understood. Had my intention been to give a minute classification showing all the various shades of meaning of the subjunctive mood, with the relative frequency of each use, I should have followed a very different system. In that case other subdivisions would have been called for. The distinctions, above referred to as not having received proper recognition, are those between the present and the perfect tenses (1) in prayers, *e. g.*, *di auertant* and *di auerterint*; (2) in expressions of contingent futurity,¹ *e. g.*, *non credam* and *non crediderim*; *quis credat?* and *quis crediderit?* (3) in expressions which have been mistakenly² appealed to as instances of a potential subjunctive, *e. g.*, *aliquis dicat* and *aliquis dixerit*.

As regards the subjunctive in prayers, I find no attempt in any

¹ This term has been made current by Bennett in his Latin Grammar.

² In Part III of this discussion I shall adduce abundant evidence to prove that there is no such thing in Latin as a "potential" subjunctive, if the term "potential" be confined to expressions of ability and possibility (ideas represented in English by the auxiliaries "can" and "may"). Throughout the present discussion the term "potential" will be used in this restricted sense.

Latin grammar to insist upon a clearly marked distinction between the tenses, except the perverted one of Kühner (p. 138), which it is difficult to suppose that he believed in himself, viz.: (Der Wunsch) "wird im Lateinischen durch den Konjunktiv des Praesens ausgedrückt, wenn er auf die Gegenwart oder Zukunft bezogen wird, oder durch den Konjunktiv des Perfekts, wenn er auf die Vergangenheit bezogen wird." Kühner then gives numerous instances of the present and of the perfect tenses side by side (both clearly referring to the future) without further comment, except that *auerterint* in Cic. Phil. 12, 6, 14 is called "stärker" than *auertant* in Cic. Phil. 3, 14, 35.

The Allen and Greenough grammar, to be sure, suggests (§ 266) a theoretical distinction, but it is an inadequate one, and in the same section we are told that it will not hold, and that in most cases the perfect "*is hardly to be distinguished from the present.*" The other standard Latin grammars dismiss the subject with the mere statement that in such expressions either the present or the perfect is used, or that the perfect (though found in all periods), is a reminiscence of archaic formulae, as though this were a sufficient explanation of the tense: cf. Gildersleeve-Lodge, § 260; Landgraf (Schulgrammatik), § 184, 3; Roby, p. 254; Schmalz (Lateinische Syntax), § 31; etc., etc. What would be said of a Latin grammar which, in its treatment of the perfect and imperfect tenses of the indicative, should say nothing about these tenses except that either the perfect or the imperfect might be used of past events? And yet such an offense would not be one whit more serious than that actually committed in the case referred to, as I hope to show to the satisfaction of anyone who will follow the discussion below. The distinction between the present and the perfect subjunctive in prayers was, to the Roman mind, just as important, just as clearly marked, and just as carefully observed on all occasions, as was that between the perfect and imperfect indicative with reference to past events; indeed the distinction between the former tenses was, in some respects, rather more clearly marked and carefully observed than that between the latter.

The treatment accorded in Latin grammars to contingent-future uses and to supposed¹ potential uses of the subjunctive is no more satisfactory than that accorded to the uses above mentioned. Kühner here makes a distinction (which he seems to consider of trifling importance) between the present and perfect tenses: § 46, 1a: "Der Konjunktiv des Perfekts, z. B. *dixerit quispiam*, bezeichnet eigentlich das Angenommene als etwas in der Gegenwart vollendetes, also: es könnte, dürfte, möchte Jemand gesagt haben, Gewöhnlich jedoch *hat er die Bedeutung des präsensischen Konjunktivs*, nur mit dem Unterschiede, dass das Perfekt dem Ausdrucke einen höheren Grad von Entschiedenheit verleiht, da es die Annahme als eine abgeschlossene und in ihren Wirkungen fortbestehende bezeichnet." This paragraph contains a peculiar mixture of misleading conceptions, as will appear below. Later grammarians evidently consider this attempt to make any distinction between the two tenses as perverted, for they either say nothing about any distinction of meaning as Landgraf (*Schulgrammatik*), § 185, 6; Gildersleeve-Lodge,² § 277, 2; Schmalz (*Lat. Synt.*), § 33; Lattmann, § 130; etc., or else particularly insist that the two tenses are used without distinction. As illustrations of this latter attitude may be cited among recent grammars the following:

Allen and Greenough, § 311: "In this use the present and the perfect (subjunctive) *refer without distinction* to the immediate future."

Bennett, § 280, 1: (under potential subjunctive): "The tense is usually the Present, but the Perfect (*with the force of the Present*) sometimes occurs;" § 280, 2: "The Potential Subjunctive may represent something as contingent upon a condition expressed or understood. Both Present and Perfect occur *and without appreciable difference of meaning*."³

¹ See note 2 on page 1.

² In Gildersleeve-Lodge, § 277, 2, *credat* is translated *he may believe*; *crediderit*, *he may come to the belief*.

³ In his Appendix, Bennett modifies these statements somewhat, so far as they apply to *aliquis dicat* and *aliquis dixerit*, by saying (§ 360 a): "As re-

Roby p. 226: "This (*i.e.*, the use of the potential or contingent future subjunctive) is most common with the present and imperfect of *volo* and its compounds; or the perfect (*with sense of present*) tense of some verbs of mental action."

Riemann, *Syntaxe Latine*, § 152 Rem.: "*Scripserim a absolument le sens d'un simple subjonctif présent* (1) dans les défenses: *ne scribat* ou *ne scripserit* (2) dans les propositions conditionnelles: *dicat aliquis* ou *dixerit aliquis*."

Even Cramer who has made a special study of the uses under discussion, joins in insisting that the perfect tense in such expressions does not differ from the present. See his dissertation, *de perfecti coniunctivi usu potentiali apud priscos scriptores Latinos*, p. 20, where in speaking of such expressions as *perierim*, he says: "Sane illis locis verbi actio ad futurum tempus spectat: cuius tamen rei causa sita est in eo, quod illae locutiones plane in praesentis naturam abierunt." And in a foot-note on the same page he adds: "Nimirum nullo pacto de 'aoristo' quodam tempore in his quidem formis cogitari potest."

Such an entire disregard of any distinction between two different tenses seems to me extremely unfortunate from more than one point of view. In the first place, the statements that the tenses are used without distinction are, as I hope to prove, not true, which in itself is an offense serious enough; but the fact that such particular statements are in themselves misleading is of trifling importance as compared with the sacrifice of certain pedagogical principles involved. When one finds that Cicero, for instance, at one time says *quis crediderit?* and on the next page says *quis credat?*, and that other authors belonging to the same period and to different periods do likewise, one is certainly justified in supposing that the two tenses do not mean exactly the same thing. Language economizes its resources too carefully to keep in constant use for centuries two tenses without distinction of

gards the use of tenses, it has been suggested that the Perfect lays stress upon the accomplishment of the act, while the Present calls attention to its progress."

meaning. Not only must the Romans have felt a distinct difference between the two tenses in such expressions, but they must have regarded the difference of sufficient importance to pay them for clinging with great tenacity for centuries to both forms of expression. I can imagine only one condition of things under which there would, in my judgment, be the slightest excuse for ever insisting upon the equivalence of two different tenses; such a condition of things would, perhaps, exist after a complete collection of instances of each tense had been made, after the instances of each tense had been carefully studied by a competent critic from all points of view and compared with the instances of the other, with all the light that could be gained from the context and the general situation and the character or mood of the speaker in each case. If such a careful and exhaustive study of the whole field should result in showing no differences between the two tenses (which I do not believe would ever be the case) then there might be some excuse for inserting in grammars a reference to such a remarkable state of things. Until that has been done, it seems to me that the least that might properly be expected of a grammar, with reference to such phenomena as are now under discussion, is a note to the effect that "the difference between the two tenses in such expressions has not yet been determined." Such a note would be stimulating in character, would encourage the student to be constantly on the watch for distinctions and would perhaps ultimately result in his undertaking a thorough examination of the subject; while such comments as are now found in our grammars are distinctly deadening in their effect upon the susceptibility of the student.

The following discussion is based upon a practically exhaustive study of the whole field of Latin literature down to the time of Livy. The list of perfects is, I believe, practically complete for this entire period. The instances of the present tense are so numerous that it has not seemed worth while to quote them all. I have accordingly cited, for the most part, only those from Plautus, Terence and Cicero. The results afforded by a com-

parison of the uses of the perfect in the authors prior to Livy with those of the present in the three authors mentioned are so satisfactory and conclusive that it would seem like a waste of energy to make further citations. Conclusions, however, will in each case be drawn only after due consideration of all the testimony that can be gained from other authors belonging to the period under investigation. I have indeed quoted even from these authors wherever any additional light could be obtained from them. I should perhaps state that the instances of the present tense from Cicero (except those from the *epistulae ad fam.*) and from the Cistellaria, Epidicus, Menaechmi, Mercator, Aulularia of Plautus, have been collected for me by a student. I cannot accordingly vouch for the list's being absolutely complete, but I have accepted it as at least sufficiently so for the purpose for which I have used it. As the list of instances is intended to be complete for the perfect tense down to the time of Livy (including Tibullus, Propertius and Ovid, but not including Livy himself), and for the present tense in the large field covered by Plautus, Terence and Cicero (with the exception of certain sorts of questions and of apodoses to formally expressed protases), it is hoped that my classification may be useful for other purposes than the one for which I have primarily prepared it.

I shall set out with the hypothesis that all those future uses of the perfect subjunctive, which are not true future perfects,¹ are aoristic in character. In a future paper, I shall attempt to show that these aoristic uses in Latin differ, in certain respects, from future uses of the aorist in Greek. It will accordingly be understood that I am speaking in the following pages only of Latin usage except where other languages are distinctly mentioned.

It seems to me that a serious mistake has been made on the

¹ By the expression "true future-perfects," I refer to uses similar to *uenerit* in *si uenerit, uideat*, where the act of *uenerit* is conceived of as one to be finished prior to that point in the future at which the act of *uideat* is to begin.

part of grammarians in making no distinction between the aoristic conception as applied to the future and the same conception as applied to the past. I am willing to concede that the original fundamental idea is the same in both cases, but I contend at the same time that the aorist when used of the future came to be associated and identified with ideas that were wholly foreign to past uses of the same tense. The perfect (aorist) indicative deals with an act that is finished. In presenting a past event it merely touches the idea of the act and then leaves it. It differs from the imperfect much as "glance at" differs from "gaze at." But this "glance" at the act has absolutely nothing to do with the real character of the act itself. This act may have been performed quickly or slowly, energetically or deliberately; it may have lasted for years or only for an instant. With all of these particulars the perfect (aorist) indicative is not in the least concerned. It merely presents the act as one that took place. Such an act is now beyond the sphere of anybody's influence—it is no longer a subject of suspense. But with the future use of the aorist, circumstances are quite different. The act is now one which *is* in suspense. Instead of taking a calm view of past events, the speaker is now referring to events whose character he himself, or some one else, is endeavoring to shape and determine, or, in the case of the contingent future subjunctive, would, under certain circumstances, shape and determine. Under such circumstances the manner of looking at the act came, naturally enough, to be closely associated with and dependent upon the manner in which the act was to be performed. My meaning will be made clearer by the use of English illustrations. Let us take the expressions "you went," corresponding to the ordinary aorist of past events, and "be gone!" representing fairly well¹ the use of the aorist of future acts (see *The Latin*

¹ I say "fairly well" for the reason that some might insist on regarding "be gone!" as a perfect instead of an aorist. But in either case the expression serves the purpose for which I have used it, as all idea of progress is eliminated from the thought. As applied to the future, the perfect and

Prohibitive, *American Journal of Philology*, Vol. XV, p. 138 f.). In the expression "you went," the speaker is merely stating that, as a matter of fact, the act of going took place in the past. The length of its duration is a matter about which the speaker is not concerned. He merely dismisses the act with a single glance. It is clear that this quick glance at the act of going is not determined or even influenced in the slightest degree by the character, or manner, or duration of that act itself. But in the case of the future use of the aorist illustrated in "be gone!", a moment's thought will show that the manner of looking at the act depends largely upon the manner in which the speaker expects, or wishes, the act to be performed. "Be gone!" represents, to be sure, a quick glance at a future act of going, but this form of expression is chosen only because the speaker wants the act itself to be promptly and quickly accomplished.

So, in such uses of the perfect subjunctive as in *di faxint, quis crediderit? dixerim*, etc., while the tense primarily indicates the manner in which the act is looked at, it also indicates with equal clearness the character which the act itself is thought of as assuming. Every such expression hurries the thought and fixes the attention at once upon the completion of the act. The use of the perfect tense almost invariably indicates that the speaker is thoroughly aroused with emotion which does not allow him to think of the progress of the act but only the prompt accomplishment of it. Occasionally, however, it is used where no special emotion is apparent, simply to indicate great emphasis or to indicate that an act is to be quickly performed and promptly finished,

the aorist resemble each other in that they both alike *include the end* of the act; they differ in that the perfect represents it as one to be performed *prior* to a future time, the aorist represents it as one to be performed in its entirety (the end of the act being therefore included) *at* a future time with no idea of priority. But as the idea of completion or accomplishment is common to the two tenses, the expression "be gone!", however it is explained, is sufficiently apropos. That the perfect and the aorist conceptions approach each other under certain circumstances is shown by the facts that a Greek aorist seems often best translated by an English perfect and that both tenses are in Latin represented by the same form.

a function for which its summary method of presenting an act makes it especially appropriate. The present tense on the other hand is chiefly confined to common-place expressions where the perfect would be entirely out of place.

This then will be the thesis that the following chapters are intended to prove: **that the perfect (aorist) subjunctive in the future uses under discussion indicates one of three things, (1) that the speaker is under the influence of some strong emotion (real or pretended), or (2) that the act is to be quickly performed, or (3) it occasionally indicates merely great decisiveness or earnestness.** But in all three of these cases great emphasis is laid upon the idea that the act is to be promptly and energetically performed and is then as promptly to cease. If the reader recalls at this point any instances of the perfect that seems to him to violate these principles, I trust that he will at least reserve his final decision till he has carefully considered all that is to be presented in the following pages.

There are many important considerations to be offered as bearing upon the thesis I have just laid down. Manifestly the first thing to do will be to compare the passages in which the perfect tense is used with those in which the present tense is used, in the light of the context, the character of the speaker in each case, the character of the verbs used, etc., and see what differences of tone, if any, can be detected between the two tenses. Much light will be thrown by a mere classification of the verbs used. I have above expressed the view that the perfect subjunctive in future uses indicates vigorous action of some sort, that it is used only of an act that is to be promptly performed (*and finished*) with all possible energy, rapidity or decisiveness. If this theory regarding the force of the perfect tense is the true one, then there are whole classes of verbs, comprising in fact a large proportion (about forty per cent.) of all the verbs in the language, which we should expect never to find used in the perfect tense in affirmative sentences. The verbs found in the perfect tense will, in such sentences, be only those with which it would seem per-

fectly possible to couple such adverbs as "instantly," "promptly" or the like. But scores of the verbs most commonly used at all periods of the literature have meanings directly opposed to the meaning I have assigned to the perfect tense, viz., the idea of vigorous action and prompt completion and the union with them of such adverbs as "instantly" or "promptly" would be absurd. I refer to such verbs as *maneant*, *habeat* ("let him keep"), *teneat*, *stet*, *sedeat*, *ualeat*, *gaudeat*, *sileat*, *possideat*, *caueat*, *ignoret*, *careat*, *deceat*, *sit*, *obsit*, *prosit*, *desit*, *supersit*, *insit*, *absit*, *adsit*, *quiescat*, *sustineat*, *doleat*, *inuideat*, *taceat*, *iaceat*, *adstet*, *arceat* ("keep away"), *constet* and many others. In *maneant*, "let him remain," the prompt or instant completion of the act is the one thing that is not desired; and the nature of the act itself is opposed to vigorous action. It would be absurd to speak of "remaining" in a vigorous and decisive manner, or to speak of performing and finishing such an act promptly or instantly. One must not be confused here by the occasional improper use of "remain" in the sense of "stop" or "decide to remain." In this sense, one might say, "let him remain instantly," i.e. "stop on the spot," but we are not at present concerned with such extreme uses. Again, in such an expression as *sit beneuolens*, the reference is to a continued state of things. The completion or the cessation of the state is something which the speaker would invariably deprecate. Here again no one should be misled by the occasional use of "be" in the sense of "become." A magician, for instance, might say "now let this water be wine," when he would perhaps mean "become wine," and in this use the adverb "instantly" might be admitted, but such a use has no bearing upon the point under discussion. To the same class of words as those above indicated belong all the numerous verbs which are translatable by the use of our auxiliary "be" e.g., *deceat* ("be fitting"), *taceat* ("be silent"), *careat* ("be free from"), etc., etc.

Into the same class as the verbs just discussed I have also put verbs like *sciat*, *putet*, *cogitet*, *arbitretur*, *meditetur*, *sentiat*, *ignoret*, etc., etc., because these verbs, in the sense in which

they are commonly used,¹ are also opposed to the idea of prompt completion, or prompt cessation, of action. No one would think, for instance, of saying *sciat*, "let him know," etc., with the implication that the act of knowing is promptly to reach its end and cease. For my present purpose, it has not seemed desirable to make a separate class of such verbs, as both those of the former and those of the latter class are alike opposed to the meaning which I assign to the future uses of the perfect tense.

But besides the classes of verbs above mentioned there are many other verbs which, while lending themselves very naturally to the idea of energetic action, or even in some instances suggesting such action, seem nevertheless to be incompatible with the idea of prompt cessation of the act, and which, if my theory be correct, we should not expect to find used in the perfect tense, except at any rate very rarely and under peculiar conditions. I refer to such verbs as *rideat*, *contendat*, *sequatur*, *defendat*. It does not seem very natural to say "let him instantly laugh," with the idea that the act of laughing *is to stop at once* after the vigorous performing of it. Again *sequor* represents an act that may be performed with great energy, but it would not seem natural or possible to issue such a command as "follow him!" in a manner that suggested not merely energy and rapidity of action but also a prompt finishing of the act. The same may be said of the act indicated by *defendo* (in the sense of *defend*). It may be, however, that some might contend that the idea of prompt completion is barely possible with such verbs and, in order to be on the safe side in such cases, I have formed a separate class for all such verbs. The formation of this class has made it possible to group together under the first class only those instances about which there can be no possible doubt.²

¹ If, however, we may suppose that, just as *cognosco* and *γινώσκω* are admittedly used sometimes in the sense of *learn*, i. e., *get a knowledge of*, sometimes in that of *know*, i. e., *have a knowledge of*, so *scire* was used occasionally, with this shifting of meaning, in the sense of "get a knowledge of", the perfect might then be used, as "getting a knowledge of" is something that could be promptly performed and promptly completed.

² Those who believe that there is such a thing as an *ingressive* aorist will

The third class will, of course, comprise all those verbs whose meanings lend themselves equally well to the idea of energetic action promptly completed and to that of slow, deliberate action.

For the purposes of this classification it is of the utmost importance to get at the exact meaning of the verb in each passage and to remember that *the same word may in different passages belong to different classes*. In the case of the word *seruare*, for instance, two distinct meanings are recognized in dictionaries, viz.: *to make safe, rescue, deliver*, and *to keep safe*. When this word is used in the sense of *make safe* it belongs to the third class; when it is used in the sense of *keep safe*, it belongs to the first class. It is probable that it is in most cases used in the sense of *make safe, rescue*, though there is often an implication that the person *made safe* is to continue to remain safe. For a fuller discussion of this word see note on p. 17. Again, the word *sinere* sometimes apparently means *to allow* (*i. e.*, passively in the sense merely of *not to prevent*), and sometimes *to grant permission*. In the former sense it belongs to the first class, in the latter sense, to the third class. It seems certain that the word, originally at least, belonged exclusively to the third class. The original meaning of *sino*, as recognized in our dictionaries was *put down, set down*, or the like (*cf. situs, pono (posino)*). The application of this idea to cases like that now under discussion clearly shows that the meaning was *put down one's will, grant permission*, or at any rate something that would place the word in the third class. On the other hand the word *licet* always clung closely to the meaning *it is lawful, it is allowed*. This difference sufficiently explains why I have below assigned the few instances of *sino* to the third class, while *licet* has been assigned to the first.

One other point must be carefully borne in mind. The addition of a negative frequently removes a verb from the first class and

probably be ready to claim that aorist as possible even in verbs like *defendo* and *sequor*. I hope to discuss the Greek ingressive aorist (so-called) in the near future. As it is of no great importance in connection with the phenomena in Latin at present under discussion, I defer consideration of the questions involved.

throws it into the third class. For instance *putet, sit*, etc., clearly belong to that class of verbs whose meanings are opposed to the idea of quick, energetic action promptly completed ; but *ne putet, let him not think, i. e., let him refuse to think*, and *ne sit, let him not be, i. e., let him refuse to be, or cease to be*, etc., represent ideas not at all opposed to prompt performance and prompt completion. In my classification each verb is classed according to the meaning of the verb itself, but it must be understood that if any verb belonging to the first or second class is found in the perfect tense, it does not militate against my theory in the least, *if it is accompanied by a negative*. There are one or two instances of *ne fueris* where the meaning apparently is *do not for an instant be*. The idea of action to be promptly, or instantly, performed readily passes, when accompanied by a negative, into that of action that is *not for an instant to be performed* or a state that is *not for an instant to exist*.

Throughout the following pages these different classes of verbs will be indicated by brief phrases that are intended merely to remind the reader of distinctions more carefully indicated above. From this point on, it will be understood that

“(a) Absolutely opposed” will represent that class of verbs whose meanings are, in their very nature, absolutely opposed to the idea of energetic action to be promptly performed and then promptly to cease.

“(b) Unfavorable” will represent that class of verbs whose meanings, while not perhaps absolutely opposed to the idea of energetic action to be promptly performed and then to cease, are of such a character that one would not ordinarily expect to find them associated with that idea.

“(c) Indifferent” will represent that class of verbs whose meanings lend themselves equally well to the idea of prompt, energetic action and to that of slow, deliberate action.

The following classification will show not merely the general idea expressed by the mood, but also the relative frequency of the verbs belonging to each one of the three classes just

indicated. Furthermore, all the passages are divided into two general groups, (1) *those without a negative* and (2) *those in which the verb is negated*.

With this introduction we are now prepared to examine the passages concerned.

I.

VOLITIVE AND OPTATIVE EXPRESSIONS.

Perfect Tense.

In many of the passages cited below, the emotion of the speaker will be perfectly evident. Where this is not the case, however, I have added such comments as seemed desirable, for the purpose of refreshing the reader's memory regarding the context in which the passage is found, the character of the person speaking, etc., etc. It should be noticed—and this is a point which I wish particularly to emphasize—that the verbs used in these expressions are, in nearly every case, such as may be naturally associated with quick or energetic action. The importance of noticing this fact will become more apparent later on (see discussion at the end of Part I). It will be seen that the perfect is almost exclusively confined to earnest prayers for something of importance to the speaker, or to some one who has thoroughly aroused the speaker's sympathy. If the prayer is not answered, the result will be disastrous to his safety or happiness. Its use in angry curses is of course but a slight modification of this idea.

In the list of passages about to be cited, it will not be necessary to discuss those in which *ne*, or *caue*, is used with the second person of the perfect subjunctive. All such passages have been fully treated in my papers on *The Latin Prohibitive* (*American Journal of Philology*, Vol. XV), where I have shown that the only important distinction to be made between the two tenses is that the perfect tense is impatient and emotional, while the present tense is common-place. This distinction has been accepted by two Latin grammars that have appeared in America since the publication of the articles referred to (Bennett, § 276 ; Gildersleeve-Lodge, § 272, 2, Remark, which recognizes

the passionate character of the perfect),¹ and also by four authors of Latin grammars in Europe (Sonnenschein, in his review of Gildersleeve's grammar, *Classical Review*, Vol. X, No. 1, p. 64; Schmalz, in the *Berliner Phil. Wochenschrift* for June 20, 1896, column 794; Ziemer, in the *Wochenschrift für Klassische Philologie* for April 22, 1896, col. 459; and apparently by Golling (who has charge of parts of the Syntax for the forthcoming *Historische Grammatik der Lat. Sprache*), in the *Zeitschrift für die oester. Gymnasien* for 1895, col. 1074). With the sanction of such authorities, I feel justified in taking it for granted that I may at once claim all such instances of *ne*, or *caue*, with the perfect in support of the theory that I am now attempting to establish.² As I shall wish to refer to the prohibitions later on, I may be allowed to include below a bare list of such uses of the perfect.³

Without a Negative.

FIRST PERSON :

No examples.

SECOND PERSON :

(a) **Absolutely opposed :**

No examples. In Ter. Adelph. 828, *seiris* has no manuscript authority; even if such authority existed, the word in this passage would probably mean *grant permission* and be better classed under (c)

(b) **Unfavorable :**

No examples.

¹ See also Gildersleeve in the *American Journal of Philology*, Vol. XVIII, 1, p. 123.

² See, however, Delbrück's *Vergleichende Syntax, Zweiter Theil* (published since the above was written) pp. 376 ff., where the author does me the honor to take my articles as the basis of his discussion of Der alte Injunctiv Aoristi im Lateinischen. A reply to his criticism of certain features of my discussion will appear in an early number of the *Classical Review*.

³ Instances of *neque* (*nec*) with the perfect subjunctive are not here included, since they belong to a different use (see *The Latin Prohibitive, Part II, American Journal of Phil.*, XV, p. 299 f.). They will be taken up in Part II.

(c) Indifferent:

Plaut. Men. 295 (301) CY. Cylindrus ego sum: non nosti
nomen meum?

ME. Sei tu Cylindrus seu Coriendrus, *perieris*!

Menaechmus thus curses a fellow who was (as he supposed)
impudently trying to impose upon him.

Ter. Ad. 828. . . . uideo eos sapere, intellegere, in loco
Vereri, inter se amare: *seiris* liberum
Ingenium atque animum.

Here, however, there is no manuscript authority for *seiris*.

Ennius (Ribbeck, *Trag. Rom. Fragmenta*, Incerti Nominis
Reliquiae XLVIII), Vocibus concide: faxis . . . musset obrutus.

THIRD PERSON:

(a) Absolutely opposed: (For the one passage classified here
see the discussion at the end of Part I).

Plaut. Curc. 578. At ita meae uolsellae pecten speculum cala-
mistrum meum

Bene me *amassint* meaque axicia linteumque extersui,
Ut ego tua magnifica uerba neque istas tuas magnas minas
Non pluris facio quam ancillam meam.

This is the defiant reply of Cappadox to the threat of Theraponti-
gonus that he would have the former's body dismembered and
carried away piecemeal.

The only other verb that has meanings that could possibly
tempt any one to classify it under this head is *seruassint*, but I
have felt justified in classing this word under (c)¹.

¹Schultz in his *Lateinische Synonymik* correctly emphasizes the
real force of *seruare* when he says: "In der Bedeutung beschützen unter-
scheiden sie (*seruare* and *tueri*) sich so, dass *seruare* mehr das Resultat
desselben, . . . *tueri* mehr die Sorgfalt des Beschützenden hervorhebt."
The use of *seruare* in the sense of *tueri*, *keep safe*, is at best comparatively
rare in early Latin. *Seruare* is originally rather a synonym of *salutem dare*,
and in Cato de agr. cult., 141, 3, it is found side by side with that expression:
Mars pater, te precor pastores pecuaque salua *seruassis* *duisque bonam*
salutem mihi. At first sight one might understand *di te seruent* in some
cases as meaning *may the gods keep you safe*. But the real meaning seems
to be indicated by the use of *seruator* and *seruatricx* as epithets of gods and

(b) Unfavorable : No example.

(c) Indifferent :

Plautus : Am. 461. Nisi etiam is quoque me ignorabit, quod
ille *faxit* Iuppiter,

Ut ego hodie raso capite caluos capiam pilleum.

This is a slave's prayer for freedom.

ib. 632. Vtinam di *faxint*, infecta dicta re eueniant tua !

Sosia has announced to his master, Amphitruo, that their own house is closed against them and that he himself has, upon attempting to enter, been soundly thrashed by some one who pretended to be Sosia himself. Amphitruo is at first very much aroused at such

goddesses (see Plin. N. H., 34, 8, 19, § 74 ; Inscr. Grut., 18, 6 ; Inscr. Gud., 31, 7 ; 52, 5 ; Inscr. Fabr., 470, 109 and 110). This word *seruator* always, at least before the period of decline, means *one who delivers, rescues from danger, or makes safe*, and never *one who keeps safe* (cf. Lyaeus, from λύν, "the deliverer," as an epithet of Bacchus). In this respect it seems to be exactly like Σωτήρ and this equivalence of the two epithets is recognized by Forcellini (under *soter*). About the exact meaning of Σωτήρ there can be no possible doubt. In Verr. II, 2, 63, 154, Cicero is expressly aiming to give the most exact definition possible for this epithet and his words are *is est nimirum soter, qui salutem dedit*. Christ, too, was sometimes called *Seruator*, i. e., the Redeemer, not *one who keeps safe* but the *one who brings salvation*. Now if *seruator*, as an epithet of a god, always means *one who delivers, or grants safety*, and never (until comparatively late times) *one who watches over, or keeps safe*, it seems highly probable that *di te seruent*, in Plautus and Terence, means *may the gods grant you safety* (instead of *keep you safe*), being practically equivalent to *di tibi salutem duint*, which latter expression, as we have seen above, actually supplants it in a prayer in Cato de agr. cult., 141, 3. That the conception indicated by the phrase *grant safety* was a familiar one to the Roman mind is seen from the frequency of the expression *salutem dare* in this sense outside of prayers. In some Latin versions of the Lord's prayer, e. g., Beza's translation from the Greek, the words "deliver us from evil" are represented by *serua nos a malo*, while other versions have *eripe* or *libera*. In fact Beza himself, while using *serua* in Luke XI, 4, uses *libera* in the same prayer in Matthew VI, 13. Of course the implication is often present that the person *saved* or *made safe* is to continue to remain *safe*. The use of *semper* with *di seruassint* in one passage refers to the continuance of this result, being precisely similar in this respect to "forever" in the sentence "His prompt assistance saved me my good name, forever," in which, of course, "forever" does not imply that the act of saving continued to be performed after the one prompt act of assistance that rescued my good name from danger.

an improbable story and thinks Sosia is trying to impose upon him, but the latter's persistence makes him fearful that something extraordinary has really happened. This is a prayer prompted by such a fear: 'May the gods grant that your words may in reality prove untrue.'

Capt. 172. Ita di deaeque *faxint* !

This is an earnest prayer that Hegio will recover his lost son.

Stich. 505. Ita me di bene ament measque mihi *servassint*¹
filias

Vt mihi uolup est quia uos uideo . . . rediisse !

It should be noticed that we have here the perfect *servassint* side by side with the present *ament*. This is not unnatural. The *me di ament* is, as we shall see later, one of the most commonplace formulæ for pronouncing a blessing. But the welfare of his daughters is the very point about which centers the interest of the entire play. With the prayer for their safety, the all-important thing for him, it is natural that there should be an outburst of feeling.

Curc. 129 (131). Male di tibi *faxint* ! (Goetz and Schöll, *faciant*.)

Cist. 51. Di *faxint* ! the prayer of a courtesan in reply to her mother's wish.

ib. 523. Di me omnes magni minutique et etiam patellarii

Faxint ne ego (oppingam) uiuos sauium Se(le)nio,

Nisi ego teque tuamque filiam meque hodie obtruncauero !

This passage is hopelessly corrupt, but it is clear that the speaker has been disappointed in love and is raging at the person addressed as the one responsible for all his trouble.

ib. 742. At uos Salus *servassit* !¹

Halisca has been in a state of great agitation in consequence of having lost a casket entrusted to her care. She is anticipating a flogging for her negligence. The words quoted are called forth by the assertion of Phanostrata that the casket is found.

¹See note on page 17.

Stich. 385. Maleuoli perquisitores auctionum *perierint* !

Trin. 384. Di te *seruassint*¹ mihi !

This is a prayer of Lysiteles prompted by the withdrawal of his father's objections to his marrying the girl he loves.

Asin. 654. Di te *seruassint*¹ semper !

Argyrippus is violently in love with Philenium, but he has no money with which to buy her and is cast down with fear of losing her. While in these straits the money is unexpectedly promised him, whereupon he utters the prayer above quoted.

Bacch. 626. Di meliora *faxint* ! (Goetz and Schöll, *faciant*.)

Pseud. 14, CA. Misere miser sum, Pseudole. PS. Id te Iuppiter *Prohibessit* !

Pseudolus has just shown that he is greatly worried at having noticed Calidorus overwhelmed with sorrow and bathed in tears. He begs him to tell him of his troubles, whereupon the conversation above quoted takes place.

ib. 37. CA. At te di deaeque . . . PS. *seruassint*¹ quidem !

Pseudolus thus turns into a blessing what Calidorus intended as a curse.

ib. 315. Di meliora *faxint* !

Most. 398 (390, 385). Ita ille *faxit* Iuppiter !

Alarm and fear have thus far characterized this scene. The present speaker, Tranio, has said that not even Salvation herself could save them (351, ff.), that for himself a flogging and chains and other tortures are in store. He is now about to try a desperate game as a means of escaping temporarily from his present danger. The prayer quoted is in answer to a promise of help in carrying out the scheme.

ib. 464 (449). Di te deaeque omnis *faxint* cum istoc omine . . . !

This scene is characterized at every point by anger, fear or alarm.

Merc. 285 (282). Dei melius *faxint* !

Poen. 909. Ita dei *faxint*, ne apud lenonem hunc seruiam !

¹See note on p. 17.

Anger and fear are the prevailing characteristics of nearly all that Syncerastus says in this scene.

ib. 911. Ita dei *faxint*. See remarks under *faxint*, 909.

ib. 1400 (1397). Di meliora *faxint*!

Aul. 50. Vtinam me diui *adaxint* ad suspendium

Potius quidem quam hoc pacto apud te seruiam!

This is the reply of an old servant to her master who has just ordered her out of his house and, with an oath, threatened to beat her with a cudgel.

ib. 149 (143). Ita di *faxint* . . . !

The old man, Megadorus, thus interrupts his sister upon hearing her ominous words, liberis procreandis. Compare his next words: Ei, occidi! . . . mihi misero cerebrum excutiant tua dicta, soror: lapides loqueris.

ib. 257 (249). Ita di *faxint*!

The speaker, Euclio, suspects that Megadorus is intriguing for his money, and he is spiteful and energetic in expression throughout the scene; *cf.* 189, Quoi ego iam linguam praecidam atque oculos effodiam domi; 198, Ego istos noui polypos qui ubi quicquid tetigerunt tenent; 200, Ei misero mihi. Aurum mi intus harpagatumst; 208, Nimis male timui exanimatus fui; 234, Asini me mordicibus scindant, boues incursent cornibus; 241, Sed pro Iuppiter, num ego disperii? 250, Si hercle ego te non elinguandam dederò usque ab radicibus, impero ut tu me quoi uis castrandum loces.

ib. 788. LYC. Bono animo's [et] benedice: nunc quae res tibi et gnatae tuae

Bene feliciterque uortat: ita di *faxint*, inquit.

EUC. Ita di faciant. LYC. Et mihi ita di faciant, audi nunciam.

Just as all the arrangements have been completed for the marriage of Euclio's daughter to Megadorus, Lyconides, the nephew of Megadorus, makes the startling announcement to Euclio that his uncle has broken off the engagement. Lyconides is himself in love with the girl and now wants to make her his wife. Before Euclio recovers from the amazement caused by the news of Mega-

dorus' action, Lyconides pronounces the common formula with which the statement of a proposed plan often begins, and then, before he has even hinted at the character of what he is going to say, he bids Euclio say "*ita di faxint*" to it. Euclio, still dazed and not yet even knowing what he is praying for, repeats the prayer in the form *ita di faciant*. Lyconides then discloses his meaning by telling him that he wants to marry the girl himself. The change of tense here seems to be an index to the moods of the two characters; Lyconides, flushed with passion at the prospects opening before him, throws his whole heart into the prayer; Euclio, dazed with disappointment, repeats in a parrot-like way the former's prayer without realizing what it is for, and so leaves out the heartiness of it. The tense of *uortat* is merely the stereotyped one of the formula (see below, under "*Present Tense*").

Pers. 652. *Ita di faxint!*

This is a procurer's prayer for riches.

Cas. 324. *Di te seruassint*¹ mihi!

With this compare the other passionate expressions in this scene, *e. g.*, 309 ff. *Vna edepol opera in furnum calidum condito atque ibi torreto me pro pane rubido*, etc.; 320, *Dies atque noctes cum cane aetatem exigit*; 323, *Negauit . . . ipsi me concessurum Ioui, si is mecum oraret*; 325, *Nunc in fermento totast: ita turget mihi*; 326, *Ego edepol illam mediam disruptam uelim*, etc., etc.

ib. 399. *Vtinam tua quidem sicut Herculei praedicant*

Quondam prognatis ista in sortiundo sors deliquerit!

The speaker is angry and nearly all of his utterances at this point are curses.

Vid. 86. *Di tibi illum faxint filium saluom tuom!*

Terentius: Heaut. 161. *Vtinam ita di faxint!*

Menedemus is heartbroken at having driven his son from home. He has been telling the story with tears (*cf.* 84) to his neighbor. The latter tries to comfort him by saying that he feels sure the son will soon return safe, whereupon Menedemus utters the prayer above quoted.

¹ See note on p. 17.

Hec. 102. Ita di deaeque *faxint* !

ib. 134. At te di deaeque *faxint* (Dziatzko, *perdant*) cum isto odio !

ib. 354. Vtinam istuc ita di *faxint* ! Quid tu igitur lacrimas ?
Lucilius : 466 (Baehrens). Di *monerint* meliora, amentiam *auerruncassint* tuam !

Ennius : Ribbeck, *Trag. Rom. Fragmenta*, Telephus IV.
qui illum di deaeque magno *mactassint* malo !

Pacuvius : Ribbeck, *Trag. Rom. Fragmenta*, Chryses XXI.
di *monerint* meliora atque amentiam *auerruncassint* tuam !

Pomponius : Ribbeck, *Comicorum Lat. Reliquiae*, Praeco Posterior V (6). At te di omnes cum consilio, calue, *mactassint* malo !

Afranius : Ribbeck, *ib.* Privignus XVI (13). Ah, fulica, bene peristi, di te *mactassint* malo !

Catullus : 61, 203. . . Bona te Venus
Iuerit, quoniam palam
Quod cupis cupis.

This is from the enthusiastic epithalamium in honor of Manlius Torquatus. The *iuerit* is perhaps, however, a future perfect indicative ; cf. neque te Venus negligit (vs. 199).

66, 18. Non, ita me diui, uera gemunt, *iuerint*.

Cicero : Phil. XII, 6, 14. Excessurum se ex Italia dixit, deos penatis et sedes patrias relicturum, si—quod di omen *auerterint* !—rem publicam oppressisset Antonius.

The prayer here is prompted by Cicero's love for his country on the one hand and his hatred of Antony on the other ; either one of these was always enough to stir his deepest emotions.

Verr. II, 3, 35, 81. Vnus adhuc fuit post Romam conditam—di immortales *faxint* ne sit alter !—cui res publica se totam traderet, temporibus malis coacta domesticis, L. Sulla.

Ad fam. 14, 3, 3. Pisonem nostrum mirifico esse studio in nos et officio et ego perspicio et omnes praedicant : di *faxint*, ut tali genero mihi praesenti tecum simul et cum liberis nostris frui liceat ! Nunc spes reliqua est in nouis tribunis pl. et in primis quidem diebus ; nam, si inueterarit, actum est.

Ad Att. 15, 29, 1. Quod prommittis, di *faxint*! quid enim mihi meis iucundius?

ib. 16, 1. Huic ego litteras ipsius arbitrato dabo: eae te ne mouerint; has scripsi in eam partem, ne me motum putares. Di *faxint*, ut faciat ea, quae promittit!

Ad Brut. 1, 16, 5. Sed mihi prius omnia di deaeque *eripuerint* quam illud iudicium quo non modo heredi eius, quem occidi, non *concesserim*. . . . Sed ne patri quidem meo, si reuiuiscat, etc.!

Ovid: Ars. Am. I, 578. Et quemcumque cibum digitis libauerit illa,

Tu pete. Dumque petes, *sit* tibi *tacta* manus.

The perfect *sit tacta* here emphasizes the quickness and the slowness of the stolen touch.

Fasti, V, 686. Siue deum prudens alium diuinae fefelli,
Abstulerint celeres improba uerba noti.

That emphasis is here laid upon swiftness of action is clear from the use of *celeris*.

With a negative.

FIRST PERSON:

No example.

SECOND PERSON:

(a) **Absolutely opposed:**

Plautus: Am. 924, iratus ne sies (?); Asin. 839, ne fueris; Pseud. 79, ne parsis; Epid. 593, ne fueris; Poen. 552, ne curassis; 990, ne parseris.

Terence: Phorm. 514, ne opertus sies.

Cicero: de rep. 1, 19, 32, ne metueritis; Ad Att. 1, 9, ne dubitaris; 7, 3, 2, ne dubitaris; 16, 2, 5, ne necesse habueris reddere; ad Quint., 1, 4, 5, ne cessaris.

For ne sis admiratus, in ad fam., 7, 18, 3, see *American Journal of Philology*, XV, p. 151.

Horace: Epist. 1, 6, 40, ne fueris.

Instances of the perfect with *caue* may be included under negative expressions:

Plautus: Bacch. 910, caue parsis; Aul. 610 (618), caue fueris.

(b) Unfavorable :

Asin. 467, caue supplicassis.

Cicero : ad Att. 4, 15, 6, ne curaris (?) ; ad Quint. 2, 10, 5, ne sis aspernatus.

(c) Indifferent :

Cato : De agri cultura, 4, ne siueris ; 37, 1, ne indideris ; 45, 2, ne feceris ; 93, ne addideris ; 94, ne addideris ; 113, 2, ne siueris ; 158, 2, ne addideris ; 161, 2, ne sarueris.

XII Tabulae (Serv. in Verg. Ecl. 8, 99), neue pellegeris.

Plautus : Mil. Gl. 283, ne dixis ; 862, ne dixeritis ; 1333, ne interueneris ; Rud. 1155, ne ostenderis ; Trin. 521, ne siris ; 704, ne induxeris ; 1012, ne destiteris ; Asin. 839, ne dixis ; Curc. 599, ne amiseris ; Most. 1097, ne occupassis ; Men. 415, ne feceris ; Epid. 148, ne feceris ; Aul. 100, ne intromiseris ; 585 (577), ne mutassis ; 744 (737), ne dixis ; Pers. 793, ne adtigeris ; Cas. 404, ne obiexis (caue obiexis, Goetz and Schöll) ; Cist. 1, 1, 111 (110), ne dixeris ; Merc. 396, neu dixeris.

Terence : Phorm. 742, ne appellassis.

Plautus : Am. 608, caue responderis ; Mil. Gl. 1125, caue faxis ; 1245, caue faxis ; 1368, caue feceris ; 1372, caue faxis ; Trin. 513, caue feceris ; 555, caue dixeris ; Asin. 256, caue faxis ; 625, caue faxis ; Bacch. 402, caue siris ; 1188, caue amissis ; Stich. 285, caue feceris ; Most. 388 (401), caue siueris ; 508 (523), caue respexis ; 795 (808), caue faxis ; Epid. 400, caue siris ; 434 (439), caue rettuleris ; Merc. 112 (113), caue praeuorteris ; 476 (484), caue deixis ; Poen. 1020 (1023), caue feceris ; Aul. 90, caue intromiseris ; 600 (608), caue indicassis ; Pers. 388 (389), caue dixeris ; Cas. II, 5, 24 (332), caue feceris ; II, 6, 52 (404), caue obiexis (Goetz and Schöll).

Terence : And. 760, caue excessis ; Heaut. 187, caue faxis ; Adelph. 458, caue dixeris.

Cicero : de div. 2, 61, 127, ne feceris ; de leg. 2, 15, 36, ne ademeris ; Ac. 2, 40, 125, ne asciveris neue fueris adsensus ; Tusc. disp. 1, 47, 112, ne reliqueris ; pro Mur. 31, 65, commotus ne sis ; Par. Sto. 5, 3, 41, ne dixeris ; ad Att. 2, 5, 1, ne repudiariis ; 5, 11, 7, ne acceperis ; 9, 9, 1, ne destiteris ; 10, 13,

13, 1, ne demiseris; ad Brut. 1, 16, 6, ne commendaueris; ad fam. 7, 17, 2, ne dimiseris; 7, 25, 2, ne dixeris.

Vergil: Ecl. 8, 102, Transque caput iace, nec (*ne* according to some authorities) respexeris.

The effect of the incantation would be entirely lost if the person looked back while throwing the ashes, hence the earnestness of the prohibition.

Horace: Sat. 2, 2, 16, ne biberis; 2, 3, 220, ne dixeris; Od. 1, 11, 1, ne quaesieris (this should, perhaps, be classed under b), nec temptaris; 1, 18, 1, Nullam seueris; Sat. 2, 3, 38, caue faxis.

THIRD PERSON:

(a) **Absolutely opposed:** Cicero: de leg. II, 8, 19, Separatim *nemo habessit* deos neue nouos neue aduenas nisi publice adscitos.

Livy: 9, 11, 13, I, lictor deme uincla Romanis; *moratus sit nemo*, quo minus . . abeant.

Vergil: Aen. 3, 453. Hic tibi *nequa* morae *fuertint* dispendia tanti,
Quamuis increpitent socii et ui cursus in altum
Vela uocet possisque sinus implere secundos,
Quin adeas uatem precibusque oracula poscas.

Horace: Sat. I, 2, 57. "*Nil fuerit* mi" inquit "cum uxoribus unquam alienis."

(b) **Unfavorable:**

No example.

(c) **Indifferent:**

Cato: de agri cult V. Satui semen, cibaria, far, uinum, oleum mutuum *dedit* nemini.

Cato is here enumerating the duties of a model *uilius*. The use of the perfect tense with a negative shows that he considers this particular duty an all-important one. Notice the position of *nemini*, which is also an indication of the intended absoluteness of the prohibition.

Plautus: Rud. 790. Verum, senex, si te umquam in urbe offendero,

Numquam hercle quisquam me lenonem *dixerit*,

Si te non ludos pessumos dimisero.

Here the speaker is a procurer who is having an angry quarrel

with Daemones. The latter is protecting two girls, whom the procurer has purchased, and is, by threats of cudgeling him (*cf.* 799 ff.), preventing him from getting control of his property.

Bacch. 468, LV. *Periit tibi sodalis.* MN. *Ne di sirint.*

Curc. 27. Num tu pudicae quoipiam insidias locas aut quam pudicam oportet esse? PH. Nemini, *Nec* me ille *sirit* Iuppiter. (The MSS. read here *nec sinit*).

Merc. 319 (323). Egon[e] te? A[t]h[e], *ne di siuerint!*

605 (613), Cha. Quia aequalem et sodalem liberum ciuem enicas.

EV. *Ne di sirint!*

Capt., 791. Minor interminorque *nequis* mi *opstiterit* obuiam, nisi qui satis diu uixisse sese homo arbitrabitur.

The *ne*-clause here, however, is probably dependent.

Livy: 9, 11, 4. *Nemo* quemquam *deceperit*.

This is from a very impassioned speech of Pontius at the time of a grave military crisis.

Cicero: ad Att., 16, 1. . . Eae te *ne mouerint*; has scripsi in eam partem, ne me motum putares. Di faxint, ut faciat ea, quae promittit.

The following, though in the nature of an earnest request or entreaty rather than of a prayer to the gods may, if the subjunctive be regarded as independent, be classed under this same head:

Plautus: Capt. 320. Sed te optestor, Hegio,

Ne tuom animum auariorem *faxint* diuitiae meae.

Here Tyndarus is speaking as a citizen who has been taken captive, and he is pleading for his return to liberty. Perhaps, however, this *ne*-clause is dependent.

The instances of the perfect above cited have, with one or two possible exceptions, been in independent clauses. Similar uses of the perfect (aorist) are more common in dependent clauses than is generally supposed. For purposes of comparison, I have thought it well to give here the instances of such dependent clauses. They are as follows:

Without a Negative.

FIRST PERSON :

No example.

SECOND PERSON :

(a) **Absolutely opposed :**

No example.

(b) **Unfavorable :**

No example.

(c) **Indifferent :**

Cato: de agr. cult. CXLII. Mars pater, te precor quaesoque
 *uti* tu morbos, etc., *prohibessis*,¹ defendas, auerruncesque;
 pastores pecuaque salua *seruassis*² duisque bonam salutem,
 etc.

Plautus: Poen. 950-952. Deos deasque ueneror, qui hanc urbem
 colunt,

Ut, quod de mea re huc ueni, rite uenerim,

Measque hic *ut* gnatas et mei fratris filium,

Reperire me *siritis*.

Here *ut* . . . uenerim clearly means "may *prove to have come*", the act of coming having already taken place at the time of speaking; *ut* . . . *siritis*, on the other hand, has in view the accomplishment of a future act.

Aul. 610. Edepol ne illic pulcrum praedam agat, siquis illam
 inuenerit

Aulam onustam auri: uerum id te quaeso *ut prohibessis*,¹
 Fides.

The speaker is a miserly old man, who is in fear of losing a pot of gold he has concealed.

¹ If *prohibeo* here had its original meaning ("keep in front," "keep off"), it would belong under (a), but this word came to be used also in the sense of "avert", "prohibit", etc. (a fact which dictionaries fully recognize), in which sense it belongs under (c). That it has this latter meaning in the present passage is shown by the fact that, while *prohibessis*, *defendas* and *auerrunces* are here evidently three synonymous words used for fullness of expression, the latter two verbs can here have no other meaning than "avert" (*de* + *fendo* meaning literally "strike away from").

² See note on page 17.

I. Tenses in Volitive and Optative Expressions. 29

Horace : Sat. II, 6, 5. . . . Nil amplius oro,
Maia nate, nisi *ut* propria haec mihi munera *faxis*.

THIRD PERSON :

(a) **Absolutely opposed :**

No example.

(b) **Unfavorable :**

No example.

(c) **Indifferent :**

C. I. L. I, 542. De decuma uictor tibi Lucius Mummius donum moribus antiquis pro usura hoc dare sese uisum animo suo perfecit tua pace rogans te cogendi dissoluendi tu *ut* facilia *faxeis* perficias decumam, etc.

Plautus : Capt. 736. Inde extra portam ad meum libertum Cordalum

In lapidinas facite *deductus siet*.

Here Hegio has just discovered that his hope of regaining his lost son has been blasted by the trickery of Tyndarus and with these angry words he bids the slaves take him to his punishment.

ib. 801. Qui mi in cursu opstiterit, faxo uitae is extemplo *opstiterit* suae.

This *opstiterit*, however, may be a future perfect indicative, *faxo* being parenthetical.

Men. 867. ME. Cursu celeri facite *inflexa sit* pedum pernicitas.

SE. Mihin equis iunctis minare ?

The speaker, Menaechmus, is pretending to be a madman. He has just threatened to take an axe and chop to pieces the old man he is trying to frighten. With the words before us he now addresses the wild horses which he pretends Apollo has ordered him to take for the purpose of crushing "this aged, stinking, toothless lion."

Cas. 396 (375). Deos quaeso *ut* tua sors ex sitella *effugerit*.

The speaker is angry and nearly every utterance of his in the context is a curse.

Afranius : Ribbeck, *Com. Lat. Rel.* Emancipatus, XI (2). Deos ego omnis *ut* fortunassint precor.

With a Negative.

FIRST PERSON :

(a) Absolutely opposed :

No example.

(b) Unfavorable :

No example.

(c) Indifferent :

Plautus : Poen. 446. Illic hinc iratus abiit. nunc mihi cautiost,
Ne meamet culpa meo amori obiexim moram.

Terence : Ad. 283. . . . Opsecro te hercle, hominem istum
 inpurissimum

Quam primum apsolutote, *ne*, si magis inritatus siet,
 Aliqua ad patrem hoc permanet atque ego tum perpetuo
perierim.

Cicero : De Inv. II, 3, 10. Qua re nos quidem sine ulla adfirmatione simul quaerentes dubitanter unum quidque dicemus, ne, dum paruolum hoc consequamur, ut satis haec commode perscripsisse uideamur, illud amittamus, quod maximum est, ut *ne* cui rei *temere* atque adroganter *adsenserimus*.

The perfect here denotes rashness, undue haste. That this idea is in mind is shown by *temere*.

SECOND PERSON :

(a) Absolutely opposed :

No example.

(b) Unfavorable :

No example.

(c) Indifferent :

C. I. L. 1027. Rogo te uiator monumento huic *nil* male *feceris*.

THIRD PERSON :

(a) Absolutely opposed :

No example.

(b) Unfavorable :

No example.

(c) Indifferent :

Plautus : Curc. 559. . . . uenit in mentem mihi,
Ne trapessita exulatum *abierit*, argentum ut petam,
 Vt ego potius comedim quam ille.

The speaker is an avaricious procurer, who fears that the banker will *be off* with the money, unless he acts promptly. The vigorous tense is quite in accordance with the procurer's character.

ib. 764. Pertimui ; postquam una cura cor meum mouit modo,
Timeo *ne* malefacta antiqua mea *sint inuenta* omnia.

Bacch. 598. . . . mihi cautiost

Ne nucifrangibula *excussit* ex malis meis,

"it is a warning to me lest he knock my nut-crackers out of my jaws."

Cas. 628. . . . abscede ab ista, obsecro,

Ne quid in te mali *faxit* ira percita !

Mil. 333. Hic opsistam, *ne* imprudenti huc ea se *subrepsit* mihi.

Palaestrio has been trying to make Sceledrus believe that the latter deserves to have his eyes gouged out (315) or his tongue cut off (318) for having said what was not true. Sceledrus is aroused at the predicament in which he finds himself and takes measures to prove the truth of his words. For this purpose the all-important thing is the prevention of the act referred to in *subrepsit*, an act which, if performed at all at such a crisis, would be performed as slyly and as quickly as possible.

Cicero : Ad. Att. 2, 21, 1. Sed ita lenibus uti uidebantur uenenis, ut posse uideremur sine dolore interire : nunc uero sibilis uolgi, sermonibus honestorum, fremitu Italiae uereor *ne exarserint*.

Terence : Phorm. 554. . . . Quaere, obsecro,

Ne quid plus minusue *faxit*, quod nos post pigeat, Geta.

Accius : Ribbeck, *Trag. Rom. Fragm.*, Philocteta, XIV.

. . . quod te obsecro, aspernabilem

Ne haec taetritudo mea me inculta *faxsit*.

C. I. L. I, 200, LXXXIV :

facitoque quei ex h(ace) l(ege) praedia dederit utei ei
satis supsignetur *neiue quis quid faxsit*, quo minus ex
h(ace) l(ege) praedium quei quomque uelit supsignet
pequiamue soluat praesque quei quomque ex h(ace)
l(ege) fieri uolet, fiat.

Of this supposed *faxsit* only the *sit* is actually found.

Ovid : Ex Ponto II, 3, 52. Si bene te noui, si quod prius esse
solebas,

Nunc quoque es, atque animi non cecidere tui,
 Quo fortuna magis saeuit, magis ipse resistis,
 Utque decet, *ne* te *uicerit* illa, caues.

True future perfect subjunctives do not, of course, belong here and must not be confused with such uses as those above cited.¹

Present Tense.

Before beginning our study of the present tense, it may be desirable to throw out a word of caution. One might, at first sight, think that the large number of instances of this tense found in

¹ Such are the following instances in which the perfect subjunctive refers to what, prior to some time in the future, *shall have been done, or shall prove to have been done* :

Plautus : Mil. 187. Vt eum qui se hic uidit uerbis uincat *ne* is se *uiderit*, *i. e.*, make him believe, *in the future, that he has not seen* ;

ib. 199. . . . id uisum ut *ne uisum siet*.

ib. 227. Quae hic sunt uisa ut *uisa ne sint*, facta ut facta *ne sient*.

ib. 588. *Ne* id quod uidit *uiderit*.

As. 698. *Ne* istuc nequiquam *dixeris* tam indignum dictum in me,

Vehes pol me hodie, si quidem hoc argentum ferre speres,
 'lest you may prove to have said, etc.'

Bacch. 701. Emungam hercle hominem probe hodie, *ne* id nequiquam *dixerit*.

Aul. 273 (265). Tace atque abi : *curata fac sint* quom a foro redeam domum.

Most. 252. Ob istuc uerbum, *ne* nequiquam, Scapha, tam lepide *dixeris*,

Dabo aliquid hodie peculi tibi, Philematium mea.

Here *ne* . . . *dixeris* means "that you may not in the future *prove to have spoken* in vain."

Cas. 569. Contriui diem,

Dum asto aduocatus quoidam cogato meo,

Quem hercle ego litem adeo perdidisse gaudeo,

Ne me nequiquam sibi hodie *aduocauerit*.

Terence : Eun. 942. Ego pol te pro istis factis et dictis, scelus,

Vlciscar, *ut ne* inpune in nos *inluseris*.

Cicero : de or. II, 89, 364. Quam ob rem *ne* frustra hi tales uiri *uenerint*, te aliquando, Crasse, audiamus, where *ne* . . . *uenerint* means "that it may not turn out that they *have come* in vain."

Ad. fam. 12, 14, 5. . . . nam mihi fuit ista prouincia plena laboris, periculi, detrimenti, quae ego *ne* frustra *subierim* neue prius, quam reliquias meae diligentiae consequar, decedere cogar, ualde laboro, where *ne* . . . *subierim* means "that I may not *prove to have undergone*."

Acad. Prior. II, 38, 121. quis . . . potest . . . si quid aduersi acciderit . . . extimescere *ne* id iure *euenerit*.

curses tended to disprove my theory regarding the distinction between the perfect and the present tenses. At first thought, one might suppose that such an expression as *di te perdant!* betrayed strong emotion and should, if my theory be correct, commonly have the perfect tense. Such a supposition would be very far from the truth. A short time ago I witnessed, upon the street, the meeting of two well-dressed young men who were evidently intimate friends. One grabbed the other's hand with the words, "Damn you, old boy, where have you been keeping yourself all these weeks?" There was every indication that the speaker was perfectly calm and in excellent spirits and that the person addressed considered himself greeted in the most cordial and friendly manner. Again, not so very long ago, a comedy was having a run in several American cities, in which one of the characters was an Englishman who prefaced nearly every remark he made with the words "Damn me!" This Englishman was represented as a man who was enjoying life to the utmost and who, despite his constant prayer, was in reality not in the least desirous of being damned. The two young men, referred to above, attracted no particular attention on the street. Even the people who heard the words I have quoted hardly gave the speaker so much as a glance. But the words with which he began, "Damn you!" might have been uttered in such a way that a crowd would have gathered around him at once in expectation of a fight. There is evidently a very great and all-important difference between these two uses of the same phrase. In what does it consist? Merely in *the tone in which it is uttered*. A man addicted to swearing will say "damn it!" or "damn you!" lightly, without really meaning it, a hundred times where he will use such expressions once in anger and in real earnest. Now the Roman expression for a mild or make-believe curse is usually *di perdant* and this *di perdant* is used just as freely and lightly and with just as little meaning as are the expressions "damn it" and "damn you" among profane people today. This particular verb, *perdo*, seems to have been associated, from the beginning, only with curses of this milder character, as *di perdiderint* is not found. Angry curses are almost

invariably expressed by other verbs than *perdo* (e. g., by *perieris*, *perierint*, *di te mactassint*), or by other means than by the use of the subjunctive mood. Passages are very rare, comparatively speaking, in which *di perdant* is passionately or angrily uttered, a fact of which anyone may convince himself by examining the passages collected below and classified for his convenience. The Latin has a distinct advantage over the English in its power of indicating the tone of such expressions. On a printed page of English their tone could be determined only by a study of the context, or of the relations existing between the speaker and the party addressed, or from some other source quite distinct from the phrase itself. The Romans, on the other hand, with their more complete apparatus, were able to make the tone of a prayer or a curse as clear on the written page as it could be made by actual utterance, by employing the perfect for prayers prompted by strong emotion, the present for merely formal or indifferent prayers. Still, it will be no cause for surprise, if we find that, even in expressions prompted by real emotion, the present tense is occasionally used. It is perfectly clear that, even when a man is aroused, it is not to be expected that every expression he uses will necessarily be the strongest that could possibly be found. What we may properly expect to find, then, if my characterization of the tenses be correct, is that, while the perfect, as we have seen above, is confined exclusively to emotional expressions, or (in some cases) to expressions denoting mere rapidity of action or unusual emphasis, the present on the other hand, though perhaps not entirely excluded from emotional expressions, is chiefly confined to expressions of ordinary types, where no emotion of any sort is involved.

A glance at the instances of the present will be sufficient to show remarkable differences between them and the instances of the perfect, cited above. Most of the classes into which I have divided the former have no parallels at all in the lists of perfects. Among the various subdivisions of the present tense, the classes (a) and (b) are, in every case, filled with a large number of examples, whereas in the whole list of perfects there is but a single instance under either (a) or (b), except such as are accompanied by a

negative, which really throws them into another class. For the one exception mentioned, an explanation is offered below (see discussion at the end of Part I), which, if accepted, removes it also into class (c) and leaves classes (a) and (b) entirely unrepresented.

From the classification made below, I have excluded deliberative questions. With these exceptions, the independent uses of the present tense of the volitive and optative in Plautus, Terence and Cicero fall into the following classes :

I. Expressions of permission, concession,¹ or the like.

Here the subjunctive commonly expresses merely an indifferent *yielding* of the will, frequently giving the answer to a request that has been made. It is frequently impossible to draw a sharp distinction between a mild command and an expression of permission, *i. e.*, between an expression indicating an exertion of the will and one indicating a yielding of the will. See, for instance, such a case as *adeas* in Plaut. Rud. 834 L.A. *Quaeso hercle adire ut liceat. L.O. Adeas, si uelis.* I may, therefore, in some cases have been somewhat arbitrary in classifying instances under this head instead of under § 5 (below), or *vice versa*. I have also classified here a few instances that some grammarians might possibly classify under the potential subjunctive. Under the latter classification they would be translated by "may (possibly)" or "can (certainly)", but I hope to show below (Part III) that such a use of the subjunctive is probably unknown to the Latin language.

[*This use is not found in the perfect tense.*]

Without a Negative.

FIRST PERSON :

No example.

SECOND PERSON : (See note on p. 75.)

¹ Some of these probably ought not to be classed as future uses of the subjunctive, *sit*, for instance, apparently meaning "grant that it now is". On the other hand, *esto* is frequently used in the same way (*e. g.*, Hor. Sat. I, 6, 19), showing that, to the Roman mind, the conception in such cases was (at least sometimes) distinctly future.

(a) Absolutely opposed :

Plautus : Rud. 1358 habeas ; Asin. 520 habeas ; Cist. 493 habeas ; Cist. 493 (G. and S.) habeas ; Most. 46 habeas ; Truc. 844 habeas.

Terence : And. 649 habeas ; Eun. 373 adsis ; dormias.

Cicero : pro Murena 17, 36 intellegas *i. e.*, "one is permitted to" *etc.*

(b) Unfavorable :

Plautus : Curc. 292 uideas.

Terence : Eun. 372 fruare ; 373 ludas ; Phorm. 341 rideas.

(c) Indifferent :

Plautus : Am. 558 facias ; Rud. 834 abeas ; As. 179 condias ; 180 uorses ; 766 conburas ; Stich. 423 sumas ; Epid. 679 quaeras (?) ; Cas. 611 ducas ; Truc. 129 eas.

Terence : Eun. 373 capias ; tangas ; Phorm. 342 bibas (?) ; decumbas ; Adelph. 830 redducas.

THIRD PERSON :

(a) Absolutely opposed :

Plautus : Am. 645. *Absit*, dum modo laude parta domum se recipiat.

Alcumena is grieving over the absence of her husband ; she really desires the opposite of *absit*, but she says in the same verse that she will patiently endure this absence. Notice, too, that *absit* means 'let him continue to be absent,' an idea entirely foreign to the perfect.

Rud. 727. DAE. Si autem Veneri conplacuerunt,
habeat, si argentum dabit.

ib. 1121. . . . ob eam siquid postulat

Sibi mercedis, dabitur : aliud quidquid ibist *habeat* sibi.

Bacch. 502. Illum exoptauit potius? *habeat* : optumest.

Curc. 175 (178). Sibi sua *habeant* regna reges, sibi diuitias diuites.

ib. 180. Dum mi abstineant inuidere, sibi quisque *habeant* quod suomst.

Stich. 493. Ergo oratores populi summales uiri

Summi *adcubent* (Götz & Schöll, *accubabunt*), ego infimatis infimus.

Pers. 164. Sibi *habeat* si non extemplo ab eo abduxero,

Terence : And. 889. Immo *habeat, ualeat, uiuat* cum illa.

Cicero : ad. fam. VII, 32, 2. *Sit* uel Silius tam eloquens, ut possit probare se liberum : non laboro.

ib. IX, 16, 9. Sed quid haec loquimur? *liceat* modo isto uenire.

ad. Att. VIII, 3, 6. *Sit* enim nobis amicus, quod incertum est, sed *sit* : deferet triumphum.

ib. IX, 13, 4. Sed *sit* hoc λάπισμα : magnas habet certe copias, et habebit non, ut ille, uestigial, sed ciuium bona.

de orat. 55, 235. *Sit* sane tanta, quantam tu illam uis.

Brut. 96, 329. *Sit* sane, ut uis.

de leg. agr. II, 13, 34. *sit* ;

de prou. consul. 9, 24. *existument* ;

pro Mur. 19, 41. *sint* ; *sit* ; *sit* ; *sit* ;

in Verr. II, 3, 77, 180. *sint* ;

de senectute 23, 84. *habeat* ;

Tusc. disp. III, 18, 40. *sit* ; IV, 31, 66 *sint* ; V, 27, 76 *sint* ; *sint* ;

de nat. deor. I, 24, 68. *sint* ; 37, 103 *sit* ;

de fin. II, 21, 68. *sint* ; 23, 76 *sit* ; 25, 80 *sit* ; 28, 92 *sit* ; V, 28, 84 *sit*.

(b) Unfavorable :

Plautus : Most. 772. TR. At tamen inspicere uolt. SI. *Inspiciat*, si lubet.

The verb *inspicere* implies *deliberate* inspection.

Cicero : ad. fam. VII, 32, 2. Nam, de iudiciis quod quereris, multo laboro minus ; *trahantur* per me pedibus omnes rei.

de prov. consul. 7, 16 *fruatur*.

(c) Indifferent.

Plautus : Am. 389 SO. Obsecro ut per pacem liceat te alloqui, ut ne uapulem.

ME. Immo indutiae parumper *fiant*, siquid uis loqui.

ib. 770. AL. Vin proferri pateram ? AM. Proferri uolo.

AL. *Fiat*. i tu, Thessala, intus pateram proferto foras.

Capt. 213. CA. Vt sine hisce arbitris atque uobis locum detis nobis loqui. LO. *Fiat*.

ib. 694. Dum pereas, nihil interduo, *aiant* uiuere.

ib. 966. HE. . . . fieri dicta compendi uolo. ST. Vt uis *fiat*.

Mil. 163. Quod ille gallinam aut columbam se sectari aut simiam

Dicat : disperistis, ni usque ad mortem male mulcassitis.

This *dicat* means "suppose he should say, etc.," for which an energetic expression would be out of place.

ib. 1037. . . . PA. Voco [ego] ergo hanc quae te quaerit?

PY. *Adeat*, siquid uolt.

Rud. 1037. GR. Paulisper remitte restem, dum concedo et consulo.

TR. *Fiat*. GR. Euge, salua res est.

ib. 1042. Quamquam istuc esse ius meum certo scio,

Fiat istuc potius quam nunc pugnem tecum.

ib. 1337. GR. . . . Deiera te argentum mihi daturum

Eodem [illo] die ubi uiduli sies potitus. LA. *Fiat*.

ib. 1417. DAE. Hic hodie cenato, leno. LA. *Fiat* : condicio placet.

ib. 1423. DAE. . . . Vos hodie hic cenatote ambo. GR. *Fiat*.

Trin. 245. "Da mihi hoc, mel meum, si me amas, si audes."

Ibi ille cuculus : "O ocelle mi, *fiat*."

As. 39. LI. Teque obsecro hercle ut quae locutu's despuas.

DE. *Fiat* : *geratur* mos tibi.

ib. 671. Quiduis egestas imperat : *fricentur* ; dant quod oro?

Bacch. 224. PI. . . . Nam iam huc adueniet miles . . .

CH. *Veniat* quando uolt atque ita ne mihi sit morae.

Curc. 673. CV. Quid cessas, miles, hanc huic uxorem dare?

TH. Si haec uolt. PL. Mi frater, cupio. TH. *Fiat*.

Pseud. 559. PS. Agite amolimini hinc uos intro nunciam

Ac meis uicissim date locum fallaciis.

CA. *Fiat* : *geratur* mos tibi.

Stich. 565. Senex quidem uoluit, si posset, indipisci de cibo :

Quia nequit, qua lege licuit uelle dixit fieri.

"*Fiat*" ille inquit adulescens.

Men. 158. ME. Concede huc a foribus. PE. *Fiat*.

ib. 544. ANC. Amabo, mi Menaechme, inauris da mihi,

Facienda[s] pondo duom nummum stalagmia :

Vt te lubenter uideam, quom ad nos ueneris.

ME. *Fiat*. Cedo aurum : ego manupretium dabo.

Merc. 991. Supplici sibi *sumat* quod uolt ipse ob hanc iniuriam.

Aul. 241. MEG. Noui : ne doceas. desponde. EVC. *Fiat*.

Poen. 611. ADV. Pone nos recede. CO. *Fiat*.

Most. 920. . . . TH. Seruauisti omnem ratem.

Nempe octoginta debentur huic minae ? TR. Hau nummo
amplius. (TH.) Hodie *accipiat*.

ib. 1038. . . . TH. I mecum, obsecro, una simul.

SI. *Fiat*.

Pers. 360. SA. Meo modo istuc potius fiet quam tuo.

VI† *Fiat*.

ib. 692. . . . SA. Hunc in collum, nisi piget,

Impone uero. DO. *Fiat*.

Truc. 736. *Discant*, dum mihi commentari liceat, ni oblitus
siem.

Terence : And. 895. CH. Tamen, Simo, audi. SI. Ego audiam ?

Quid audiam,

Chremes ? CH. At tandem dicat. SI. Age *dicat*, sino.

ib. 956. . . . PA. Iube solui, obsecro.

SI. Age *fiat*.

Heaut. 464. . . . *Faciat* quidlibet :

Sumat consumat perdat, decretumst pati,

Dum illum modo habeam mecum.

ib. 722. Age age *traducatur* Bacchis.

ib. 1067. . . . CL. Syro ignoscas uolo,

Quae mea causa fecit. CH. *Fiat*.

Eun. 100. TH. . . . sed huc qua gratia

Te accersi iussi, ausculta. PH. *Fiat*.

ib. 500. . . . THR. Abi prae, cura ut sint domi

Parata. GN. *Fiat*.

ib. 614. CH. . . . de istac simul, quo pacto porro possim

Potiri, consilium uolo capere una tecum. AN. *Fiat*.

Phorm. 811. Vin satis quaesitum mi istuc esse ? Age, *fiat*.

ib. 1029. *Redeat* sane in gratiam iam : supplici satis est mihi.

ib. 1054. . . . DE. Eamus intro hinc. NA. *Fiat*.

Hec. 358. PA. . . . I sodes intro, consequar iam te, mea mater. SO. *Fiat*.

ib. 634. Dum ne reducam, *turbent* porro quam uelint.

Adelph. 201. Verum enim quando bene promeruit, *fiat* : suum ius postulat.

ib. 945. Si uos tanto opere istuc uoltis, *fiat*.

Cicero : ad. Att. X, 6, 1. Astute nihil sum acturus : *fiat* in Hispania quidlibet.

de or. I, 13, 58. Iam uero de legibus iubendis, de bello, de pace . . . *dicant* uel Graeci, si uolunt, Lycurgum aut Solonem scisse melius, quam Hyperidem aut Demosthenem . . . , uel nostri decemuiros, qui XII tabulas perscripserunt, quos necesse est fuisse prudentes, *anteponant* in hoc genere et Ser. Galbae et socero tuo C. Laelio, quos constat dicendi gloria praestitisse.

Orat. 9, 29. *Dicat* igitur Attice uenustissimus ille scriptor ac politissimus Lysias—quis enim id possit negare?—dum intellegamus, etc.

de leg. agr. II, 23, 34. *dissoluant* ; *abducant* ; *indicent* ; *permittant* (*cf.* remarks on *sino*, p. 12), *mittant*.

in Cat. II, 7, 15. *dicatur*.

pro Quinct. 13, 44. *fiat*.

pro rege Deiotaro 9, 25. *pereant* (quoted from poetry).

Phil. II, 34, 84. *faciat*.

With a Negative.

FIRST AND SECOND PERSONS :

No example.

THIRD PERSON :

(a) Absolutely opposed :

Plautus : Epid. 584. *Ne fuat*, si non uolt.

Cicero : Orat. 9, 29. *Ne sit* Aeschines neue Demosthenes Atticus.

de senectute 11, 34. *Ne sint* (*non sunt*?) in senectute uires : ne postulantur quidem uires a senectute.

I. Tenses in Volitive and Optative Expressions. 41

Tusc. disp. 2, 5, 14. *Ne sit* sane summum malum dolor ;
malum certe est.

Acad. Prior. II, 26, 84. *Ne sit* sane : uideri certe potest.

(b) **Unfavorable :**

No example.

(c) **Indifferent :**

Plautus : Asin. 460. Non magni pendo : *ne duit*, si non uolt.

2. Expressions used merely to strengthen an assertion (which is sometimes introduced by ut), or to vouch for the fulfillment of a condition.

The prayer is here used for the same purpose as in the English expression "So *help me God*, I will tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth." When used with a condition, the prayer is for something which the one who offers it would least desire to have answered. The prayer in such cases is comparable with the English expression, frequently heard among children, "I hope to die," *e. g.*, "I *hope to die*, if what I say is not true."

Without a Negative.

FIRST PERSON :

No example.

SECOND PERSON :

(a) **Absolutely opposed :**

Plautus : Most. 182. Ita tu me *ames*, . . . ut uenusta's.

Terence : Heaut. 1030. Ita mihi atque huic *sis* superstes, ut ex me atque ex hoc natus es.

THIRD PERSON :

(a) **Absolutely opposed :**

(α) *Expressions strengthening assertions* (sometimes introduced by *ut*) :

Plautus : Am. 597. Neque, ita me di *ament*, credebam primo mihimet Sosiae,

Donec Sosia ille egomet fecit sibi uti crederem.

Mil. *ib.* 725. O lepidum caput. ita me di deaeque *ament*,
aequom fuit

Deos parauisse, uno exemplo ne omnes uitam uiuerent.

ib. 1403. Ita me di *ament*, ultro uentumst ad me.

Trin. 1024. ST. . . . Quorum [hercle] unus surrupuit currenti cursori solum.

CH. Ita me di *ament*, graphicum furem.

Bacch. 111. Namque ita me di *ament*, ut Lycurgus mihi quidem Videtur posse hic ad nequitiam adducier.

ib. 892. . . . Ita me Iuppiter Iuno Ceres
Summanus Sol Saturnus dique omnes *ament*,
Vt ille cum illa neque cubat neque ambulat
Neque ausculatur neque illud quod dici solet.

Curc. 208. Ita me Venus *amet*, ut ego te hoc triduum numquam sinam

In domo esse istac, quin ego te liberalem liberem.

Pseud. 943. PS. Ita me di *ament*—SI. Ita non facient: mera iam mendacia fundes.

Vt ego ob tuam, Simia, perfidiam te amo et metuo.

Stich. 505. Ita me di bene *ament* measque mihi seruassint filias,
Vt mihi uolup est, quia uos Pamphilippe, in patriam domum

Rediisse uideo bene gesta re ambos, etc.

Here we have a perfect side by side with a present, both used merely to strengthen an assertion. Notice, however, that the welfare of the daughters, in connection with whom he uses the perfect, is of the utmost importance to him; his regard for them is, in fact, the center of interest of the entire play. For the meaning of *seruassint* see p. 17, note.

ib. 685. Ita me di *ament*, lepide accipi[a]mur, quo[nia]m hoc recipi[a]mur in loco.

ib. 742. . . . nam ita me Venus amoena *amet*,
Vt ego huc iam dudum simitu exissem uobiscum foras,
Nisi me uobis exornarem.

ib. 754. Ita me di *ament*, numquam enim fiet hodie haec quin saltet tamen.

Aul. 445. Ita me bene *amet* Lauerna, (uti) te iam, nisi reddi Mihi uasa† iubes, pipulo te hic differam ante aedis.

Cas. 452. Ita me di bene *ament*, ut ego uix reprimō labra,
Ob istanc rem quin te deosculer, uoluptas mea.

Most. 170. Ita me di *ament*, lepidast Scapha.

ib. 182. Ita tu me ames, ita Philolaches tuos te *amet*, ut uenusta's.

Pers. 492. Ita me di *ament*, ut ob istanc rem tibi multa bona instant a me.

ib. 639. Ita me di bene *ament*, sapienter.

Poen. 289. Ita me dei *ament*, ut illa me amet malim quam di, Milphio.

ib. 504. Ita me di *ament*, tardo amico nil[i] est quicquam inaequius,

Praesertim homini amanti qui quicquid agit properat omnia.

ib. 827. Ita me di *ament*, uel in lautumiis uel in pistrino mauelim

Agere aetatem praepeditus latere forti ferr(e)o

Quam apud lenonem hunc seruitutem colere.

ib. 1326. . . . Ita me Iuppiter

Bene *amet*, bene factum.

ib. 1413. Ita me di *ament*, (ut) mihi uolup[tatis] est.

Terence : And. 947. Ita me di *ament*, credo.

Heaut. 309. Prae gaudio, ita me di *ament*, ubi sim nescio.

ib. 383. Minumeque, ita me di *ament*, miror si te sibi quisque expetit.

ib. 569. Vt equidem, ita me di *ament*, metui, quid futurum denique esset.

ib. 686. Atque ita me di *ament*, ut ego nunc non tam meapte causa

Laetor quam illius.

ib. 953. Non, ita me di *ament*, auderet facere haec uiduae mulieri,

Quae in me fecit.

Eun. 474. Ita me di *ament*, honestust.

ib. 615. Ita me di *ament*, quantum ego illum uidi, non nil timeo misera,

Ne quam ille hodie insanus turbam faciat aut uim Thaidi.

ib. 882. Te quoque iam, Thais, ita me di bene *ament*, amo.

ib. 1037. Bene, ita me di *ament*, factum.

Phorm. 165. Ita me di *ament*, ut mi liceat tam diu quod amo frui,

Iam depecisci morte cupio.

ib. 883. Bene, ita me di *ament*, factum.

ib. 954. Monstri, ita me di *ament*, simile.

Hec. 206. L.A. . . . Tu nescis? SO. Nescio, ita me di *ament*, mi Laches.

ib. 233. Gaudeo, ita me di *ament*, gnati causa.

ib. 258. At ita me di *ament*, haud tibi hoc concedo, etc.

ib. 276. Nam ita me di *ament*, quod me accusat nunc uir, sum extra noxiam.

ib. 579. Verum ita me di *ament* itaque obtingant ex te quae exopto mihi,

Vt numquam sciens commerui, merito ut caperet odium illam mei.

ib. 642. Bene, ita me di *ament*, nuntias.

ib. 864. BA. . . . Perliberalis uisast. PAM. Dic uerum. BA. Ita me di *ament*, Pamphile.

Adelph. 749. Ita me di *ament*, ut uideo ego tuam ineptiam, Facturum credo, ut habeas quicum cantites.

(β) *Expressions vouching for the reality or the fulfillment of a condition :*

Plautus: Mil. 501. At ita me di deaeque omnes *ament*,
Nisi mihi supplicium uirgarum de te datur
Longum diutinumque a mane ad uesperum.

Terence: Adelph. 701. . . . Di me, pater,
Omnes *oderint*, ni magis te quam oculos nunc ego amo meos.

Here, of course, *oderint* is properly classed as a present tense, being perfect only in form.

(b) **Unfavorable :**

No examples.

(c) **Indifferent :**

(α) *Expressions used to strengthen assertions* (sometimes introduced by *ut*) :

Plautus: Poen. 1258. . . . At ita me dei *seruent* (see note on p. 17)

Vt hic pater est uoster.

I. Tenses in Volitive and Optative Expressions. 45

Terence : Phorm. 807. . . . At ita me *seruet* (see note on p. 17)

Iuppiter,

Vt prior illi, quam ego sum ac tu, [homo] nemost.

Hec. 279. itaque *obtingant* ex te quae exopto mihi,

Ut numquam sciens commerui, etc.

Cicero : ad Quint. fratr. 3, 10. Reliqua, ita mihi, salus aliqua *detur* potestasque in patria moriendi, ut me lacrimae non sinunt scribere.

Ad Att. I, 16, 1. Saepe, ita me di *iuuent*, te non solum auctorem consiliorum meorum, uerum etiam spectatorem pugnarum mirificarum desiderauit.

(β) *Expressions vouching for the reality or the fulfillment of a condition :*

Plautus : Mil. 834. PA. Neque tu bibisti? LV. Di me *perdant* si bibi,

Si bibere potui.

Trin. 992. CH. At etiam maledicis? SV. Immo, saluos quando quidem aduenis,

Di te *perdant* si te flocci facio an periisses prius.

Curc. 575. At ita me machaera et clypeus . . .

Bene *iuuent* pugnantem in acie, nisi mi uirgo redditur,

Iam ego te faciam ut hic formicae frustillatim differant.

Cist. 497. ME. Tu iam, siquid tibi dolebit, scies qua doleat gratia.

AL. Dei me *perdant*,—ME. Quodcumque optes, tibi uelim contingere.

AL. Sei illam uxorem duxero umquam, etc.

Aul. 645. Di me *perdant*, si ego tui quicquam abstuli.

ib. 776. EVC. Id (si) fallis? LYC. Tum me *faciat* quod uolt magnus Iuppiter.

Cas. 246. . . . Di me et te *infelicient*,

Si ego in os meum hodie uini guttam indidi.

Most. 192. Pro Iuppiter, nam quod malum uorsatur meae dom(i) illud?

Di deaeque omnes me pessumis exemplis *interficient*,

Nisi ego illam anum interfecero siti fameque atque algu.

ib. 222. Di(ui) me *faciant* quod uolunt, ni ob istam orationem
Te liberasso denuo et ni Scapham enicasso.

Poen. 489. Si hercle istuc umquam factumst, tum me Iuppiter
Faciat ut semper sacrucicem nec umquam litem.

Pers. 292. SA. Di deaeque me omnes *perdant*—

PAE. Amicus sum : eueniant uolo tibi quae optas. (SA.)

Atque id *fiat*,

Nisi te hodie, si prehendero, defigam in terram colapheis.

With a Negative.

FIRST PERSON :

(a) **Absolutely opposed :**

Cicero : ad Att. IV, 17, 5. "Quid poteris", inquires, "pro iis dicere?" *Ne uiuam*, si scio : in illis quidem tribus libris, quos tu dilaudas, nihil reperio.

ib. XII, 3, 1. *Ne uiuam*, mi Attice, si mihi non modo Tusculanum, ubi ceteroqui sum libenter, sed *μακάρων νῆσοι* tanti sunt, ut sine te sim tot dies.

SECOND PERSON :

No example.

THIRD PERSON :

(a) **Absolutely opposed :**

Plautus: Bacch. 504. Nam mihi diuini *numquam* quisquam *creduat*,¹

Ni ego illam exemplis plurumis planeque amo.

ib. 847. Nam *neque* Bellona mi umquam *neque* Mars *creduat*,¹

Ni illum exanimalem faxo, etc.

Truc. 307. . . . *Numquam* edepol mihi

Quisquam homo mortalis posthac duarum rerum *creduit*,¹

Ni ego ero maiori uostra facta denarrauero.

¹ The original meaning of *credo* was "to give one's heart". It accordingly belonged originally to class (c) instead of to (a). It may have continued to be felt occasionally as meaning "to give credence" or "to reach the belief"; but it seems to have been commonly used in the sense of "have the belief" and I have accordingly classed it here under (a). For *crediderim*, which was almost unknown before the period of decline (though our grammars give the impression that it is a common usage of classical times), see discussion in Part II.

(b) Unfavorable :

No example.

(c) Indifferent :

No example.

3. Expressions used merely as a method of greeting, serving the same purpose as the English expressions "good morning", "how do you do?" "farewell", etc., and corresponding to the German greeting "grüsse Gott."

[This use is not found in the perfect tense.]

Without a Negative.

FIRST PERSON :

No example.

SECOND PERSON :

(a) Absolutely opposed :

Plautus: Rud. 103 saluos *sis*; Bacch. 456 saluos *sis*; Stich. 316 saluos *sis*; 482 *ualeas*; Men. 776 salua *sis*; Aul. 182 saluos atque fortunatus *sies*; Cas. 216 *ualeas*; Pers. 224 *ualeas*; Pers. 579 saluos *sis*; Poen. 330 saluos *sis*; 632 fortunati *sitis*; 751 saluos *sis*; 858 saluos *sis*; 912 *ualeas*; Truc. 123 salua *sis*; 358 salua *sis*; 433 *ualeas*.

Terence: And. 802 saluos *sis*; 906 saluos *sis*; Adelph. 622 *ualeas*; 890 saluos *sies*.

(b) Unfavorable :

No example.

(c) Indifferent :

No example.

THIRD PERSON :

(a) Absolutely opposed :

Plautus: Mil. 1316. . . PL. Materque et soror

Tibi salutem me iusserunt dicere.

PH. Saluae *sient*.

Aul. 183. MEG. Saluos atque fortunatus, Euclio, semper *sies*.

EUC. Di te *ament*, Megadore.

Capt. 138. HE. Ergasile, salue. ER. Di te bene *ament*, Hegio.

Rud. 1303. LA. Adulescens, salue. GR. Di te *ament* cum inraso capite.

Curc. 456. LY. . . . leno, salue. CA. Di te *ament*.

Bacch. 457. PH. Saluos sis, Mnesiloche: saluom te aduenire gaudeo.

MN. Di te *ament*, Philoxene.

Pseud. 271. BA. Compellabo. Salue multum, serue Athenis pessume.

PS. Di te deaeque *ament*.

Most. 341. CAL. Salue, amicissime mi omnium hominum.

PHILO. Di te *ament*. Accuba, Callidamates.

ib. 717. TR. Accedam. Di te *ament* plurimum, Simo.

SI. Saluos sis, Tranio.

ib. 806. SI. Saluom te aduenisse peregre gaudeo, Theo(p)ropides.

TH. Dei te *ament*.

ib. 1130. CA. Iubeo te saluere. . . . Hic apud nos hodie cenes: sic face.

TH. Ca(1)lidamate(s), dei te *ament*: de cena facio gratiam.

Pers. 16. . . . TO. Congrediar. SA. Contra adgredibor.

TO. O Sagaristio, dei *ament* te. SA. O Toxile, dabunt di quae exoptes.

Poen. 751. AG. Saluos sis, leno. LY. Dei te *ament*, Agorastocles.

ib. 858. . . . MI. Saluos sis, Synceraste. SY. O Milphio,

Dei omnes deaeque *ament*. MI. Quemnam hominem?

SI. Nec te nec me, Milphio,

Neque erum meum adeo. MI. Quem *ament* igitur?

SY. Aliquem eo dignus qui siet.

Merc. 327. LY. Bene uale[to]. DE. Bene *sit* tibi.

Terence: And. 696. Hanc mi expetiui: contigit; conueniunt mores: *ualeant*

Qui inter nos discidium uolunt: hanc nisi mors mi adimet nemo.

(b) **Unfavorable:**

No example.

(c) Indifferent :

Plautus : Trin. 436. PH. Erum atque seruom plurumum Philto iubet

Saluere. . . . LE. Di *duint*

Tibi, Philto, quaecumque optes.

ib. 1152. LY. Charmidem socerum suum

Lysiteles salutat. CH. Di *dent* tibi, Lysiteles, quae uelis.

Epid. 6. TH. Salue. EP. Di *dent* quae uelis.

Venire saluom gaudeo.

Mil. 1038. . . . MI. Pulcer, salue.

PY. Meum cognomentum commemorat. Di tibi *dent* quaequomque optes.

With a Negative.

No example.

4. Such calm prayers, or wishes, as do not fall into one of the classes already indicated.

The fulfillment or non-fulfillment of these prayers or wishes, will not, as a rule, materially affect the interests of the speaker and they are not prompted by emotion, or at any rate by any more emotion than commonly prompts expressions like "I only hope it may prove to be so". Many of them are mere blessings accompanied by much the same feeling as calls out such exclamations as "Bless me!" "Bless you!" (for "God bless me", "God bless you"). These are expressions sometimes merely of surprise at something that has happened, sometimes of thanks for favors received, sometimes of good wishes for the success of an undertaking. Many more of them are in the form of mild, or make-believe, curses. These are often prompted by the most trivial occurrences, *e. g.*, by someone's attempt at a pun, by the failure of a parasite to get a dinner which he had expected, by surprise at finding that a certain person could walk very rapidly, etc., etc. The speaker sometimes includes himself in these make-believe, curses. The curse is frequently uttered against no one in particular, but is general in character, as in Most. 307. An earnest curse is not natural

except when directed against some particular person or thing that has aroused one's anger or indignation. (For more extended remarks regarding these make-believe curses, and for parallel instances in English, see pp. 32f.). A comparison of the prayers here classified with those in which the perfect tense is used will disclose a marked difference in tone between the two classes.

[Such a use is not found in the perfect tense.]

Without a Negative.

FIRST PERSON :

(a) **Absolutely opposed :**

Terence : Hec. 536. MY. Misera sum. PH. Vtinam *sciam* ita esse istuc.

Cicero : ad Att. IV, 16, 2. itaque cogitabam, quoniam in singulis libris utor prooemiis, ut Aristotles in iis, quos ἐξωρετικούς uocat, aliquid efficere, ut non sine causa istum appellarem, id quod intellego tibi placere : utinam modo conata efficere *possim* ; rem enim, quod te non fugit, magnam complexus sum, etc.

ib. X, 12a, 3. Quintum filium seuerius adhibebo : utinam proficere *possim* ; tu tamen eas epistolas, quibus asperius de eo scripsi, aliquando concerpito, ne quando quid emanet : ego item tuas.

ad fam. XIV, 4, 2. huic utinam aliquando gratiam referre *possimus*.

ib. XV, 1, 6. Quid casurum sit, incertum est : utinam salutis nostrae consulere *possimus* ; dignitati certe consulemus.

Ad Brut. I, 3, 1. Caesaris uero pueri mirifica indoles uirtutis : utinam tam facile eum florentem et honoribus et gratia regere ac tenere *possimus*, quam facile adhuc tenuimus.

de nat. deor. 32, 91. Vtinam tam facile uera inuenire *possim* quam, etc.

(b) **Unfavorable :**

Terence : Eun. 1028. TH. Qui minus quam Hercules seruiuit Omphalae? GN. Exemplum placet.

Vtinam tibi conmitigari *uideam* sandalio caput.

Sed fores crepuerunt ab ea.

The speaker, Gnatho, has, as usual, been flattering the pride of Thraso, the boastful captain, by heaping compliments upon him. The wish here quoted is an "aside", showing that he would in reality like to see the captain's pride humbled.

(c) Indifferent :

Plautus : Capt. 682. HE. At cum cruciatu maxumo id factumst tuo.

TY. Dum ne ob malefacta, *peream*.

This *peream* denotes merely the speaker's resignation to his own fate ; it is a prayer for what he would really prefer to avoid.

Aul. 433. EVC. Volo scire ego item meae domi mea(n) salua futura ?

CONG. Vtinam mea mihi modo *auferam* quae ad (te) tuli salua.

Asin. 615. utinam sic *efferamur*.

Cicero : ad Att. XIV, 17, 2. De Buthrotio negotio utinam quidem Antonium *conueniam* ; multum profecto proficiam ; sed non arbitrantur eum a Capua declinaturum.

SECOND PERSON :

(a) Absolutely opposed :

Plautus : Men. 1104. utinam efficere quod pollicitu's *possi(e)s*.

Terence : Eun. 210. Utinam tam aliquid inuenire facile *possis*, Phaedria, quam hoc peribit.

(b) Unfavorable :

No example.

(c) Indifferent :

Cicero : Ad Quint. II, 8, 4. utinam *detis* ; in Verr. II, 1, 23, 61 utinam *neges* ; de senectute 23, 85 utinam *perueniatis*.

THIRD PERSON :

(a) Absolutely opposed :

Plautus : Am. 392. SO. Quid, si falles ? ME. Tum Mercurius Sosiae iratus *siet*.

This is a bit of humor instead of an earnest prayer. The speaker himself is Mercury, pretending, however, to be Sosia, and the prayer therefore means "Then may I be angry with the person I am pretending to be."

ib. 935. IV. . . . Id ego si fallo, tum te, summe Iuppiter,
Quaeso Amphitruoni ut semper iratus sies.

AL. Ah, propitius *sit* potius. IV. Confido fore.

Pseud. 714. Bene *sit* tibi, Charine: nolo tibi molestos esse nos.

Aul. 546. Plus plusque * istuc *sospitent* quod nunc habes.

Most. 306. Haec qui gaudent, *gaudeant* perpetuo suo semper bono.

Qui inuident, neumquam eorum quisquam *inuideat* prosus commodi(s).

Pers. 189. Bona pax *sit* potius.

Poen. 1002. Istuc tibi *sit* potius quam mihi.

Terence: Eun. 655. . . . PH. Temulenta's. PY. Vtinam sic *sint* qui mihi male uolunt.

Hec. 610. Fors *fuat* pol.

Adelph. 411. Saluos *sit*. Spero, est similis maiorum suom.

Cicero: ad fam. IX, 24, 2. Vtinam ea fortuna rei publicae *sit*, ut ille, etc.

ib. XIV, 1, 4. Vtinam ea res ei uoluptati *sit*.

ad Att. X, 16, 3. Vtinam, quod aiunt, Cotta Sardiniam *teneat*; est enim rumor.

ib. XIIa, 2. Sicilia petenda; quam si erimus nacti, maiora quaedam consequemur. *Sit* modo recte in Hispaniis; quamquam de ipsa Sicilia utinam *sit* uerum; sed adhuc nihil secundi.

ib. XV, 15, 1. L. Antonio male *sit*, si quidem Buthrotiis molestus est: ego testimonium composui, quod, cum uoles, obsignabitur.

Tusc. disp. III, 6, 12. *Adsit*.

de nat. deor. III, 20, 51. Ergo mihi Alabandus, tibi Hercules *sit* iratus (a quotation from Stratonicus).

This is a prayer based on a supposition which the speaker did not believe true.

pro Milone, 34, 93. *ualeant*; *ualeant*; *sint* (three times); *stet*.

Phil. XI, 5, 12. *ominetur* (here in the sense of *be an omen*).

Plautus: Pseud. 1294. PS. Vir malus uiro optumo obuiam it.

SI. Di te *ament*, Pseudole. PS. Hae. SI. I in malam crucem.

Simo thus ejaculates upon seeing his servant Pseudolus in a very intoxicated condition.

Terence : Hec. 206. inter nos agere aetatem *liceat*.

Cic. ad Att. IX, 11, 2. respondit se non dubitare, quin et opem et gratiam meam ille ad pacificationem quaereret. Utinam in hac aliquod miseria rei publicae πολιτικὸν opus efficere et nauare mihi *liceat*.

Orat. 13, 42. Me autem, qui Isocratem non diligunt, una cum Socrate et cum Platone errare *patiantur*.

de fin. 4, 11, 27. *liceat* enim fingere aliquid eius modi, quo uerum facilius reperiamus.

(b) Unfavorable :

Plautus : Asin. 841. AR. Aspecta, rideo. DE. Utinam male qui mihi uolunt sic *rideant*.

Cicero : ad Att. III, 15, 3. Varronis sermo facit expectationem Caesaris, atque utinam ipse Varro *incumbat* in causam, quod profecto cum sua sponte, tum te instante faciet.

pro Flacco 2, 5 *contendant*.

(c) Indifferent :

The purely formal expression *quae res bene uortat* (with its variations) is frequently used as a means of pronouncing a blessing upon any proceeding, e. g. :

Plautus : Capt. 361. Quae res bene *uortat* mihi meoque filio Vobisque.

This formula is here used with reference to an agreement just made with a view to securing the return of Hegio's son. The preceding context is a perfectly calm and business-like conversation.

Trin. 500. Sine dote posco tuam sororem filio.

Quae res bene *uortat*.

ib. 572. Nunc tuam sororem filio posco meo :

Quae res bene *uortat*.

Asin. Prol. 2. Hoc agite sultis, spectatores, nunciam :

Quae quidem mihi atque uobis res *uortat* bene

Gregique huic et dominis atque conductoribus.

Curc. 273. CA. . . Ibo atque orabo. CO. Quae res male *uortat* tibi.

ib. 729. PH. Tu, miles, apud me cenabis : hodie fient nuptiae.

TH. Quae res bene *uortat* mi et uobis.

Aul. 218. Quae res recte *uortat* mihi que tibi que tuaeque filiae, Filiam tuam mi uxorem posco.

Pers. 329. Quae res bene *uortat* mihi et tibi et uentri meo
Perennitassitque adeo huic perpetuo cibo(m),
Vt mihi supersit, suppetat, superstitet.

Terence : Phorm. 678. Quae quidem illi res *uortat* male.

Adelph. 191. Quae res tibi *uortat* male.

Passing over the other instances of this formula, which are in every respect exactly like those given above, we find belonging under this section the following passages :

Plautus : Asin. Prol. 14. . . date benigne operam mihi.

Vt uos† item alias, pariter nunc Mars *adiuuat*.

This is an expression of the Prologue's good wishes.

ib. 46. DE. Dono te ob istuc dictum ut expers sis metu.

LI. Di tibi *dent* quaequomque optes.

Am. 380. ME. Quia uaniloquo's, uapulabis : ego sum, non tu, Sosia.

SO. Ita di *faciant*, ut tu potius sis atque ego te ut uerberem.

Sosia has been getting a beating and his words at this point are meek and humble. Furthermore, this prayer is for something that in the nature of things could never be, and is, therefore, not earnest.

Capt. 355. Di tibi omnes omnia optata *offerant*,

Quom me tanto honore honestas quomque ex uinclis eximis.

The captive, Tyndarus, thus blesses Hegio upon being released from his chains. This, however, is a purely business transaction, the result of a bargain calmly made in the preceding context.

ib. 868. Iuppiter te dique *perdant*.

Hegio says this good-naturedly in reply to an equally good-natured pun of Ergasilus. The latter has just brought to Hegio joyful tidings and the utmost good feeling prevails between the two.

Mil. 286. PA. Edēpol, Sceledre, homo sectatu's nili nequam bestiam.

SC. Di te *perdant*. PA. Te—istuc aequomst, quoniam occcepisti, eloqui.

Sceledrus here says *di te perdant*, in answer to what he considers a bit of pleasantry from Palaestrio. He has, only a few lines before (277), expressed himself as delighted at meeting his fellow slave and there is nothing in the general tone of what Sceledrus says throughout this scene that shows the slightest hard feeling on his part towards Palaestrio. He meets him as a friend to whom he wishes to confide his secret, though Palaestrio does not encourage his advances.

ib. 570. PE. Ignoscami tibi istuc. SC. At tibi di *faciant* bene.

This is a calm reply in answer to a promise of forgiveness for certain things he had said.

Trin. 502. Quin fabulare "di bene *uortant* : spondeo"?

This is a prayer suggested to one who hesitates about sanctioning the proposal that had been made.

ib. 572. PH. . . . Nunc tuam sororem filio posco meo :

Quae res bene *uortat*. Quid nunc? Etiam consulis?

LE. Quid istic? Quando ita uis, di bene *uortant* : spondeo.

The latter is a prayer made merely to comply with another's request.

ib. 715. Si mihi tua soror, ut ego aequom censeo, ita nuptum datur

Sine dote neque tu hinc abituru's, quod meum erit id erit tuom :

Sin aliter animatus es,—bene quod agas *eueniat* tibi :

Ego amicus numquam tibi ero alio pacto : sic sentiast.

ib. 923. CH. Chares? an Charicles? numne Charmides?

SY. Em, istic erit : qui istum di *perdant*. CH. Dixi ego iam dudum tibi :

Te potius bene dicere aequomst homini amico quam male.

This *perdant* is merely a playful utterance prompted by the speaker's having forgotten the person's name. His companion is helping him recall it and upon the former's suggesting "*Char-*

mides?”, he replies in effect, “Yes, that’s his name, confound him.” The speaker has nothing whatever against the person referred to.

ib. 997. Qui di te omnes aduenientem peregre *perdant*, Charmides.

The speaker has been hired to pretend (falsely) that he brings letters from Charmides, whom he does not know and who is supposed to be still abroad. Upon reaching the house to which he has been sent, he engages in conversation with a stranger whom he finds before the door. He has just discovered that the stranger is Charmides himself, who has unexpectedly returned from abroad and thus prevented him from carrying out his plans. He has no personal feeling against the man and the latter has given no offense beyond arriving sooner than he was expected.

Curc. 39. PH. Lenonis hae sunt aedes. PA. Male istis *euenat*.

PH. Qui? PA. Quia scelestam seruitutem seruiunt.

These are calm expressions of general disapproval—no particular offense has been given.

ib. 317. . . . PA. Ventum. CV. Nolo equidem mihi

Fieri uentulum. PH. Quid igitur? CV. Esse, ut uentum gaudeam.

PH. Iuppiter te dique *perdant*.

This expression is merely a good natured reply to a pun just made by the parasite. The speaker is, in reality, on the best of terms with him.

Pseud. 646. PS. At illic nunc negotiosust : res agitur apud iudicem.

HA. Di bene *uortant*. At ego, quando eum esse censebo domi,

Rediero.

Di bene uortant here means merely “success to it”.

ib. 837. CO. Haec ad Neptuni pecudes condimenta sunt :

Terrestris pecudes cicimandro condio,

Hapalopside aut cataractria. BA. At te Iuppiter

Dique omnes *perdant* cum condimentis tuis

Cumque tuis istis omnibus mendaciis.

Ballio thus speaks to his cook, whom he has just hired, prompted by the latter's bragging words. The latter has done nothing whatever to give real offense and Ballio is not in the least angry with him.

ib. 934. PS. Iuppiter te mihi *seruet*. SI. Immo mihi.

ib. 937. PS. Optume habet. SI. Esto.

PS. Tantum tibi boni di immortales *duint*, quantum tu tibi optes :

Nam si exoptem quantum dignu's, tantum dent, minus nilo sit.

ib. 1230. BA. Quid nunc faciam? HA. Si mihi argentum dederis, te suspendito.

BA. Di te *perdant*. Sequere sis me ergo hac ad forum ut soluam.

Ballio has delivered up a girl to a person who falsely pretends to be the messenger of the person to whom he has sold her. The real messenger, Harpax, of that person now presents himself and claims the girl. Harpax is at first treated as an impostor, but soon convinces Ballio of his real character and, as he can no longer get the girl, he demands back the money paid for her. Ballio, in the passage cited, knows who the guilty party is and realizes that the person he is addressing is in no sense responsible for his misfortunes. The *di te perdant* is prompted merely by the indifferent reply of Harpax to his question.

Stich. 262. CR. Nullan tibi linguast? GE. Quae quidem dicat 'dabo' :

Ventri reliqui : eccillam quae dicat 'cedo'.

CR. Malum di tibi *dent* (Goetz and Schöll have a different reading).

GE. Malum quidem si uis, haec eadem dabit tibi.

The two speakers are merely talking familiarly with each other and the best of feeling prevails between them.

ib. 469. Bene atque amice dicis. Di *dent* quae uelis.

ib. 595. EP. Vasa lautum, non ad cenam dico. GE. Di te *perduint*.

The parasite, Gelasimus, has been trying to get an invitation to

dinner. Epignomus (?) has just intimated that the former might come after the regular guests have departed. The parasite expresses the utmost delight at this invitation, whereupon Epignomus (?) adds that he meant he might come *to wash the pots, not to dinner*. The *di te perduint* is prompted, therefore, merely by this jest and the disappointment at having the invitation withdrawn. That it is not to be taken too seriously is shown by the same parasite's readiness a moment later (617-620) to accept another invitation from the same person.

Epid. 13. Di immortales te *infelicient*: ut tu es gradibus grandibus.

Nam ut apud portum te conspexi, curriculo ocepī sequi:
Vix adipiscendi potestas modo fuit.

This *infelicient* is merely a good-natured expression of surprise at the rapidity with which the person addressed could walk. The best of feeling exists, as yet, between the two.

ib. 23. EP. Sed ubi sis? TH. Aduenit simul. EP. Vbi is ergo? nisi si in uidulo

Aut si in mellina attulisti. TH. Dei te *perdant*. EP. Te uolo—

Percontari, operam da: opera reddetur tibi.

This *Dei te perdant* is merely a good-natured reply to the jest of Epidicus.

ib. 66. TH. Plusque amat quam te umquam amauit. EP. Iuppiter te *perduit*.

This expression is prompted by the form in which Thesprio has conveyed his information, but the speaker, Epidicus, has no real grievance against him.

Men. 308. . . . CY. Non tu in illis aedibus

Habes? ME. Di illos homines qui illic habitant *perduint*.

CY. Insanit hic[e] quidem, qui ipse male dicit sibi.

The speaker here has nothing whatever against the people referred to in *illos homines, qui illic habitant*, does not know them (or supposes he does not), and has never heard of them till the present moment. The utterance is prompted solely by the intimation of Cylindrus that he (Menaechmus II) lived *in illis*

aedibus, which intimation the latter considers absurd and impertinent.

ib. 451. . . . Menaechmus se subterduxit mihi

Atque abit ad amicam, credo, neque me uoluit ducere.

Qui illum dei omnes *perduint*, quei primus commentust

Contionem habere, qui homines occupatos occupat.

The character itself of this utterance shows that it is not seriously meant.

ib. 596. Di illum omnes *perdant*, ita mihi

Hunc hodie corrumpit diem :

Meque adeo, qui hodie forum

Vinquam oculis inspexi meis.

That this *perdant* is not seriously meant is shown by the fact that the speaker includes himself in the curse. The speaker is not angry with the client referred to, whose case he has been pleading. His language is prompted merely by his disappointment at having been prevented, by business before the aedile, from going to see his mistress.

ib. 666. Id quidem edepol numquam erit : nam nil est quod perdam domi.

Qua uirum qua uxorem di uos *perdant*. Properabo ad forum :

Nam ex hac familia me plane excidisse intellego.

The parasite who utters these words has, throughout the scene, been befriending the woman he is addressing and championing her cause against her husband, who has stolen her mantle for his mistress. He has just asked her how she intends to reward him for his service ; she replies that she will reward him when a mantle is similarly stolen from him. This reply is not satisfactory and prompts him to use the language above quoted.

ib. 931. Qui te Iuppiter dique omnes, percontator, *perduint*.

The question that prompted this expression is not preserved by the manuscripts, but the expression is addressed to a physician who had come to cure the speaker of a supposed mental disease and who is inquiring carefully about his symptoms. The speaker has no serious grievance against the physician, having never seen

him till the moment before ; and the latter comes now to do him a kindness.

ib. 1021. At tibi di semper, adulescens, quisquis es, *faciant* bene.

The meaning I assign to the perfect would make that tense here clearly out of place.

Mil. 1418. CA. Verberetur etiam : postibi amittendum censeo.

PY. Di tibi bene *faciant* semper quom aduocatus mihi bene es.

Faciant is a prayer for the welfare of one who has in his last utterance ordered him flogged a second time. The fact that it is not earnest is self-evident.

Merc. 710. . . . Equidem hercle oppido perii miser :

Vidit. Vt te omnes, Demipho, di *perduint*.

Demipho is in reality one of the speaker's best friends. The speaker has been brought into embarrassing relations with his wife by a favor he has done this friend, Demipho. Irritated by these relations, he indulges in a mild curse against the friend on whose account he has compromised himself.

ib. 793. At te, uicine, di deaeque *perduint*

Cum tua amica cumque amationibus.

As in the preceding, the speaker utters these words against Demipho, who is in reality one of his best friends. Demipho has been guilty of no unkind act with reference to the speaker and is in no sense responsible for the unfortunate result that has followed the obliging favor which the speaker has done him.

ib. 967. LY. Di me seruant. EV. Tibi amicam esse nullam nuntio.

DE. Di te *perdant*. Quid negotist nam, quaeso, istuc?

EV. Eloquar.

Demipho here has nothing whatever against the person addressed. The *di te perdant* is merely an exclamation of astonishment at what he has just heard from him.

Cist. 481. . . . deaeque illam *perdant* pariter (?)

This passage is too corrupt to be intelligible.

I. Tenses in Volitive and Optative Expressions. 61

Rud. 1166. DAE. Filiam meam esse hanc oportet, Gripe. GR.

Sit per me quidem.

Qui te di omnes *perdant*, qui me hodie oculis uidisti tuis,
Meque adeo scelestum, qui non circumspexi centiens

Prius me, nequis inspectaret, quam rete extraxi ex aqua.

That this *perdant* is not an earnest prayer, is shown by the fact that he includes himself in it. The fulfillment of the prayer is in reality not wished for. All that is involved is the loss of a wallet that has been fished out of the sea.

Aul. 175. . . . (MEG.) Eius cupio filiam

Virginem mihi desponderi : uerba ne facias, soror.

Scio quid dictura's : hanc esse pauperem : haec pauper
placet.

EVN. Di bene *uortant*.

This prayer is a sister's blessing upon what her brother proposed to do contrary to her wishes. She wished him to marry another.

ib. 257. MEG. Quid nunc? etiam mihi despondes filiam?

EVC. Illis legibus,

Cum illa dote quam tibi dixi. MEG. Sponden ergo? EVC.

Spondeo.

MEG. [Istuc] Di bene *uortant*. EVC. Ita di faxint : illud
facito ut memineris

Conuenisse, ut nequid dotis mea ad te afferret filia.

The *uortant* of Megadorus and the perfect *faxint* of Euclio reflect the difference between the character of the two men. For the spiteful and energetic character of nearly everything that Euclio says throughout this scene, see my remarks on this passage on page 21.

ib. 272. STA. Di bene *uortant* : uerum ecastor non potest :
subitumst nimis.

EVC. Tace atque abi.

Euclio has just informed his servant Staphyla that he has promised his daughter in marriage to Megadorus. The *di bene uortant* is her blessing upon the engagement.

ib. 545. EVC. Neque pol, Megadore, mihi nec quoquam pauperi

Opinione melius re(s) structast domi.

MEG. Immo est et . . . di *faciant* ut siet.

ib. 658. EVC. Postremo hunc iam perscrutauī : nil habet. abi quo lubet.

STR. Iuppiter te dique *perdant*.

Strobilus utters this after having been searched by Euclio under suspicion that he has stolen something. Strobilus really intends to steal something as soon as he gets an opportunity ; he cannot, therefore, feel much real indignation at having been suspected and searched. Still the perfect would have seemed not inappropriate. However, it is uncertain whether the *Iuppiter* . . . *perdant* really belongs to Strobilus. If the words belong to Euclio, the present is what we should expect, since Euclio has just found Strobilus apparently innocent.

Cas. 238. Vt te bonus Mercurius *perdat*, myropola, quia haec mihi dedisti.

This is uttered by Lysidamus against the perfumer who had dressed the former's hair with choicest ointment, that he might seem more attractive to Casina. Upon meeting his wife, Cleostrata, Lysidamus fears that his perfumed condition will arouse her suspicion, and he pronounces this curse upon the person who dressed his hair. That he is not really offended at the person is self-evident.

ib. 275. Hercules dique istam *perdant*, quod nunc liceat dicere.

Ego discrucior miser amore, illa autem quasi ob industriam

Mi aduorsatur. Subolet hoc iam uxori, quod ego machinor.

The speaker, Lysidamus, has just been having a conversation with his wife, in which he has attempted to allay her suspicions regarding his relations with Casina. As soon as he is alone he uses the language quoted, *istam* referring to his wife. Just before this (vss. 230 ff.) he has assured her in the most emphatic manner of his affection for her.

ib. 279. Qui illum di omnes deaeque *perdant*.

This is uttered by Lysidamus against Chalinus, who comes out

in answer to his summons. Chalinus is in love with Casina and the speaker wishes to persuade him to give her up to another (secretly wishing her for himself). Chalinus has committed no offense whatever. The speaker is the guilty one and realizes the fact. There can, then, be no real indignation on his part.

ib. 609. Quin hercle di te *perdant* postremo quidem.

The speaker here is one of the best friends of the person addressed. Just at present they are having a misunderstanding, owing to the supposed failure of one to keep his promise to do a favor for the other. This misunderstanding has been due to the cleverness of Cleostrata.

ib. 641. PAR. Optine auris, amabo. LY. I in malam a me crucem.

Pectus auris caput teque di *perduint*.

Pardalisca has just come running out of the house, pretending to be terribly frightened at what was happening inside. Lysidamus calls to her civilly and wants to know what the matter is. She replies with foreboding exclamations that give no clue to the trouble. She nearly faints and calls upon Lysidamus to support her, crying *contine pectus; face uentum, amabo, pallio. Optine auris*. This is her only offense, but it irritates Lysidamus and calls forth the language above quoted. The language is not, then, prompted by anger, but is rather to be regarded as the language which an irritated master, without serious provocation, allows himself to use to a slave. The long dialogue, that immediately follows between the two, is perfectly good-natured and Lysidamus, showing no further signs of displeasure with the person, ends by requesting a favor of her and promising her beautiful presents (705 ff.).

ib. 813. OL. Edepol, ne tu si equos esses, esses indomabilis.

LY. Quo argumento? OL. Nimis tenax es. LY. Num me expertu's uspiam?

OL. Di melius *faciant*. Sed crepuit ostium: exitur foras. This whole scene is characterized by a light, trifling tone.

Most. 233. Vtinam meus nunc mortuos pater ad me *nuntietur*,
Vt ego exheredem† meis me bonis faciam atque haec sit
heres.

ib. 655. *Malum quod isti di deaeque omnes duint.*

This is uttered against a banker whose only offense was that he demanded back the money he had lent. The speaker himself is attempting to keep from him what rightly belongs to him, though he has no personal grievance against him.

ib. 668. . . . *Di istum perduint—*

Immo istunc potius.

This is an "aside" prompted solely by his own embarrassment at not being able to give a satisfactory answer to a question that has just been asked him. He has told a falsehood and is in danger of being detected. But he has no further grievance against the person referred to.

ib. 684. *Di te deaeque omnis funditus perdant, senex :*

Ita mea consilia undique oppugnas male.

This is another "aside" uttered under the same circumstances as those indicated just above (vs. 668). He has no grievance whatever against the *senex*.

Pers. 269. *Verberibus caedi iusserit, compedes inpingi : uapulet.*

Vapulet here is merely an expression of the speaker's indifference to consequences.

ib. 298. . . . *PAE. Abigis facile :*

Nam umbra mea hic intus uapulat. SA. Vt istum di deaeque perdant.

Tamquam proserpens bestias bilinguis et scelestus.

The only offense committed by the person referred to consisted in the pertness of his replies to questions asked him.

ib. 352. *VI. Nam inimici famam non ita, ut natast, ferunt.*

SA. Ferant eantque maxumam malam crucem.

This is applied to no one in particular but to *inimici* in general.

ib. 483. . . . *DO. Credo tibi.*

Di dent quae uelis.

ib. 488. *DO. Libera inquamst. Ecquid audis? TO. At tibi di bene faciant omnes.*

Numquam enim posthac tibi nec tuorum quoquam quod nolis uolam.

ib. 622. VI. Qur ego hic mirer, mi homo?

Seruitus mea mihi interdixit, nequid mirer meum malum.

DO. Noli flere. TO. Ah, di istam *perdant*: ita catast et callida.

Vt sapiens habet cor: quam dicit quod opust.

This *perdant* is only an emphatic expression of admiration.

Poen. 208. . . . O multa tibi di *dent* bona,

Quom hoc mihi optulisti tam lepidum spectaculum.

ib. 449. Di illum *infelicient* omnes qui post hunc diem

Leno ullam Veneri umquam immolarit hostiam.

This is uttered not against anyone in particular, but against supposed cases that may arise in the future.

ib. 588. MI. Hodie iuris doctiores non sunt qui lites creant,

Quam hi sunt qui, si nil est quicum litigent, lites emunt.

ADV. Dei te *perdant*. MI. Vos quidem hercle.

The *aduocatus* here is not in the least angry. His words are prompted solely by the remark just made by Milphio.

ib. 610. . . . CO. Fores hae fecerunt magnum flagitium modo.

ADV. Quid (id) est flagiti? CO. Crepuerunt clare. ADV.

Di te *perduint*.

The *perduint* is here called forth merely by Collabiscus' good-natured attempt at a pun.

ib. 667. Di deaeque vobis multa bona *dent*, quom mihi

Et bene praecipitis et bonam praedam datis.

ib. 687. Multa tibi dei *dent* bona, quom me saluom esse uis.

ib. 740. Diespiter uos *perduit*.

The speaker uses this expression only because the *aduocatus* persists in answering the former's questions by the single word *quippini?* and other unsatisfactory expressions (*e. g.*, 731, 732, 738, 739).

ib. 746. *Suspendant* omnes nunciam se haruspices,

Quam ego illis posthac quod loquantur creduam.

The speaker is congratulating himself over a piece of good fortune, whereas the *haruspices* had prophesied misfortune for him. He now expresses, by means of the words quoted, his loss of respect for their prophecies in general.

ib. 863. MI. Quid agis? SY. Facio quod manifesti moechi
hau ferme solent.

MI. Quid id est. SY. Refero uasa salua. MI. Dei te et
tuom erum *perduint*.

This *perduint* is called out merely by Syncerastus' attempt at a
jest.

ib. 1055. (AG.) Ergo hic apud me hospitium tibi praebebitur :
Nam laud repudio hospitium neque Carthaginem :

Inde sum oriundus. HA. Di *dent* tibi omnes quae uelis.

Truc. 331. . . . AST. Quid uis? DI. Di me *perduint*

†Qui te reuocauit. Non tibi dicebam : i modo.

Terence : And. 761. DA. Propera adeo puerum tollere hinc ab
ianua.

Mane ; caue quoquam ex istoc excessis loco.

MY. Di te *eradicent* : ita me miseram territas.

Mysis is not in the least angry. She is merely puzzled by the
strange behavior of Davus, who has been suddenly compelled by
the unexpected arrival of Chremes to do a clever bit of acting.

Heaut. 589. Di te *eradicent*, qui me hinc extrudis, Syre.

The speaker and Syrus agree well enough ; the former uses
these words only because a ruse of Syrus has brought about his
withdrawal.

ib. 811. Vt te quidem di deaeque omnes quantumst, Syre,

Cum istoc inuento cumque incepto *perduint*.

The speaker trusts to Syrus as his adviser. Just at this mo-
ment he is out of patience with him, but at the very next moment
(vs. 825) he changes his tone and assures Syrus that he loves
him devotedly (*deamo te*).

Eun. 302. Vt illum di deaeque senium *perdant*, qui me hodie
remoratus est ;

Meque adeo, qui restiterim ; tum autem qui illum flocci
fecerim.

The speaker, while trying to overtake a beautiful girl whom he
has met on the street and with whose face he has fallen in love at
sight, has been stopped by an old man, a friend of his family.
This has resulted in his losing sight of the girl and prompted the
words quoted.

I. Tenses in Volitive and Optative Expressions. 67

ib. 390. . . . PA. Iubesne? CH. Iubeam? Cogo atque impero :
Numquam defugiam auctoritatem. PA. Sequere : di
uortant bene.

Parmeno has suggested to Chaerea that he (Chaerea) should dress up as a eunuch and thus gain access to a beautiful girl with whom he has fallen in love. Chaerea wishes to act upon the suggestion at once, whereupon Parmeno begins to fear the consequences of the advice he has given. He tries to dissuade Chaerea from following it, but Chaerea insists, whereupon Parmeno again consents to the scheme and uses the words just quoted.

ib. 431. PA. At te di *perdant*.

This is an "aside" and merely expresses surprise at the impudence shown by the parasite, Gnatho, in his conversation with Thraso, the boastful captain. The speaker himself is not specially concerned in the conversation that he is overhearing.

Phorm. 123. . . . est parasitus quidam Phormio,

Homo confidens : qui illum di omnes *perduint*.

Geta is really acting with Phormio in the interest of the young men left in his charge. He uses this expression regarding Phormio only because they find themselves in an embarrassing position in consequence of having followed his advice.

ib. 394. . . . PH. Itane? Non te horum pudet?

At si talentum rem reliquisset decem—

DE. Di tibi *malefaciant*. PH. primus esses memoriter

Progeniem uostram usque ab auo atque atauo proferens.

Demipho's words are prompted by the intimation just made that he is inclined to be avaricious.

ib. 519. DO. Neque ego neque tu. GE. Di tibi omnes id quod es dignus *duint*.

Dorio refuses to grant Phaedria's request that he wait three days for his pay for the music girl. Geta's words, just quoted, are caused by Dorio's indifference to Phaedria's feelings.

ib. 552. PH. Quoquo hinc asportabitur terrarum, certumst
persequi

Aut perire. GE. Di bene *uortant* quod agas. Pedetemp-
tim tamen.

Di bene uortant means merely "success attend you."

ib. 976. [Malum quod isti di deaeque omnes *duint*].

Tantane adfectum quemquam esse hominem audacia.

Hec. 134. At te di deaeque *perdant* cum isto odio, Laches.

The courtesan Philotis uses these words upon hearing from Parmeno that Laches, the father of Pamphilus, had persuaded the latter to marry against his inclination. Philotis, of course, has no particular interest in the matter and the *perdant* merely expresses her disapproval of such a proceeding.

ib. 196. PH. . . . constitui cum quodam hospite

Me esse illum conuenturum. PA. Di *uortant* bene

Quod agas ("success to you").

ib. 207. Itaque una inter nos agere aetatem liceat. LA. Di mala *prohibeant*.

The daughter-in-law of Sostrata shuns the latter's company to avoid detection of the fact that she was pregnant before marrying her son. Neither Laches nor his wife Sostrata understands this behavior, but Laches accuses his wife of having in some way caused this estrangement. Sostrata is made unhappy by this unjust accusation and, in the words above quoted, expresses the wish that she and her husband may yet pass their lives together in unity. Laches replies "Heaven forbid (such a) misfortune." That this is not seriously meant is clear on the face of it.

ib. 441. PAR. At non noui hominis faciem. PAM. At faciam noueris:

Magnus, rubicundus, crispus, crassus, caesius,

Cadauerosa facie. PAR. Di illum *perduint*.

Parmeno, though already tired, is now being sent on an errand to a man he has never seen. The *di illum perduint* is, therefore, said about a person of whom the speaker knew nothing, merely because the latter must go to him in his present tired condition.

ib. 469. At istos inuidos di *perdant*, qui haec lubenter nuntiant.

Adelph. 714. Defessus sum ambulando: ut, Syre, te cum tua Monstratione magnus *perdat* Iuppiter.

Demea uses these words only because, in consequence of having followed the directions of Syrus, he has had a long walk for nothing.

ib. 728. DE. Puer natust. MI. Di bene *uortant*.

This is merely a formal wish for the prosperity of a new-born child.

ib. 918. DE. . . . Tu illas abi et traduce. GE. Di tibi, Demea, Bene *faciant*, quom te uideo nostrae familiae
Tam ex animo factum uelle.

ib. 972. DE. Gaudeo. AE. Et ego. SY. Credo. Vtinam hoc perpetuom *fat* gaudium.

ib. 978. . . . DE. . . . Postremo a me argentum quantist sumito.

SY. Di tibi, Demea, omnes semper omnia optata *offerant*.

Cicero: ad fam. V, 11, 3. Dalmatis di male *faciant*, qui tibi molesti sunt; sed, ut scribis, breui capientur et illustrabunt res tuas gestas.

This is from a very ordinary letter of friendship to Vatinius and is merely a courteous expression of good wishes. That the writer attaches no particular importance to the wish is shown by the fact that the Dalmatae are not mentioned at all till the last sentence and are then dismissed with a single allusion—a significant fact in view of the trifling importance of all that has preceded it in the same letter.

ib. X, 33, 4. Nunc haec mihi scribuntur dici etiam Octavianum cecidisse—quae si, quod di *prohibeant*, uera sunt, non mediocriter doleo.

Pollio is here giving a long account of the calamities that the Roman armies have been suffering. The report regarding Octavianus is merely one of this long list of calamities and the words are uttered with the characteristic calmness and stolidity of the great soldier from whom they come. It should be noticed, also, that this prayer is regarding a past event, which could not in any sense be influenced by prayer. That the prayer is uttered without any particular emotion is shown by the very mild words “non mediocriter doleo”.

ib. XI, 21, 1. Di isti Segulio male *faciant*, homini nequissimo omnium, qui sunt, qui fuerunt, qui futuri sunt; quid? tu illum tecum solum aut cum Caesare? qui neminem praetermisit, quicum

loqui potuerit, cui non eadem ista dixerit. Te tamen, mi Brute, sic amo, ut debeo, quod istud quidquid esset nugarum me scire uoluisti.

ad Att. VII, 2, 4. Filiola tua te delectari laetor et probari tibi *φυσικὴν* esse τὴν πρὸς τὰ τέκνα; etenim, si hoc non est, nulla potest homini esse ad hominem naturae adiunctio, qua sublata uitae societas tollitur. “Bene *eueniat*”, inquit Carneades; spurce, sed tamen pudentius quam Lucius noster et Patro, qui, cum omnia ad se referant, numquam quidquam alterius causa fieri putent, etc. in Verr. II, 4, 9, 19. *negent*.

ib. 5, 13, 33. *di faciant ut audeas*, merely means *I only hope that you will venture*, etc.

Phil. IV, 4, 10. *eueniat; recidat*; quod ita futurum esse confido.

ib. X, 9, 19. *erumpat* enim aliquando uera et me digna uox.

ib. XIII, 18, 38. quod tibi tuisque *contingat*.

With a Negative.

FIRST PERSON:

(a) Absolutely opposed:

Cicero: Tusc. disputationes III, 6, 12. “Ne aegrotus *sim*; si”, inquit, “fuero, sensus adsit”, etc.

de fin. V, 3, 8. sed *ne*, dum huic obsequor, uobis molestus *sim*.

This *ne*-clause may, however, be dependent upon *uereor*, understood.

SECOND PERSON:

(a) Absolutely opposed:

Plautus: Cist. 555. utinam audire non queas(?)

(c) Indifferent:

Cicero: ad Quint. I, 3, 9. utinam *ne experiare*.

THIRD PERSON:

(a) Absolutely opposed:

Plautus: Pers. 851 (847). DO. Nolo mihi bene esse. LE. *Ne sit*.

5. Expressions that convey merely a calm order, request, or exhortation, that give general directions, or advice, as to what is proper, or that set forth a course determined upon.

I refer to such expressions as "Let him go and report", "Let the subject under discussion be divided into the following heads", "Let us proceed", etc., etc. I have included here also the use of the subjunctive in laying down a hypothesis (*e. g.*, *ueniat, let him come*, in the sense of *suppose that he does come*¹) and in making a proviso. A few of the instances included under this section virtually express permission, or a yielding of the will, and might be classed under § I. The phenomena grouped together under this section might, of course, be subdivided into other classes, but it has not seemed necessary for my present purpose.

[*This use is not found in the perfect tense.*]

Without a Negative.

FIRST PERSON :

I have classed here the so-called hortatory subjunctive, which is never uttered with uncontrolled emotion. It is the calm utterance of one who is under perfect self-control and who is trying to persuade others, or to get their consent.

(a) **Absolutely opposed :**

Plautus : Stich. 699. colamus ; Pers. 243 credamus² ; 548 contemlemur ; Men. 897 obseruemus.

Terence : Adelph. 796 putemus.

Cicero : ad Att. II, 3, 3 reseruemus ; Cic. ad Att. III, 7, 3 expectemus ; ad Att. VII, 6, 1 seruemus (?) ; ad Att. XIII, 3, 1 teneamus ; XIV, 14, 3 simus ; XIV, 14, 3 tueamur ; ad fam. VI, 1, 4 simus ; XI, 21, 2 neglegamus. Elsewhere in Cicero the construction occurs with the frequency indicated in the following list : amemus 1 ; caueamus 1 ; cogitemus 2 ; cominoremur 1 ; contemnamus 1 ; credamus² 3 ; doleamus 1 ; existimemus 1 ; expectemus 2 ; habeamus 1 ; intellegamus³ 4 ; laetemur 1 ; neglegamus 2 ;

¹ See note on page 35.

² For the proper classification of this verb, see note on page 46.

³ The original meaning of this word was one that would make it belong under class (c).

patiamur 5; putemus 2; seruiamus 2; sileamus 1; simus 1; spectemus 1; speremus 1; reseruemus 1; teneamus 6; tueamur 1; uerseur 1.

(b) **Unfavorable:**

Plautus: As. 586. subauscultemus; 588 auscultemus; 881 aucupemus; Stich. 57 quaeramus; Most. 990 quaeritemus; Men. 349 uideamus; Mil. 993 subauscultemus; Curc. 279 auscultemus; Rud. 241 consequamur; 250 persequamur.

Terence: Eun. 1068 audiamus.

Cicero: ad Att. IX, 5, 3 uideamus; 10, 4 uideamus; 18, 4 uideamus; X, 1, 4 sequamur; insectemur; XIV, 13, 3 uideamus; 14, 1 uideamus; 21, 4 uideamus; XV, 20, 3 uideamus; ad fam. VII, 32, 2 defendamus. Elsewhere in Cicero: arrideamus 2; audiamus 16; consideremus 17; disputemus 1; exerceamus 1; pertractemus 1; quaeramus, quaeritemus 7; sequamur (with compounds) 10; uideamus 70.

(c) **Indifferent:**

Terence: Phorm. 140. Ad precatorem *adeam*, credo, qui mihi sic oret.

The *adeam* here seems to be merely the anticipation of a command from someone who is supposed to be giving advice: "I am to go, I suppose", *i. e.*, the advice that one would naturally give me under the present circumstances would be *ad precatorem adeas*, *go to some intercessor*,¹ etc. It may be, however, that we have in *adeam* a "subjunctive of obligation or propriety."¹

¹ Professor Hale (The Anticipatory Subjunctive in Greek and Latin, p. 14, note) explains this *adeam* as a subjunctive of determination or resolve, making the passage mean, *I believe I'll go to some intercessor*. This interpretation, however, seems to me open to serious objections. To say nothing of the uncertainty as to whether the subjunctive was ever used in Latin to express mere determination or resolve, such an interpretation of the passage in question necessitates assigning to *credo* a meaning which, at least so far as I know, it never has. *Credo* indicates literal belief, or supposition (in the strictest sense of those terms) that something is, was, will be, would be, ought to be (or the like), or that something is, was, will be, would be, ought to be (or the like) done, as a mere matter of truth or fact, which is a very different thing from the idea indicated by the English "believe" with expressions

Accusemus : Ter. Hec. 717 ; agamus, agitemus : Plaut. Capt. 930 ; 967 ; As. 834 ; Pers. 769 ; Poen. 193 ; Truc. 9 ; amplectamur : Poen. 1261 ; appellemus : Mil. 420 ; As. 618 ; castigemus : Cic. de orat. I, 41, 185 ; cedamus (with its compounds) : Capt. 212 ; Bacch. 107 ; Men. 570 ; Hec. 622 ; Adelph. 309 ; circum-sistamus : As. 618 ; condamus : Poen. 1269 ; consignemus : Trin.

of resolve. Professor Hale himself, in the note above referred to, calls attention to the fact that, in general, "both Greek and Latin take the same course and come to express resolve for one's own action by the future indicative." Can he, however, find any instance of *credo* used with this future indicative of resolve? And the same question may be asked with reference to *opinor*, of which he quotes similar instances with what he regards as the subjunctive of resolve. Among the seven supposed instances of the subjunctive of resolve which he is able to cite from Latin literature, there are four instances of *credo* and *opinor*. In other words, 57 per cent. of the supposed instances of the subjunctive of resolve are accompanied by *credo* or *opinor*. Surely then among the hundreds of instances of the future indicative of resolve, there ought to be accompanying such expressions many instances of *credo* and *opinor*. Can any such instances be cited? I certainly know of none. It will not, of course, be claimed that the passage in Ter. And. 313, *credo impetrabo, ut aliquod saltem nuptiis prodat dies* is an instance of such a use. The meaning here is clearly, *I believe I shall prevail upon him to, etc., i. e., that he will grant my prayer*, referring to the outcome of the preceding *orabo* and *supplicabo*. Professor Hale has been anticipated, in the interpretation he offers for such passages as those in question, by Rodenbusch, *de Temporum Vsu Plautino Quaestiones Selectae* (Strassburg, 1888), p. 60. But unless these two scholars can support their interpretation of *credo* and *opinor* by indisputable instances of these words with expressions of resolve (which are extremely common), this alone, it seems to me, will prove that their interpretation of the mood in the passages concerned can not possibly be the correct one.

There is, however, an interpretation of these passages that is, so far as I can see, open to no objection of any kind whatever. It presupposes, to be sure, a use of the subjunctive, which receives little or no formal recognition in our Latin grammars, but which is tacitly recognized by the correct translations that are vouchsafed for such expressions as *cur gaudeam*? I refer to that use of the subjunctive, for the recognition of which I have pleaded in Part II of my Latin Prohibitive (American Jour. of Philology, Vol. XV), viz., its use in independent statements (as well as questions) to express *obligation* or *propriety*. I have there attempted to show that this is really a somewhat common use of the subjunctive, of far more frequent occurrence than is generally supposed, and that it is akin not to the volitive subjunctive, but to the subjunctive of contingent futurity. If this use of the subjunctive be

775; curemus: Poen. 1422; Ter. Ad. 130; decumbamus: As. 828; Cic. ad Att. II, 16, 3; demus: Ter. And. 560; Adelph. 950; Cic. ad fam. IX, 18, 2; ad Att. IV, 5, 2; de orat. I, 62, 265; deripiamus: Plaut. Aul. 748; desinamus: Cic. ad Att. VII, 18, 2; IX, 19, 2; de orat. I, 5, 19; dicamus: Merc. 1015; ducamus (with its compounds): Cic. ad Att. V, 21, 11; eamus (with its compounds): Plaut. Am. 543; Capt. 1027; Mil. 78; 420; 944; 1427; 1437; Rud. 1179; 1182; Trin. 1078; Bacch. 105; 760; Curc. 365; 670; Stich. 147; 622; 774; Epid. 157; Men. 387; 422; 431; 1152; 1154; Merc. 1005; 1008; Cas. 422; Most. 989; Poen. 194; 263; 329; 491; 502; 582; 607; 713; 814; 1342; 1422; Truc. 840; Ter. And. 171; Heaut. 432; Eun. 377; 380; 459; 506; 612; 811; 850; Phorm. 103; 562; 981; 1054; Adelph. 278; 601; 678; Cic. ad fam. II, 10, 1; XII, 25, 5; ad Att. XV, 4, 2; experiamur: Ter. Hec. 778; Adelph.

recognized, many passages which have been looked upon as presenting unsolved problems will at once become perfectly clear and regular. And, so far as I can see, nothing but a recognition of this use will offer a satisfactory interpretation of the passages with *credo* and *opinor*, cited by Professor Hale. What possible explanation, other than the one I am now offering, will make any sense whatever, for instance, in Cic. ad Att., 9, 6, 2, *sed opinor quiescamus*? But my interpretation suits the context perfectly: *opinor quiescamus* will then mean, "I believe we should keep quiet"; *sed maneam etiam, opinor*, "I think I'd better stay awhile longer", and so on with all similar passages. Furthermore, what would Hale and Rodenbusch do with the subjunctives in the following passage from Cic. pro Murena, 14, 30? *Quod si ita est, cedat, opinor, Sulpici, forum castris, otium militiae, stilus gladio, umbra soli: sit denique in ciuitate ea prima res, propter quam ipsa est ciuitas omnium princeps.* The *sit* here evidently represents the same use of the subjunctive as *cedat*, and the presence of *opinor* with *cedat* shows that it can not be a jussive or an optative. What possible interpretation, then, will suit the case? So far as I can see, only the one that treats these subjunctives as expressions of obligation or propriety. This interpretation does no violence to the usual meaning of *opinor* and *credo*, and it admirably suits the other passages, cited by Hale, that are not accompanied by *credo* or *opinor*. The passage in Ter. Heaut., 273 *Mane: hoc quod coepi primum enarrem, Clitipho: post istuc ueniam*, which has been regarded as presenting great difficulty, will then be perfectly clear: *wait, I'd better tell you first what I began to: I'll come to that point later.* For further justification of the view here presented, I must merely refer to my article above mentioned.

877; explicemus: Cic. ad fam. XII, 1, 1; faciamus: Plaut. Pseud. 1167; fateamur: Cic. de orat. II, 9, 36; feramus: Cic. ad fam. XIV, 4, 5; de orat. I, 29, 133; fugiamus 3; hortemur (with its compounds): Plaut. Cas. 422; Cic. de orat. I, 5, 19; largiamus: Cic. de orat. I, 15, 68; laudemus: Cic. ad Att. II, 1, 10; loquamur: Cic. de orat. I, 22, 99; ludificemur: Plaut. Stich. 578; Pers. 833; ministremus: Stich. 689; minitemur: Ter. Hec. 717; mittamus: Eun. 442; Cic. ad Att. XV, 11, 4; obstrudamus: Plaut. Curc. 366; occedamus: Plaut. Ps. 250; occultemus: Plaut. Curc. 95; occupemus: Plaut. Stich. 87; omittamus: Cic. ad Att. VIII, 9, 3; XIV, 14, 3; oneremus: Plaut. Stich. 531; oremus: Ter. Hec. 717; pareamus: Cic. ad Att. VII, 18, 2; proficiscamur: Cic. ad Att. IX, 19, 2; properemus: Ter. Eun. 609; rapiamus: Plaut. Poen. 1336; relinquamus, linquamus: Cic. de orat. I, 15, 68; reperiamus: Plaut. Epid. 256; rogemus: Cic. de orat. I, 22, 99; sentiamus; Cic. ad Att. IX, 19, 2; soluamus: Cic. ad Att. VII, 3, 11; sumamus (with compounds): Ter. Adelph. 287; 854; ueniamus: Cic. de orat. II, 3, 11; uocemus, pro-uocemus: Ter. Eun. 443; Phorm. 195; Adelph. 320; uortamur (with compounds): Plaut. Bacch. 1140; Cic. ad Quint. II, 7 (9), 3; ad Att. II, 16, 3; V, 20, 6; VIII, 12, 5; utamur: Cic. ad fam. V, 15, 5; consequamur: XII, 47; ad Att. XIII, 15, 5. Elsewhere in Cicero: accusemus 1; addamus 1; adducamus 1; adgrediamur 1; adhibeamus 1; adiungamus 2; admoneamus 1; adsidamus 1; agamus, agitemus 11; ambiamus 1; amplexamur 1; appellemus 8; ascribamus 1; attingamus 1; audeamus ("venture") 1; augeamus 1; capiamus 4; concedamus 5; cognoscamus 1; conburamus 1; concludamus 1; conlocemus 1; considamus 1; consolemur 1; consulamus 1; demus 5; descendamus 1; desinamus 1; dicamus 13; dimittamus 2; diruamus 1; disseramus 2; eamus 32; eiciamus 1; eripiamus 1; excitemus 1; experiamur 2; explicemus 7; exponamus 2; faciamus 6; fateamur 3; feramus 9; gratulemur 1; imitemur 4; incendamus 1; incidamus 1; inspiciamus 2; instituamus 1; interpretemur 2; inuestigemus 1; iubeamus 2; iudicemus 3; laudemus 1; laxe-

mus 1; loquamur 2; lustremus 1; metiamur 1; mittamus 1; moriamur 2; negemus 2; numeremus 1; omittamus 15; ordiamur 3; oremus 1; pareamus 1; pergamus 9; periclitemur 1; perscribamus 1; petamus 2; prodamus 1; proficiscamur 1; progrediamur 1; prosequamur 1; recipiamus 1; reiciamus 1; relinquamus (linquamus) 5; remoueamus 1; residamus 2; respondeamus 1; rogemus 2; scribamus 1; seiungamus 1; sinamus ("grant permission") 2; spondeamus 1; sumamus 2; surgamus 1; tollamus 1; transferamus 1; ueniamus 16; uincamus 1; uortamur (with compounds) 23; utamur 4.

SECOND PERSON¹:

(a) Absolutely opposed :

Plautus: Am. 928. ualeas, habeas; Mil. 1178 habeas; 1179 habeas; Rud. 1229 habeas; Trin. 63 habeas; As. 539 contemples; 680 taceas; Bacch. 44 caueas; 989 taceas; 1153 taceas; Stich. 476 censeas; 615 habeas; Cist. 768 teneas; Epid. 293 habeas; 651 taceas; gaudeas; Men. 569 habeas; Most. 388 taceas; Persa 610 taceas; Pseud. 749 scias.

Terence: And. 598. quiescas.

Cicero: ad Fam. IX, 26, 1. uiuas; XI, 20, 3 censeas; XIII, 64, 1 sustentas; habeas; XVI, 9, 4 cautus sis; ad Quint. Frat. I, 3, 10 sis fortis (?); ad At. IV, 19, (17), 2 maneat; in Verr. II, 3, 14, 36 habeas (quotation from a decree); de Off. III, 21, 82 colas (in a verse of poetry).

¹ Entirely wrong ideas are commonly held regarding the use of the second person, present subjunctive of command. It is commonly stated that this is used chiefly of an indefinite person (an imaginary "you"). This is not true for any period of Latin and it is very far from the truth for early Latin. In Plautus and Terence there are (if I may trust my lists above) only 12 instances of the second person present subjunctive addressed to an imaginary "you", while there are 128 instances addressed to a definite person (this includes the few instances classed under § 1, "expressions of permission", etc.). In Cicero I have noted only 4 instances (not counting those used as protases, *e. g.*, *roges, respondeam*) addressed to an imaginary "you" while there are at least 22 instances addressed to a definite person. To be sure, these are in the Letters, but the use of the second person, jussive subjunctive, is so rare in his other works that the lack of instances addressed to a definite person may be due to mere chance. In Livy this use seems to be common enough with a definite person (see Kühner, § 47, 6).

(b) **Unfavorable :**

Plautus : As. 680 spectes ; Bacch. 14 (27) uideas ; 1061 quaeras ; 1189 potes ; Cist. 300 (302) ores ; Most. 1129 cenes.

Terence : And. 832. feras ; Heaut. 345 fruare.

(c) **Indifferent :**

Plautus : Am. 828. reddas ; Capt. 191 uenias ; 340 des ; 855 adferas ; 865 facias ; Mil. 1030 des ; 1341 dicatis ; Rud. 430 aias, neges ; 1331 aias, neges ; Trin. 386 adeas, concilies, poscas ; As. 99 iubeas ; 121 mandes ; 644 facias ; 768 uoces ; 772 bibas ; 797 apstergeas ; Bacch. 417 morem geras ; 991 facias ; 1189 accipias, accumbas ; Curc. 271 petas ; 436 des (*bis*) ; 456 dicas ; 457 (458) accipias ; mittas ; 526 des ; 632 quaeratis ; 660 des : Pseud. 237 praeuortaris ; 1015 des, abducas ; 1148 accipias ; 1198 nunties ; 1227 dedas ; Cist. 111 accipias ; 250 des, suspendas ; 300 deuenias, expurges, iures, exores ; Epid. 455 quaeras (?) ; Cas. 113 induas ; 373 facias ; 611 eas (prayer ?) ; Most. 1110 (1099) agas ; Pers. 314 iubeas ; 570 iubeas ; 571 commutes ; indas ; 573 iubeas ; Poen. 330 adeas ; 801 apscedas ; sumas ; 1100 dicas ; 1102 asseras ; 1156 despondeas ; 1349 eas ; Truc. 429 consulas ; 779 fateamini ; Vid. 85 duis.

Terence : Heaut. 619. uideas ("find out") ; 884 desinas ; Phorm. 69 desinas ; 540 inuenias ; 768 fugias (?) ; 786 adiuues ; Hec. 391 facias ; 638 accipias ; 669 reddas ; 700 accipias ; 754 eas ; 755 polliceare ; 810 desinas ; Adelph. 372 mandes ; 431 morem geras.

Cicero : ad fam. VIII, 4, 5. perscribas ; XI, 20, 3 facias ; XIV, 4, 3 confirmes, adiuues ; 21 prouideas, administres, mittas ; ad Att. I, 17, 11 ; X, 15, 4 ; de orat. II, 71, 286 concedas ; Brut. 86, 295 laudes ; pro A. Caecina 30, 88 restituas ; in Verr. II, 2, 12, 31 accuses, ducas (both quotations from a decree) ; de senectute 10, 33 utare ; Tusc. disp. 5, 41, 118 relinquo.

The following are instances of the subjunctive used as protases : de nat. deor. I, 21, 57. roges me—nihil respondeam ; quaeras . . . nihil dicam, etc. ; I, 22, 60 roges me . . . auctore utar Simonide ; de finibus IV, 25, 69 roges Aristonem . . . neget. Zenonem roges . . . respondeat.

THIRD PERSON :

(a) Absolutely opposed :

Plautus : Am. 960. Proinde eri ut sint, ipse item *sit* : uoltum
e uoltu comparet :

Tristis *sit*, si eri sint tristes : hilarus *sit*, si gaudeant.

Mil. 1099. Aurum atque uestem muliebrem omnem *habeat* sibi.

Asin. 759-760. Fores occlusae * omnibus *sint* nisi tibi.

ib. 762 ff. *sit* (three times).

Rud. 486. Qui homo sese miserum et mendicum uolet,

Neptuno *credat*¹ sese atque aetatem suam.

Bacch. 656 ff. Improbis *sit* cum improbis.

ib. 660. Bonus *sit* bonis, malus *sit* malis :

Vt cumque res sit, ita animum *habeat*.

Curc. 298. Proin sese domi *contineant*, *uitent* infortunio.

Cas. 821. uir te *uestiat* ("keep you in clothes").

Epid. 267. *arbitretur*.

Merc. 989. Redde filio : sibi *habeat*.

Pers. 125. Cynicum esse (e) gentem oportet parasitum probe :

Ampullam, strigilem, scaphium, soccos, pallium,

Marsupium *habeat* : inibi paullum praesidi,

Qui familiarem suam uitam *oblectet* modo.

This subjunctive is probably to be explained as merely a subjunctive of obligation.

Poen. 29. *procurent*.

ib. 264. *Maneat* pol.

Pseud. 263. PS. . . . Nosce saltem hunc quis est.

BA. Iam diu scio qui fuit : nunc qui sit ipse *sciat*.
ambula tu.

Truc. 163. Dum uiuit, hominem noueris : ubi mortuost *quiescat*.

Terence : Phorm. 16. Nunc si quis est, qui hoc dicat aut sic
cogitet,

.
Is sibi responsum hoc *habeat*, in medio omnibus
Palmam esse positam, qui artem tractant musicam.

¹ See note on page 46.

ib. 21. Quod ab illo adlatumst, [id] sibi esse rellatum *putet*.

ib. 243. Pericla, damna, exilia peregre rediens semper *cogitet*.

ib. 926. . . . sin est ut uelis

Manere illam apud te, dos hic *maneant*, Demipho.

Heaut. 643. Melius peius, *prosit obsit*, nil uident nisi quod lubet.

Eun. 5. Tum si quis est, qui dictum in se inclementius

Existumauit esse, sic *existumet*,

Responsum, non dictum esse, quia laesit prior, etc.

Hec. 508. *Deliberet* renuntietque hodie mihi,

Velitne an non.

Cicero : ad fam. V, 5, 2. quantum mihi debeas, ceteri *existent*.

ib. VI, 18, 1. Quare bono animo *sint* et tui et mei familiares.

ib. VI, 18, 5. *habeat* in ore.

ib. IX, 2, 5. *stet*.

ib. XI, 26. *Deliberent*.

Ad Quint. Fratrem : I, 1, 4, 12 and 13. Nunc uero, tertius hic annus *habeat* integritatem eandem, quam superiores, etc. *Sint* aures tuae, quae id, quod audiunt, existimentur audire, etc. ; *sit* anulus tuus non ut uas aliquod, sed tamquam ipse tu, etc. ; accensus *sit* eo numero, quo eum maiores nostri esse uoluerunt, etc. ; *sit* lictor non (?) suae, sed tuae lenitatis apparitor maioraque praeferant fasces illi ac secures dignitatis insignia quam potestatis : toti denique *sit* prouinciae cognitum tibi omnium, quibus praesis, salutem, liberos, famam, fortunas esse carissimas. Denique haec opinio *sit*, etc.

ib. 1, 6, 18. Quare *sint* haec fundamenta dignitatis tuae.

ib. 1, 7, 20. Quare *sit* summa in iure dicundo seueritas.

ib. 2, 3, 11. Quare, si ulla res est, quam tibi me petente facendam putes, haec ea *sit*.

ib. III, 3, 1. Occupationum mearum tibi signum *sit* librarii manus.

ib. 8, 1. Plura ponuntur in spe, quam petimus : reliqua ad iacturam *reseruentur*.

ad Att. IV, 5, 1. sed *ualeant* recta, uera, honesta consilia.

ib. 5, 2. Finis *sit* : quoniam, qui nihil possunt, ii me uolunt amare, demus operam, ut ab iis, qui possunt, diligamur.

ib. XVI, 2, 3. sed tamen "dummodum doleant aliquid, *doleant* quidlibet".

de orat. I, 42, 188. *Sit* ergo in iure ciuili finis hic: legitimae atque usitatae in rebus causisque ciuium aequabilitatis conseruatio.

ib. II, 22, 90. Ergo hoc *sit* primum in praeceptis meis, ut demonstremus, quam imitetur, atque ita, ut, quae maxime excellent in eo, quem imitabitur, ea diligentissime persequatur.

ib. 32, 141 (quotation from laws). Cum scriptum ita sit, "Si mihi filius genitur, isque prius moritur . . . tum mihi ille *sit* heres.

ib. 61, 248. Haec igitur *sit* prima partitio, quod facete dicatur, id alias in re habere, alias in uerbo facetias.

ib. 66, 264. cuius exemplum, ut breuissimum, *sit* sane illud, quod ante posui, Crassi de Memmio.

ib. III, 26, 101. sed *habeat* tamen illa in dicendo admiratio ac summa laus umbram aliquam et recessum, etc.

orat. 33, 113. Disputandi ratio et loquendi dialecticorum *sit*, oratorum autem dicendi et ornandi.

ib. 33, 118. Nec uero dialecticis modo *sit* instructus, sed *habeat* omnes philosophiae notos ac tractatos locos.

ib. 34, 120. Ius ciuile *teneat*, quo egent causae forenses cotidie.

ib. 47, 157. *Sit* plenum est, *sit* imminutum.

ib. 50, 168. *sint*.

ib. 56, 190. *Sit* igitur hoc cognitum, in solutis etiam uerbis inesse numeros.

ib. 57, 196. *Sit* igitur, ut supra dixi, permixta et temperata numeris nec dissoluta nec tota numerosa, etc.

Part. orat. 8, 28. *Sit* autem hoc etiam in praeceptis, ut, si quando tempus ipsum aut res aut locus . . . dederit occasionem nobis [aliquam], ut dicamus aliquid ad tempus apte, ne derelinquamus.

ib. 27, 96. Uterque uero ad augendum *habeat* exemplorum aut recentium, quo notiora sint, aut ueterum, quo plus auctoritatis habeant, copiam.

ib. 36, 124. *Sit* ergo haec contentio prima uerborum, etc.

ib. 36, 127. Atque accusatori *sit* in hoc genere causarum locus

ille communis, etc. . . ; defensor autem et ea, quam proposui, aequitate *nitatur* et, ea cum secum faciat, non re, sed, etc.

de optimo genere oratorum 4, 9. Quod qui ita faciet, ut, si cupiat uberior esse, non possit, *habeatur* sane orator, sed de minoribus.

Topica 11, 49. Quid enim opus exemplo est? Tantum *intellegatur*¹, in argumento quaerendo contrariis omnibus contraria non conuenire.

de inv. II, 20, 59. Exemplum autem translationis in causa positum nobis *sit* huiusmodi.

ib. 29, 87. Causae remotionis hoc nobis exemplo *sit*.

pro A. Cluentio 2, 5. in hoc loco falsa inuidia imbecilla esse debet: *dominetur* in contionibus, *iaceat* in iudiciis: *ualeat* in opinionibus ac sermonibus imperitorum, ab ingeniis prudentium repudietur: uehementis *habeat* repentinos impetus, spatio interposito et causa cognita *consenescat*: denique illa definitio iudiciorum aequorum . . . *retineatur*.

Phil. II, 3, 6. *sit*; 40, 103 *ualeat*; *ualeant*.

ib. V, 11, 30. *sit*; 13, 35 *laetetur*; 13, 37 *habeat*; 16, 45 *sit*.

ib. VIII, 5, 16. *sint*.

ib. XI, 12, 31. *obtineantur*; 15, 39 *fruantur* illi suis.

ib. XII, 12, 30. *reseruetur*; *habeat*.

de div. I, 19, 38. *maneant*; 21, 43 *sint*.

de re pub. II, 29, 51. *sit*; *sit*.

de legibus II, 11, 28. *sit*; 12, 29 *praesint*; 25, 62 *intellegant*.

pro P. Sest. 1, 1. *miretur*; 1, 2 *seruiat*; 6, 14 *lateant*.

in P. Vatinius 4, 9. *sit*.

pro M. Caelio 2, 3. *habeant*; 4, 9 *sit*; 4, 10 *existimetur*; 18, 42 *sit*; *parcat*; *careat*; 28, 67 *uigeant*; *dominentur*; *haereant*; *iaceant*; *deseruiant*; *parcant* ("let alone").

de prov. consul. 4, 8. *lateant*; 7, 16 *putet*; 14, 35 *sit*.

pro L. Cornelio Balbo 20, 47. *exsistat parumper*; 21, 49 *ualeat*; *ualeant*; *ualeat*; *ualeat*; *sit*; 7, 17 *sit*; *careat*; *liceat*.

pro Rabirio 9, 25. *maneant*; *sit*; 16, 44 *sint*.

¹ See note 2 on page 71.

pro Milone 4, 11. *maneant*; 7, 17 *intersit*; *teneatur*; 34, 93 *perfruantur*; 38, 105 *sit*.

pro Ligario 6, 18. *liceat* (three times); 11, 33 *ualeat*.

de leg. agr. I, 9, 27. *habeat*.

in Cat. I, 13, 32. *sit*; II, 5, 11 *quiescant*; *exspectent*; IV, 10, 21 *sit*; *habeatur*; *sit*.

pro Mur. 28, 59. *ualeant*.

pro Flacc. 17, 40. *quiescant*; 21, 51 *seruet*¹; 25, 61 *liceat*; 30, 73 *habeat*; 38, 97 *absit*; *sileant*; 42, 104 *sint*; *habeant*; *liceat*.

pro Sull. 8, 25. *gaudeat* ("be glad"); 28, 79 *ualeat*.

de har. resp. 22, 46. *sit*.

pro Quinct. 17, 55. *considerent*; 23, 75 *cogitent*.

pro Ros. Com. 11, 32. *possideat*.

in Verr. I, 12, 36. *abstineant*; 18, 55 *intellegat*²; II, 1, 1, 3 *adsit*; *certet*; *ib.* 1, 4, 11 *sustineant*; *ib.* 1, 5, 12 *meditetur*; *ib.* 1, 12, 33 *habeat*; *sileatur*; *ib.* 1, 23, 60 *sit*; *ib.* 2, 56, 139 *teneat*; *ib.* 2, 72, 177 *adsint*; *ib.* 3, 87, 202 *habeat*; *ib.* 4, 37, 81 *sit*.

de off. I, 1, 3. *sit*; *ib.* 7, 21 *teneat*; *ib.* 19, 63 *habeat*; *ib.* 21, 73 *caueat* ("be on guard"); *ib.* 25, 85 *teneant*; *ib.* 33, 120 *teneat*; *ib.* 34, 122 *caueant*, *meminerint* (equivalent to a present tense); *ib.* 36, 130 *caueatur*; 37, 132 *uersetur*; 37, 134 *sit*; *insit*; *putet*; 37, 135 *sit*; II, 14, 50 *adsit*.

de off. III, 12, 49. *maneant*; *ib.* 13, 53 and 54 *ignorent*; *sint*; *habeantur*; *ignoretur*; *sint*; *sciat*; 19, 76 *intellegatur*²; 32, 115 *sit*.

de senectute 6, 19. *reseruent*; 10, 33 *adsit*; *nitatur*; 16, 58 *habeant*.

de amicitia 5, 18. *sit* (concession); *habeant*; 13, 44, *adsit*; *absit*; *ualeat*; 24, 89 *adsit*.

de fato 19, 43. *intellegatur*².

Tusc. disp. I, 17, 41. *sit*; 22, 51 *reputent*; 35, 85 *sit*; 45, 109 *curent*; 49, 119 *liceat*; II, 22, 52 *obuersentur*; *cogitetur*; IV, 25, 11 *sit*; 6, 13 *intellegatur*; 25, 55 *habeat*; 38, 82 *sit*; 36, 105 *excellat*; *sit*.

¹ See note on page 17.

² See note 2 on page 71.

de nat. deor. I, 44, 124. *ualeat*; *sit*.

de finibus II, 8, 23. *adsint*; 9, 27 *seruet* ("keep," "reserve");
IV, 11, 27 *liceat*; 12, 31 *sint*; 15, 41 *sit*; 26, 72 *sit*.

paradoxa V, 1, 33. *teneat*; *coerceat* ("keep back," "restrain");
putetur; *refrenet* ("keep back"); 2, 38 *habeantur*.

Timaeus II, 39. *habeatur*; II, 41 *teneant*.

(b) Unfavorable:

Plautus: Capt. 794. Proinde ita omnes itinera *insistant* sua,

Nequis in hanc plateam negoti conferat quicquam sui.

Here *insistant* means "let all *keep pursuing* their own paths".

Asin. 771. Tecum . . . *potitet*.

Poen. 32. *spectent* ("gaze at"), . . . *rideant*.

Terence: Heaut. 790. *quaeratur* aliquid.

Cicero: ad Att. V, 5, 1. eo autem die credo aliquid actum in
senatu. *Sequantur* igitur nos tuae litterae, etc.

de orat. II, 30, 132. Ac primum naturam causae *uideat*, quae
numquam latet, factumne sit *quaeratur*, an quale sit an quod
nomen habeat.

orat. 71, 234. Sed si quos magis delectant soluta, *sequantur*
ea sane.

part. orat. 36, 127. Sed deprauatione uerbi se urgeri *queratur*.

paradoxa V, *spernet*; 2, 38, *uideat* (serves as protasis); 3, 41
uideat; 66, 138 *patiantur*.

pro Rabirio 16, 44. *sentiat*.

Phil. XII, 12, 30. *custodiatur* igitur mea uita rei publicae.

pro Mur. 14, 31. *derideatur*.

pro Flacc. 17, 40. *patiantur*; *ib.* 26, 61 *aspiciant*; *expendant*
(here implies deliberation).

pro Quinct. 17, 55. *quaerant*.

pro Ros. Com. 11, 32. *persequatur*.

in Verr. II, 1, 1, 3. *defendatur*; *ib.* 1, 5, 12 *quaerat*; *ib.* 1, 6,
15 *conentur omnia*; *ib.* 2, 31, 76 *omnia sentiat*; *ib.* 4, 57, 126
spectet; *ib.* 5, 50, 131 *defendat*.

de off. I, 37, 132. *sequatur*.

Tusc. disp. IV, 4, 7. *defendat*; *ib.* 41, 118 *fruat*.

de finibus II, 28, 92. *consequatur*.

(c) Indifferent :

Plautus : Am. 950. . . . Euocate huc Sosiam :

Gubernatorem, qui mea in naui fuit,

Blepharonem *arcessat*, qui nobiscum prandeat.

ib. 960. uoltum e uoltu *comparet*.

Capt. 63. Proin siquis pugnam expectat, litis *contrahat*.

The Prologue has just informed the audience that all the battles would be fought behind the scenes and that they must not expect to see any. He now says, good-naturedly, that if anyone expects a battle, he will have to get up the quarrel himself.

Mil. 81. Qui autem auscultare nolet, *exsurgat* foras,

Vt sit ubi sedeat illi qui auscultare uolt.

ib. 188-190. Si quidem centiens hic uisa sit, tamen infitias *eat*.

Qui arguat se, eum contra *uincat* iure iurando suo.

This is uttered with earnestness, but here both *eat* and *uincat* refer not to any one particular act, but to repeated acts that are to be performed as often as certain circumstances should arise.

ib. 1054. Age, mi Achilles, *fiat* quod te oro : serua illam pulcram, pulcer.

This is merely a plea that the speaker's mistress be allowed an interview with Pyrgopolinices. The *serua* refers to the feelings of her mistress ; *i. e.*, if she is allowed the interview, her love will be satisfied, otherwise she will pine away for him.

ib. 1100. Quae illi instruxisti : *sumat*, *abeat*, *auferat* :

Dicasque tempus maxume esse ut eat domum.

Pyrgopolinices has just asked for advice as to what he had better do. He receives it in the words quoted. The tone of the context is that of calm conversation.

ib. 1126. Istuc caue faxis. Quin potius per gratiam

Bonam *abeat* aps te :

[Aurum ornamenta quae illi instruxisti *ferat*.]

See remarks under 1100.

ib. 1299. . . . Si iturast, *eat*.

Omnis moratur : nauim cupimus soluere.

Trin. 765. ME. Scitum, ut ego opinor, consilium inueni. CA.

Quid est ?

I. Tenses in Volitive and Optative Expressions. 85

ME. Homo *conducatur* aliquis iam quantum potis

ib. 767. Is homo *exornetur* graphice in peregrinum modum.

ib. 772. Quasi ad adulescentem a patre ex Seleucia

Veniat, salutem ei *nuntiet* uerbis patris.

. *ferat* epistulas

Duas : eas nos consignemus, quasi sint a patre.

Det alteram ili, alteram *dicat* tibi

Dare sese uelle.

Asin. 756. Alienum hominem * intro *mittat* neminem.

This is part of a formal agreement in writing.

ib. 760 ff. In foribus *scribat* occupatam * esse se.

Ne epistula quidem ulla sit in aedibus

Nec cerata adeo tabula : et siqua inutilis

Pictura sit, eam *uendat* : ni in quadriduo

Abalienarit, quo ex argentum acceperit,

Tuos arbitratus sit

Vocet conuiuiam neminem illa :

Siquem alium aspexit, caeca continuo siet.

Tecum una postea aequae pocula potitet,

Abs te *accipiat*, tibi *propinet*, tu bibas.

This also is a formal agreement in writing.

ib. 774. Suspiciones omnis ab se *segreget*.

ib. 781 ff. Deam *inuocet* sibi quam lubebit propitiam,

Deum nullum : si magis religiosa fuerit,

Tibi *dicat* : tu pro illa ores, ut sit propitius.

Post si lucerna extincta sit, nequid sui

Membri *commoueat* quicquam in tenebris.

This is a written agreement like the preceding.

ib. 805. Tuos seruos seruet, Venerine eas det an uiro.

Si forte pure uelle habere dixerit,

Tot noctes *reddat* spurcas, quot pure habuerit.

Bacch. 537. PI. Saluos quom peregre aduenis,

Cena *detur*. MN. Non placet mi cena quae bilem mouet.

ib. 656. *harpaget* cum furibus.

ib. 1133. SO. Ecaster sine omni arbitror malitia esse.

.

BA. *Cogantur* quidem intro. SO. Haud scio quid eo opus sit.
Pseud. 307. Non est iustus quisquam amator nisi qui perpetuat
data :

Det, det usque quando nil sit, simul amare *desinat*.

Notice the *usque*.

ib. 570. . . . nam qui in scaenam prouenit
Nouo modo nouom aliquid inuentum adferre addecet :
Si id facere nequeat, *det* locum illi qui queat.

ib. 753. . . . ubi hominem exornauero,
Subdituom fieri ego illum militis seruom uolo :
Symbolum hunc *ferat* lenoni cum quinque argenti minis,
Mulierem ab lenone *abducat*.

Stich. 300. Sic hoc uidetur mihi magis meo conuenire huic
nuntio :

Aduorsum *ueniat*, *opsecret* se ut nuntio hoc impertiam.

ib. 711. SA. Bibe si bibis. ST. Non mora erit apud me. SA.
Edepol conuiui sat est :

Modo nostra huc amica *accedat* : id abest, aliud nil abest.

• Epid. 693. PE. Quid ago? AP. Quid agas? mos *geratur*.

Men. 353. Intus para, cura, uide :

Quod opust, *fiat*. Sternite lectos,
Incendite odores.

Aul. 156. †Sed his legibus si quam dare uis, ducam :

Quae cras ueniat, perendie foras *feratur* [soror].

His legibus †quam dare uis cedo : nuptias adorna.

These are the words of Megadorus in reply to his sister's urgent request that he should marry a certain woman. He wishes to please his sister, but is in love with another woman and wishes to marry the latter.

Cas. 527. LY. Fac habeant linguam tuae aedes. AL. Quid ita?

LY. Quom ueniam, *uocent*.

AL. Attatae, caedundus tu homo's : nimias delicias facis.

ib. 744. LY. Quid nunc? quam mox recreas me?

OL. Cena modo si sit cocta.

LY. Hisce ergo *abeant*. OL. Propere, Cit(ri)o, intro ite
et cito deproperate.

I. Tenses in Volitive and Optative Expressions. 87

ib. 821. *Tua uox superet* tuomque imperium : uir te uestiat, tu uirum despolies.

These are the words of a servant to a (supposed) bride whom the former was conducting over the bridegroom's threshold.

Pers. 151. *Sed longe ab Athenis esse se gnatam autumet.*

ib. 447. *Supplicatum cras eat.*

ib. 524. *Eam te uolo curare ut istic ueneat :*

Ac suo periculo is emat qui eam mercabitur.

Curc. 39. PH. *Obloquere.* PA. *Fiat* maxume.

Poen. 24-38. *uel . . . dent, . . . abeant, uitent . . . procurent . . . conferant.*

ib. 905. *Omnia memoras, quo id facilius fiat : manu eas adserat,*
Suas popularis, liberali caussa.

Truc. 127. *Peregre quoniam aduenis, cena detur.*

ib. 230. *Quin ubi nil det, pro infrequente eum mittat militia domum.*

ib. 232. *Dum habeat, dum amet : ubi nil habeat, alium quaestum coepiat.*

Aequo animo, ipse si nil habeat, aliis qui habent det locum.

ib. 839. *Eloquere haec erae tu : puerum reddat, siquis eum petat.*

ib. 961. PHR. *Tu dedisti iam, (hic) daturust : istuc habeo, hoc expeto :*

Verum utrique mos geratur amborum ex sententia.

STRAT. *Fiat :* ut rem gnatam uideo, hoc accipiundumst quo(d) datur.

ib. 966. †Romabo siquis animatus facere, *faciat* ut sciam.

Terence : And. 919. . . . CH. *Sic, Crito, est hic : mitte.* CR.
Videat qui siet.

Crito's words are prompted by Simo's intimation that he was a *Sycophanta*. Crito is perfectly calm throughout the scene.

Heaut. 743. BA. *Eatur.* CL. *Sequere hac.*

ib. 790. . . . CH. *Atqui quam maxume*

Volo te dare operam ut fiat, uerum alia uia.

SY. *Fiat, quaeratur* aliquid.

Eun. 529. *Aut dicat* quod nolt aut molesta ne siet.

- Phorm. 662. . . . GE. "Ager oppositus pignori
Ob decem minas est." DE. Age, age, iam *ducat*: dabo.
- ib.* 677. GE.
Nam illi mihi dotem iam constituerunt dare.
CH. Iam *accipiat*: illis repudium *renuntiet*;
Hanc *ducat*. DE. Quae quidem illi res *uortat* male.
- ib.* 720. Transito ad uxorem meam, ut conueniat hanc prius
quam hinc abit.
Dicat eam dare nos Phormioni nuptum: ne suscenseat.
- Hec. 452. Venisse aiunt: *redeat*.
- ib.* 502. Si est ut uelit reducere uxorem, licet:
Sin alio animo, *renumeret* dotem huc, *eat*.
- Adelph. 77. Hoc pater ac dominus interest. Hoc qui nequit,
Fateatur nescire imperare liberis.
- ib.* 134. . . . Si tibi istuc placet,
Profundat, *perdat*, *pereat*, nil ad me attinet.
- ib.* 249. Vt ut haec sunt acta, potius quam litis sequar,
Meum mihi *reddatur*, saltem quanti emptast, Syre.
- ib.* 280. . . . SY. Reddetur: ne time.
SA. At ut omne *reddat*. SY. Omne reddet.
- ib.* 515. Si est, is facturus ut sit officium suum,
Faciat; sin aliter de hac re est eius sententia,
Respondeat mi, ut quid agam quam primum sciam.
- ib.* 997. . . . DE. Sino:
Habeat; in istac finem *faciat*.
- Cicero: ad fam. VI, 18, 5. Lepta suauissimus *ediscat* Hesiodum.
- ib.* IX, 16, 8. Memini te mihi Phameae cenam narrare: tem-
perius *fiat*, cetera eodem modo.
- ib.* X, 23, 6. *Veniat* Caesar cum copiis, quas habet firmissimas,
aut, si ipsum aliqua res impedit, exercitus *mittatur*.
- ib.* XI, 26. Deliberent utrum traiciant legiones ex Africa necne,
etc. et . . . *decernant*.
- ib.* XIII, 56, 2. Praeterea Heracleotae et Bargylitae, qui item
debent, aut pecuniam *soluant* aut fructibus suis *satisfaciant*.
- ib.* XVI, 24, 1. Mihi prora et puppis, ut Graecorum prouerbium
est, fuit a me tui dimittendi, ut rationes nostras *explicares*.
Ofillio et Aurelio utique *satisfiat*.

ad Att. I, 19, 10. Si est enim apud homines quidquam, quod potius sit, *laudetur*, nos uituperemur, qui non potius alia laudemus, etc.

ib. II, 7, 3. Megabocchus et haec sanguinaria iuuentus inimicissima est ; *accedat* uero, *accedat* etiam ista rixa auguratus.

ib. 12, 1. Negant illi Publium plebeium factum esse ; hoc uero regnum est et ferri nullo pacto potest. *Emittat* ad me Publius, qui obsignent ; iurabo Gnaeum nostrum, collegam Balbi, Antii mihi narrasse se in auspicio fuisse.

ib. 15, 2. Nimirum in Publio spes est : *fiat*, *fiat* tribunus pl., si nihil aliud, ut eo citius tu ex Epiro reuertare, nam, ut illo tu careas, non uideo posse fieri, praesertim si mecum aliquid uolet disputare.

ib. XIII, 42, 3. opinor augures† nil habere ad templum effandum : *eatur* : † ΜΙΑΚΟΡΔΟΥ.

ad Quint. Fr. I, 1, 4. *praeferant* fasces.

orator 7, 23. Quid enim sit Atticum *discant* eloquentiamque illius uiribus, non imbecillitate sua *metiantur*.

ib. 34, 120. *Cognoscat* etiam rerum gestarum et memoriae ueteris ordinem, maxime scilicet nostrae ciuitatis, sed etiam imperiosiorum populorum et regum illustrium.

ib. 39, 136. quid attinet nominibus uti aut exemplis? Tantum modo *notetur* locus.

ib. 41, 142. Nam si uitiosum est dicere ornatè, *pellatur* omnino e ciuitate eloquentia.

ib. 50, 168. Ergo et hi numeri sint cogniti et genus illud tertium *explicitur* quale sit, etc.

ib. 52, 174. Primum ergo origo, deinde causa, post natura, tum ad extremum usus ipse *explicitur* orationis aptae atque numerosae.

ib. 53, 177. Quoniam igitur habemus aptae orationis eos principes auctoresque, quos diximus, et origo inuenta est, causa *quaeratur*.

ib. 66, 222. Ex hoc genere illud est Crassi : Missos *faciant* patronos : ipsi *prodeant*.

de orat. II, 22, 90. Tum *accedat* exercitatio, qua illum, quem delegerit, imitando effingat atque exprimat, etc.

Brutus: 84, 289. Quare si anguste et exiliter dicere est Atticorum, sint sane Attici; sed in comitium *ueniant*, ad stantem iudicem *dicant*.

topica: 24, 92. Itaque aut infitialis aut coniecturalis prima *appelletur*, definitiua altera, tertia, quamuis molestum nomen hoc sit, iuridicialis *uocetur*.

de partitione oratoria 6, 21. tum ex contrariis sumpta uerbis, crebra crebris, paribus paria *respondeant*, relataque ad idem uerbum et geminata ac duplicata uel etiam saepius iterata *ponantur*, constructioque uerborum tum coniunctionibus *copuletur*, tum dissolutionibus quasi *relaxetur*.

ib. 16, 55. fictae etiam personae, muta denique *loquantur*.

ib. 38, 134. Post iudicem ad uim scripti *uocet*. Hac confirmatione usus *amplificet* rem lege laudanda audaciamque *confutet* eius, qui cum palam contra fecerit idque fateatur, adsit tamen factumque defendat. Deinde *infirmet* defensionem, etc.

de opt. gen. orat. 4, 12. Sin autem intellegentiam ponunt in audiendi fastidio neque eos quidquam excelsum magnificumque delectat, *dicant* se quiddam subtile et politum uelle, grande ornatumque contemnere; id uero *desinant* dicere, qui, etc.

de inuentione I, 4, 5. hoc eodem uita iucunda *fiat*.

ib. 26, 39. quae iam diu gesta et a memoria nostra remota, tamen *faciant* fidem uere tradita esse.

ib. II, 21, 63. *Supponatur* enim ab heredibus haec ratio.

ib. 55, 167. Nunc hoc sic ad usum oratorium *relinquatur*.

ib. 58, 175. illud *attendatur*, dignane causa uideatur, etc.

pro M. Fonteio 5, 12. Unae tabulae *proferantur*, in quibus uestigium sit aliquod, quod significet pecuniam M. Fonteio datam: unum . . . testem *producant*.

de imperio Cn. Pompei 22, 63. *uideant* ne sit periniquom.

ib. 22, 64. *fateantur*.

pro Cluentio 2, 5. ab ingeniis prudentium *repudietur*.

de leg. agr. I, 1, 3. *ueneat*; *ib.* 9, 27 *desistat*; II, 27, 71 *dicat*; *ostendat*; *ib.* 29, 79 *proferat*; *describat*; *proponat*; III, 4, 15 *ueniant*; *disserant*.

in Cat. I, 13, 32. *secedant*; *secernant*; *congregentur*; *discer-*

I. Tenses in Volitive and Optative Expressions. 91

nantur; desinant; II, 4, 6 exeant; proficiscantur; ib. 5, 11 exeant; ib. 9, 20 desinant; IV, 10, 21 anteponatur; ornetur.

pro Mur. 28, 59. repudientur; 35, 74 condemnetur.

pro Flacc. 15, 35. prodeant; mentiat; dicant; 22, 53 desinant; 26, 61 comparent; anteponant; 30, 73 restituat; reddat; 38, 97 remoueat; facessant.

pro Sull. 8, 25 doceat; 28, 79 moueat.

de domo sua 11, 29. desinant.

de har. resp. 24, 52. legant; uideant.

pro Quinctio 2, 8. detur; 13, 42 petat; utatur; 13, 44 accipiat; det.

pro Ros. Am. 35, 101. ueniat; explicet; 48, 140 desinant (three times); uideant.

pro Ros. Com. 16, 48. dicat.

in Verr. II, 1, 1, 3. respondeat; ib. 1, 5, 12 uideat; fateatur; ib. 1, 5, 13 confringat; perrumpat; euolet; ib. 1, 12, 33 fiat; praetereantur; lucretur; ib. 1, 26, 66 uocetur; ib. 1, 51, 133 exigantur; ib. 1, 52, 137 det; addicat; ib. 2, 10, 26 ueniat; experiatur; ib. 2, 21, 52 appellentur; ib. 2, 31, 76 ueniat; decernat; liberet; appellet; dicat; ib. 2, 56, 139 cogat; 2, 72, 177 obligentur; ib. 3, 87, 202 det.

in Verr. II, 4, 9, 19. negent; ib. 4, 9, 20 procedat; subleuent; ib. 4, 37, 81 desinat; ornetur; ib. 4, 38, 82 neglegantur; restituatur; incidatur; reponatur; ib. 4, 57, 126 eat; det; ib. 4, 67, 150 laudent (three times); ib. 5, 50, 131 praetermittat; ib. 5, 71, 182 subeantur; suscipiatur.

de off. I, 14, 42. dicatur; ib. 22, 77 cedant; concedat (both of these quoted from poetry); ib. 26, 92 augeatur; praebeat; pareat; ib. 29, 103 eluceat; ib. 31, 106 referatur; ib. 31, 114 noscat; praebeat; ib. 36, 130 remoueat; ib. 37, 132 tribuatur; ib. 37, 134 excludat; uideat; adhibeat; provideat; II, 14, 50 tribuat; ib. 15, 55 adhibeatur; referatur; III, 13, 53 and 54 uendat; ib. 19, 76 fateatur; doceat; 22, 88 uincat; 29, 106, uideant.

de senectute 16, 58. relinquat.

de amicitia 5, 18. concedant; 13, 44 sanciat; adhibeatur; pareatur; 24, 89 amoueat.

Tusc. disp. I, 18, 41. *concedat*; *doceat*; *exerceat* (quoted from poetry); *ib.* 36, 87 *concedatur*; *ib.* 39, 93 *pellantur*; *ib.* II, 10 23 *ueniat*; *ib.* 14, 33 *fodiat*; *ib.* 21, 48 *uinciatur*; *constringatur*; *ib.* 22, 52 *proponatur*.

Tusc. disp. III, 20, 49. *dicat*; *ib.* 31, 74 *tollatur*; *ib.* 34, 83 *dicant*; IV, 4, 8 *dicat*; *ib.* 6, 13 *appelletur*; *nominetur*; *ib.* 12, 28 *dicatur*; *nominetur*; *ib.* 28, 60 *abluatur*; V, 12, 34 *repetatur*; *ib.* 19, 56 *moriatur*; *ib.* 23, 66 *redeat*; *ib.* 24, 68 *sumatur*; *fin-gatur*; *ib.* 25, 72 *transeat*; *ib.* 26, 75 *desinant*; *audeant* ("venture"); *ib.* 28, 80 *adhibeat*; *redeat*; *ib.* 40, 117 *congerantur*; *ib.* 41, 118 *bibat*; *abeat*; *discedat*.

de nat. deor. I, 11, 26. *cingatur*; *ib.* 29, 80 *detur*; II, 34, 87 *doceat*; *ib.* 55, 138 *explicetur*; III, 14, 37 *concludatur*; *ib.* 25, 64 *pellatur*.

de finibus I, 5, 13. *ueniat*; II, 8, 23 *respondeat*; *ib.* 9, 27 *appellet*; *ib.* 26, 83 *faciant*; *ib.* 29, 95 *moriatur*; *dicantur*; IV, 11, 26 *doceant*; *ib.* 12, 31 *obscrentur*; *ib.* 15, 41 *explanetur*.

paradoxa I, 3, 13. *ueniant*; *indicent*; *ib.* V, 1, 33 *appelletur*; *repellat*; *incipiat*; *laudetur*; *ib.* 2, 38 *reuivescat* (serves as pro-tasis).

Timaetus II, 39 *dicatur*; II, 41 *appelletur*; *pareant*.

de div. I, 7, 12. *omittat*; *ib.* 21, 43 *adiungatur*; II, 10, 25 *concludatur*; *ib.* 72, 148 *explodatur*.

de re pub. II, 29, 51. *appelletur*.

de legibus II, 15, 37. *liberet*; *damnet*; *iudicet*; *ib.* 16, 41 *audiant*; III, 8, 18 *decedatur*; *redeatur*; *ib.* 20, 47 *detur*; *edant*; *exponant*; *praeiudicent*.

pro P. Sestio 66, 138. *faciant*.

in P. Vatinius 4, 9. *iudicent*.

pro Caelio 6, 14. *respuatur*; 10, 25 *remoueantur*; 14, 33 *ex-sistat*; 18, 42 *relinquatur*; *detur*; *denegentur*; *superet*; *uincat*; *reuocet*; 28, 67 *audiant*; *nauent*; *ineant*; *ostentent*.

pro L. Cornelio Balbo 20, 47. *dicat*; 28 65, *accedat*.

pro Plancio 6, 15. *cedat*; 30, 74 *recitetur*.

pro Rabirio 1, 1 *ascribat*; 4, 8 *inducatur*.

pro Ligario 11, 33 *moueant*; *moueant* (twice).

I. Tenses in Volitive and Optative Expressions. 93

Phil. II, 16, 39. *omittatur*; 44, 113 *cedant*; III, 7, 17 *compellat*.

Phil. V, 1, 3. *deponat*; *roget*; *deprecetur*; 9, 26 *profiscantur*; *paretur*; 10, 26 *recedat*; *desinat*; *decedat*; 13, 37 *laudetur*; VIII, 5, 15 *amputetur*; 5, 16 *deleantur*; 11, 32 *redeat*; IX, 6, 15 *augeatur*; *notetur*; XII, 12, 30 *oppetatur*; XIII, 10, 22 *desinat*.

With a Negative.

FIRST PERSON :

(a) **Absolutely opposed :**

Cicero : in Verr. II, 4, 7, 15. Sed *ne* difficilia *optemus*.¹

SECOND PERSON :

The subject of *ne* with the present subjunctive in prohibitions has been fully discussed in my Latin Prohibitive, where it has been shown that such prohibitions are of a mild type. A mere citation, therefore, must here suffice.

(a) **Absolutely opposed :**

Plautus : Capt. 58. *ne uereamini*; 349 *ne uereare*; 854 *ne frustra sis*; Mil. 1215 *ne sis cupidus*; 1360 *ne morere*; 1422 *ne sis frustra*; Rud. 968 *ne speres*; *ne sis frustra* (?); 1414 *ne speres*; Trin. 16 *ne exspectetis*; 267 *ne fuas*; Curc. 539 *ne censeas*; Ps. 118 *ne sis*; 889 *ne sis*; 1234 *ne exspectetis*; Most. 74 *ne sis*; 572 *ne sis*; 611 *ne censeas*; 757 *ne sis*; 799 *ne uideare*; 863 *ne sis*; 871 *ne sis*; 994 *ne censeas*; Merc. 318 *ne ducas* ("regard"); Merc. 520 *ne frustra sis*; *ne arbitrere*; Poen. 520 *ne censeas*; 526 *ne opinere*; Aul. 231 *ne censeas*; 450 *ne sis*; Pers. 141 *ne frustra sis*; Truc. 477 *ne exspectetis*; 658 *ne censeas*; 744 *ne frustra sis*; Cas. 64 *ne exspectetis*; 394 *ne suspices*; Cist. 558 *ne censeas*; 782 *ne exspectetis*; Asin. 469 *ne sis*; Men. 251 *ne sis*.

Terence : And. 706. *ne credas*; 980 *ne exspectetis*; Eun. 212 *ne patiare*; 273 *ne sis*; 786 *ne metuas*; Adelph. 22 *ne exspectetis*.

Cicero : in Verr. II, 4, 23, 52. *ne putetis*; ad fam. I, 9, 23 *ne pertimescas*; Phil. II, 5, 10 *ne putetis*.

¹ When this word means "choose", as it frequently does, it belongs under (e), when it means "wish", it belongs under (a). It is often difficult to decide which of these meanings the word has in a particular passage.

These instances from Cicero are commonly regarded as dependent clauses. But see *American Journal of Philology*, Vol. XV, pp. 136 f.

(b) **Unfavorable :**

Plautus : Am. 87. *ne miremini* ; 116 *ne admiremini* ; Mil. 1274 *ne mirere* ; Stich. 320 *ne cures* ; 446 *ne miremini* ; Men. 790 *ne obserues* ; Merc. 536 *ne conteras* ; Poen. 1370 *ne mirere* ; Aul. 350 *ne quaeras*.

Terence : Eun. 988. *ne spectes* ; Heaut. 745 *ne quaeras*.

Cicero : No example.

For the subjunctive with *non*, *neque*, *nec*, see Part II of this discussion and also Part II of my *Latin Prohibitive*.

(c) **Indifferent :**

Plautus : Capt. 14. *ne erres* ; 186 *ne postules* ; 331 *ne duis* ; 393 *ne praecipias* ; 548 *ne immittas* ; 947 *ne duis* ; 957 *ne ponas* ; Mil. 1363 (1351) *ne deseras* ; 1378 *ne moneatis* ; Rud. 941 *ne postules* ; 992 *ne feras* ; 1012 *ne postules* ; 1368 *ne duis* ; 1385 *ne postules* ; 1390 *ne dicas* ; Trin. 370 *ne prohibeas* ; Bacch. 445 *ne attigas* ; 747 *ne uerberes* ; 758 *ne exsurgatis* ; Curc. 183 *ne occlamites* ; 213 *ne rogites* ; 539 *ne facias* ; 565 *ne facias* ; 568 *ne territes* ; 713 *ne territes* ; Ps. 275 *ne praedices* ; Most. 453 *ne attigas* ; 598 *ne postules* ; 1010 *ne postules* ; Men. 327 *ne abeas* ; Epid. 147 *ne inhabitas* ; 305 *ne abitas* ; 339 *ne referas* ; 721 *ne attigas* ; Merc. 164 *ne rogites* ; 396 *ne duas* ; 457 *ne bitas* ; Poen. 1152 *ne neges* ; Aul. 166 *ne facias* ; 231 *ne duas* ; *ne doceas* ; Cas. 394 *ne memores* ; Truc. 273 *ne attigas*.

Terence : And. 704. *ne erres* ; 789 *ne attigas* ; Eun. 76 *ne afflictes* ; 388 *ne conferas* ; Phorm. 419 *ne agas* ; Hec. 342 *ne mittas*.

Cicero : de rep 6, 12, 12. *ne excitetis* (where *audite* makes it probable that the *ne*-clause is also independent) ; ad fam. 16, 9, 4 *ne nauiges* ; ad Att. 9, 18, 3 *ne agas* ; ad Quint. fratrem 1, 4, 1 *ne adsignes* (Cicero never uses *amare* with a dependent clause).

THIRD PERSON :

(a) **Absolutely opposed :**

Plautus : Trin. 348. . . . bene si amico feceris,
Ne pigeat fecisse.

Asin. 762 (?). *Ne* epistula *quidem* ulla *sit* in aedibus ; 773 *Ne* illa minus aut plus quam tu *sapiat* ; 793 *Neque sciat* (?).

Men. 222 (221). *Neque defiat neque supersit* (?).

Poen. 18. Scortum exoletum *nequis* in proscaenio *sedeat* ; 23 Serui *ne obsideant* ; 1405 (1402) Mi pater, *nequid* tibi cum istoc rei *siet*.

Pers. 270. *Ne* sibi me *credat*¹ supplicem fore.

Cas. 24. *Nequis formidet* flagitatorem suum.

Terence : Eun. 14. *ne* frustretur ipse se aut sic *cogitet* ; 529 Aut dicat quod uolt aut molesta *ne siet*.

Heaut. 30, 529. molesta *ne siet*.

Cicero : pro Cael. 18, 42. *Ne intersit* insidiis, scelere *careat*.

Phil. VIII, 11, 33. eis fraudi *ne sit* (possibly dependent), quod cum M. Antonio fuerint.

de deorum natura I, 31, 88. *ne sit* igitur sol, ne luna . . quoniam nihil esse potest nisi quod attigimus.

in Verr. II, 1, 17, 44. *ne sit* hoc crimen in Verrem ; 1, 54, 142 Quod est igitur remedium ? Quod ? *ne liceat* pupillo redimere ; 4, 38, 82 iudicium de pecuniis repetundis *ne sit* hoc tempore.

ad Att. 16, 2, 2. Si quid eius modi acciderit, *ne* quid tibi *sit* fama mea potius.

de off. I, 35, 129. duo maxime sunt fugienda : *ne* quid effeminatum aut molle et ne quid durum aut rusticum *sit* ; III, 20, 81 aut illud, quod utile uidetur, turpe *ne sit*, aut, si turpe est, *ne uideatur* esse utile.

(b) Unfavorable :

Plautus : Poen. 18 f. *Neu[e]* lictor uerbum aut uirgae *muttiant*,
Neu dissignator praeter os *obambulet*.

Pers. 542 (538). *Nequis* uero ex Arabia penitissima *persequatur*.

Cicero : pro Planc. 6, 15. *ne contendat* cum praetorio nomine equester locus.

(c) Indifferent :

Plautus : Asin. 769. Ad eorum *nequem* oculos *adiciat* suos ;

¹ For the classification of this verb, see note on p. 46.

780 "te" *ne dicat* ; 787 Post si lucerna extincta sit *nequid* sui membri *commoveat* quicquam in tenebris ; 796 . . *ne* sic *tussiat* ut quoiquam linguam . . proserat ; 797 Quod illa autem simulet quasi grauedo profluat, hoc *ne* sic *faciat*.

Most. 403 (390). *Neu* quisquam *responset*, quando hasce aedis pultabit senex.

Poen. 20. *Neu* sessum *ducat* ; 29 . . . *Neu[qu]e* spectatum *adfera(n)t* ; 37 *Ne* palma *detur* quoiquam artifici iniuria ; *neue* ambitionis causa *extrudantur* foras.

Truc. 554 . . . hoc qui sciam *nequis* id *quaerat*.

Terence : Eun. 14. *ne frustretur* ipse se ; 183 *ne fiant* isti uiginti dies.

Cicero : pro Sest. 66, 138. Si qui uoluptatibus ducuntur . . . missos faciant honores, *ne attingant* rem publicam, etc.

pro Cael. 18, 42. parcat iuuentus pudicitiae suae, *ne spoliēt* alienam, *ne effundat* patrimonium, *ne faenore trucidetur*, *ne incurrat* in alterius domum . . . ; *ne* probrum castis . . . *inferat* ; *ne* quem ui *terreat*.

de partit. orat. 24, 85. Si non utile est *ne fiat* ; si fieri non potest, *ne suscipiatur*.

in Verr. II, 1, 52, 137. domus erat plena . . . noua iudicia petebantur. " Mihi det possessionem ", " mihi *ne adimat* ", " in me iudicium *ne det* " ; II, 3, 14, 37 *Ne tollat* ex area, nisi erit pactus (from an edict).

de off. II, 20, 71. quod si etiam bonus erit uir *ne impediant* diuitiae quominus iuuetur.

de rep. V, 3, 5. Sed se responsitando et lectitando et scriptitando *ne impediāt*, ut quasi dispensare rem publicam . . . possit.

de leg. II, 24, 60. *ne* sumptuosa respersio, *ne* longae coronae nec acerrae *praetereantur*.

Acad. prior. II, 27, 87. denique uideantur sane, *ne adfirmentur* modo.

de senectute 20, 73. *nemo decorēt* neque faxit.

Tusc. disp. I, 49, 117. *nemo decorēt* neque faxit.

This is quoted from Ennius. It is doubtful whether we should consider *decorēt* a volitive or a subjunctive of obligation or propriety.

(See American Journal of Philology, Vol. XV, p. 313 ff.). Notice the *nemo* instead of *ne quis* and the *nec* instead of *neue*, both pointing (possibly) to some other than a volitive construction.

6. Earnest prayer or wish, or angry order.

In order to be on the safe side, I include under this head some instances that might be classed as mild prayers or wishes. For a comparison of these passages with those in which the perfect tense is used and for the bearing of them upon the thesis I am trying to establish, see the discussion below at the end of Part I.

Without a Negative.

FIRST PERSON :

(a) Absolutely opposed :

No example.

(b) Unfavorable :

Plautus : Trin. 618. Vtinam te redisse saluom *uideam*, etc.

Cicero : ad Att. III, 3. Vtinam illum diem *uideam*, cum tibi agam gratias, quod me uiuere coegisti ; adhuc quidem ualde me paenitet.

ib. 11, 1. Atque utinam eum diem *uideam*, cum ista oratio ita libere uagetur, ut etiam in Siccae domum introeat.

(c) Indifferent :

No example.

SECOND PERSON :

No example.

THIRD PERSON :

(a) Absolutely opposed :

Plautus : Rud. 158. . . Video : sequimini.

Vtinam is *sit* quem ego quaero, uir sacerrumus.

Valete.

Curc. 588. CA. . . uale atque salue. TH. Male uale, male *sit* tibi.

Most. 50. Meum bonum me, te tuom *maneant* malum.

Pseud. 108. Vtinam quae dicis dictis facta *suppetant*.

Pers. 289. Vtinam uades *desint*, in carcere ut sis.

Terence : And. 931. Vtinam id *sit*, quod spero. Eho, dic mihi,
Quid eam tum ? Suamne esse aibat ?

Cicero : ad fam. VI, 21, 2. Atque utinam *liceat* aliquando aliquo
rei publicae statu nos frui inter nosque conferre sollicitudines
nostras, etc.

ib. IX, 1, 1. In spem tamen uenio appropinquare tuum ad-
uentum : qui mihi utinam solatio *sit*.

ib. 8, 2. Sed superiorum temporum Fortuna rei publicae causam
sustineat, haec ipsi praestare debemus.

ad Att. II, 9, 3. Patria propitia *sit*.

ib. IV, 16, 9. Sed hoc mallet integra re tecum egisse, profecto
enim aliquid egissem : nunc reprimam susceptam obiurgationem ;
utinam *ualeat* ad celeritatem reditus tui.

ib. XVI, 15, 3. At quae contio—nam est missa mihi— ! iurat
“ ita sibi parentis honores consequi *liceat* ”, et simul dextram in-
tendit ad statuam : μηδὲ σωθείην ὑπὸ γε τοιούτου.

(b) Unfavorable :

Plautus : Pers. 831. TO. Tace, stulte : hic eius geminus frater.

DO. Hicines ? TO. Ac geminissimus.

DO. Di deaeque et te et geminum fratrem *excrucient*.

(c) Indifferent :

Plautus : Am. 570. Iuppiter te *perdat*.

The speaker thinks his slave is imposing upon him by telling
him an absurdity. He has just threatened to cut out the slave's
tongue (556) for the same reason.

Capt. 909. Diespiter te dique, Ergasile, *perdant* et uentrem
tuom

Parasitosque omnis et qui posthac cenam parasitis dabit !

Rud. 569. L.A. Meas oportet intus esse hic mulieres, mi Char-
mides.

CH. Iuppiter te *perdat*, et si sunt et si non sunt tamen.

The speakers have been friends, but they are now sullen as a
result of misfortune and inclined to abuse each other for their
calamities.

ib. 885. L.A. Sicin me spernis ? CH. Sic ago : semel bibo.

L.A. Di te *infelicient*. CH. Istic capiti dicito.

ib. 1112. Vbi sunt signa qui parentes noscere haec possit suos,
Quibuscum parua periit Athenis, sicuti dixi prius.

GR. Iuppiter te dique *perdant*. Quid ais, uir uenefice?

Quid, istae mutae sunt, quae pro se fabulari non queant?

Trachalio is trying to make Gripus show a wallet that (the former claims) contains certain tokens valuable to two young women for whom he is pleading. Gripus refuses to show it. Neither speaker, however, is excited in this scene, though both occasionally use abusive language.

Asin. 467. ME. Ego certe me incerto scio hoc daturum nemini homini.

LE. (*aside*) Hercle istum di omnes *perduint*. (*aloud to Libanus*) uerbo caue supplicassis.

The person referred to has a sum of money for Demaenetus and has just remarked that he will not give it up to any one he does not know. As Leonidas was manœuvring to get possession of it, the remark causes him to utter this "aside". The conversation between Leonidas and the *mercator* had not, up to this point, been especially unpleasant, though the former had used angry words to Libanus and uses similar language later to the *mercator*.

Curc. 621. . . . PH. Licet antestari? TH. Non licet.

PH. [At] te Iuppiter male *perdat*: intestatus uiuito.

This expression is prompted by the refusal of a bystander to be a witness in court.

ib. 719. CA. Hercle istam rem iudicasti perfidiose, Phaedrome.
Et tibi oberit et te, miles, di deaeque *perduint*.

Pseud. 250. PS. Nimis superbe. BA. Nimis molestus. CA.
Reprehende hominem: adsequere. BA. I puere.

PS. Occedamus hac ob uiam. BA. Iuppiter te
Perdat quisquis es.

Aul. 785. Vt illum di immortales omnes deaeque quantumst
perduint,

Quem propter hodie auri tantum perdidisti infelix miser.

LYC. Bono animo's [et] benedice: nunc quae res tibi et
gnatae tuae

Bene feliciterque uortat: ita di faxint, inquito.

EVC. Ita di faciant. LYC. Et mihi ita di faciant. Audi nunciam.

The *perduint* in this passage is uttered against the man to whom the speaker was on the point of giving his daughter. It is prompted by Lyconides' statement that the intended son-in-law proposes to break the engagement. It should be noticed that when Lyconides tells Euclio to say *ita di faxint*, the latter changes it to *ita di faciant*. This is natural enough. Lyconides wants to marry the girl himself and is accordingly enthusiastic at the turn affairs have taken and uses the vigorous *faxint*. Euclio, on the other hand, is still dazed by the news that his daughter's engagement to Megadorus was broken off and his repetition of Lyconides' prayer is perfunctory and half-hearted. Lyconides' next words, *ita di faciant*, are intended merely as an exact repetition of the preceding words, as is shown by the *et mihi*.

Most. 39. . . . At te Iuppiter

Dique omnes *perdant*: (fufae) oboluisti alium,
Germana inluuies,† rusticus, hircus, hara sui(s),
†Canem capram commixtam.

These are the words of one slave to another who has reproached him for improper care of his master's son and property during the master's absence.

Pers. 784. Qui illum Persam atque omnis Persas atque etiam omnis personas

Male di omnes *perdant*: ita miser(o) Toxilus haec mihi con[s]ciuit.

Here, however, the inclusion of *omnis personas* in the curse makes it of a general character.

ib. 823. Di *faciant* ut id bibatis, quod uos numquam transeat.

The speaker is here angry, but the nature of the thought is opposed to the idea of the perfect. The previous speaker has just said, "Give us drink in full goblets," to which Dordalus replies in effect, "May what you drink never go through you".

Terence: And. 568. Nempe incommoditas denique huc omnis redit,

Si eueniat, quod di *prohibeant*, discessio.

I. Tenses in Volitive and Optative Expressions. 101

And. 666. . . . Hem, quid ais? O scelus!

At tibi di dignum factis exitium *duint*.

Heaut. 1038. . . . CH. Non, si ex capite sis meo

Natus, item ut aiunt Minervam esse ex Iove, ea causa
magis

Patiar, Clitipho, flagitiis tuis me infamem fieri.

SO. Di istaec *prohibeant*. CH. Deos nescio: ego, quod
potero, sedulo.

Phorm. 688. GE. Quid ergo narras? AN. Quid ego narrem?
opera tua

Ad restim mihi quidem res redit planissime.

Vt te quidem omnes di deae, superi inferi

Malis exemplis *perdant*. Em, si quid uelis,

Huic mandes.

Antipho has overheard a conversation between Geta and Demipho and Chremes, which leads him to think (falsely) that Geta, whom he has trusted, is proving treacherous to his interests. A satisfactory explanation follows.

ib. 711. GE. . . . Haec fient. AN. Vt modo *fiant*. GE.
Fient: me uide.

ib. 1005. NA. Mi homo, di melius *duint*.

Nausistrata uses these words upon hearing from Phormio that her husband had another wife.

Cicero: ad fam. XII, 6, 2. Brutus enim Mutinae uix iam sustinebat; qui si conseruatus erit, uicimus; sin—quod di omen *auertant*—omnis omnium cursus est ad uos.

ad Att. III, 15, 5. Verum est stultum me praecipere, quid agatis aut quomodo: utinam modo *agatur* aliquid, in quo ipso multa occultant tuae litterae, credo, ne uehementius desperatione perturber.

ad Brut. I, 12, 1. ita, cum rogamur, ut misericordiam liberis eius impertiamus, nihil affertur, quo minus summa supplicia, si—quod Iuppiter omen *auertat*—pater puerorum uicerit, subeunda nobis sint.

Phil. X, 6, 13. Cum VII cohortibus esse Apolloniae scribet Antonium, qui iam aut captus est—quod di *duint*—aut certe homo uerecundus in Macedoniam non accedit.

ib. XI, 5, 11. Quid Bestiam? qui consulatum in Bruti locum se petere profitetur: atque hoc quidem detestabile omen *auertat* Iuppiter. Quam absurdum autem, qui praetor fieri non potuerit, petere eum consulatum?

ib. XIII, 19, 41. O praeclarum lucrum, quo te uictore—quod di omen *auertant*—beata mors eorum futura sit, qui ex uita excesserint sine tormentis.

ib. XIII, 3, 7. Aut enim interfectis illis fruemur uictrix re publica aut oppressi—quod omen *auertat* Iuppiter—si non spiritu, at uirtutis laude uiuemus.

ib. XIV, 9, 26. Ego uero hunc non solum imperatorem sed etiam clarissimum imperatorem iudico, qui cum aut morte aut uictoria se satis facturum rei publicae spondisset alterum fecit, alterius di immortales omen *auertant*.

The allusion to this omen is entirely incidental and all thought of it is, after this single brief allusion, at once dismissed from the mind.

pro Sex. Rosc. Am. 52, 151. Di *prohibeant*, iudices, ut hoc, quod maiores consilium publicum uocari uoluerunt, praesidium sectorum existimetur.

de harusp. resp. 20, 42. quod di omen *obruant*.

With a Negative.

No example.

7. Angry order or passionate entreaty.

The context in which the following passages are found shows that the speakers are aroused by some emotion.

FIRST PERSON:

No example.

SECOND PERSON:

(a) **Absolutely opposed:**

No example.

(b) **Unfavorable:**

No example.

(c) **Indifferent:**

I. Tenses in Volitive and Optative Expressions. 103

Plautus: Capt. 551. *apscedas*; Mil. 543 *ignoscas*; Men. 782 *abducas*.

THIRD PERSON :

(a) Absolutely opposed.

No example.

(b) Unfavorable :

Plautus: Mil. 1401. CA. *Iamne* [ego] *in hominem inuolo*?

PE. *Immo etiam prius uerberetur* fustibus.

Pyrgopolinices is about to be chastised for his disgraceful behavior. Extravagant, passionate expressions abound in this scene, but the perfect here would be inappropriate. The tense that lays stress upon the progress and continuance of the whipping is clearly more in keeping with the circumstances than that which would represent it as one to be promptly accomplished and ended.

ib. 1418. *uerberetur* etiam: *postibi amittendum censeo*.

(c) Indifferent :

No example.

An examination of the material presented in the foregoing pages will show that, of the 7 classes into which I have divided all instances of the present tense, there are 4 classes which represent uses entirely unknown to the perfect tense. I refer to the classes indicated by 1, 3, 4, 5. The perfect tense is never used to express permission or a mere yielding of the will; it is never used in a formula of greeting, or in make-believe or indifferent prayers or curses, or in giving calm directions or advice. But these four classes are just the ones that contain nearly all the instances of the present tense. There are, if I have counted correctly, 2046 instances of this tense, and of this number, 1927 instances fall into one or another of these four classes. Our next step will, of course, be to compare those classes which show instances in the perfect tense which seem to have parallels among the instances of the present. Let us consider first the passages in which a prayer is used merely to strengthen, or to vouch for, the reality or truth

of a condition introduced by a *si* or *nisi*. The perfect in this use is very rare, but it does occur in three passages, viz. :

Plautus : Cist. 523. AL. Di me omnes magni minutique . . .

Faxint, ne ego (oppingam) uiuos sauium Se(le)nio,

Nisi ego teque tuamque† filiam meque hodie obtruncauero . . . ,

Nisi tu illam remittis ad me. Dixi quae uolui. Vale.

ME. Abiit intro iratus.

Plautus : Rud. 790. Verum, senex, si te umquam in turbe offendero,

Numquam hercle quisquam me lenonem *dixerit*,

Si te non ludos pessumos dimissero.

DAE. Facito istuc quod minitare. Sed nunc interim

Si illas attigeris, dabitur tibi magnum malum.

Ov. Fasti V, 686. Siue deum prudens alium diuamue fefelli,

Abstulerint celeres improba uerba noti.

It will be noticed that the first two of these instances are accompanied by dire threats which betray very clearly the excited condition of the speaker ; and it is equally clear that in the third the speaker is not merely in earnest, but that he is also laying stress upon the quickness (*cf. celeres*) with which the act is to be performed.

There are three other passages in which the perfect tense is similarly used, not with a conditional clause, but with a simple statement, introduced, in two of the passages, by *ut*, viz. :

Plautus : Curc. 578. TH. . . nisi mi[hi] uirgo redditur,

Iam ego te *faciam ut hic formicae frustillatim differant*.

CA. At ita me uolsellae, pecten, speculum, calamistrum meum

Bene me *amassint* . . . ,

Vt ego tua magnifica uerba neque istas tuas magnas minas

Non pluris facio quam ancillam meam, quae latrinam lauat.

Stich. 505. Ita me di bene ament measque mihi *seruassint* filias.

Ut mihi uolup est quia uos in patriam domum

Rediisse uideo.

Catullus : 66, 18. Estne nouis nuptis odio Venus, atque parentum

Frustrantur falsis gaudia lacrimulis

Vbertim thalami quas intra limina fundunt?

Non, ita me diui, uera gemunt, *iuerint*.

The first of these is an angry and defiant reply of Cappadox to a threat of bodily harm and death. The outburst of emotion in *meas mihi seruassint filias* in the second passage is explained on p. 19. The emotion in the third passage is not so clearly indicated by the context as in the others, but an unusually energetic expression seems entirely appropriate here and the order of words, in the last line quoted, seems to indicate emotional utterance.

Now let us look at the corresponding instances of the present tense, which will be found under 2, above (pp. 41 ff.). The present tense is used with a mere indicative statement (sometimes introduced by *ut*) 54 times. In 45 of these the expression concerned is the purely formal one, *di me ament* (with slight variations), which, in point of earnestness and meaning, amounts to no more or less than our "Bless me!" It is used almost exclusively with assertions of the most commonplace sort, e. g., Plaut. Most. 182. Ita tu me *ames*, . . . ut uenusta's, "bless me, you look charming!" Most. 170. Ita me di *ament*, lepidast Scapha! etc. There is nowhere the slightest indication among all these instances that the speaker is aroused with such passion or emotion of any sort as would make any of the passages parallel in this respect with the instances, cited above, of the perfect tense. The nearest approach to such a parallel is found in Plaut. Aul. 445. Ita me bene *amet* Lauerna, (uti) te iam nisi reddi Mihi uasa† iubes, pipulo te hic differam ante aedis, "may Lauerna so love me, as I will expose (defame) you by an outcry here in front of the house, if you don't order my cooking utensils restored to me." This is the very mild threat of a cook against the old Athenian Euclio, at whose house he had been engaged to cook. And it is the only threat accompanying any of the 54 instances of the present tense.

There are 19 instances of the present tense vouching for the truth of a condition introduced by *si* or *nisi*. Thirteen of these show no similarity, from the point of view of emotion on the part of the speaker, to the instances of the perfect. The six remaining instances are accompanied by threats, viz.: Mil. 501; Curc.

575; Most. 192; 222; Pers. 292; Bacch. 847. Notice the character of the first of these: At ita me di deaeque omnis *ament*, Nisi mihi supplicium uirgarum de te datur, Longum diutinumque a mane ad uesperum, "may the gods love me (*ament* instead of *perdant*), if you do not get punished". This seems to imply that the speaker does not want the person punished at all. If the threat were serious, we should expect the prayer to take the form "May the gods *destroy* me, if you do not get punished." It will be seen, then, that, of the 73 instances classed under 2, there are after all only 6 with sufficient indication of emotion or intended quickness of action to make them parallel in this respect to the instances of the perfect with which we have compared them. And the existence of these 6 examples cannot be regarded as militating in the slightest degree against my theory of the force of the perfect. Regarding the bearing of such examples upon this theory, see the remarks on p. 108.

The only remaining classes into which I have divided the instances of the present tense are those numbered 6 and 7, comprising expressions of an earnest wish or an energetic order. These should accordingly next claim our attention. I have classed 50 instances under these heads. Anyone who reads them over will probably feel that some of them might well be classed under 4, as calm, or indifferent, prayers or wishes, but I have preferred to be on the safe side and have included here every instance which could possibly offer, as it seemed to me, after a careful examination of the context, any fair ground for a claim that it was emotional.

In our examination of the instances of the perfect, we found it clear in nearly every case that the speaker was intensely in earnest. He was either in trouble and praying for deliverance, or in anxiety about something of the greatest importance to his own happiness (or to the happiness of someone who had aroused his heartfelt sympathy) and praying for the help of the gods, or else he was intensely angry and was venting his feelings in a curse. Keeping these characteristics of the perfect tense constantly in mind, let us compare the passages grouped under 6,

the only passages we have found which seem to be uttered with anything like strong emotion. It will be noticed that, even here among these passages, the circumstances are, as a rule, such as would be likely to call forth less passionate outbursts. For instance, while the speaker is apparently under the influence of emotion, the prayer which he utters is very seldom for anything upon which depends his own personal safety or individual happiness, or the safety or happiness of anyone whose distress has enlisted his sympathy, while those in which the perfect tense is used are almost always prompted by something of that sort. There are 43 of these instances of the present tense. Of this number, 16 are in curses, and in 9 of these 16 instances the verb is *perdat*, the very verb which we found to be especially characteristic of lightly uttered, make-believe curses. Of the remaining instances, 7 are in Cicero and are concerned with the result of elections, or of certain battles, or of something else connected with the condition of Rome. It should be remembered that one would hardly be likely to find extreme outbursts of passion so frequently in Cicero as, for instance, in Plautus. Cicero, except in a few of his letters, is always self-controlled and he never loses his dignity. But loss of both dignity and self-control meets one at every turn among the characters of Plautus. This difference may perhaps explain why the perfect in earnest prayers is relatively less common in Cicero than in Plautus. The rest of the 43 instances are prayers for various sorts of favors, but are in no case of any great importance to the speaker's safety, or happiness.

Our examination thus far has been carried on merely with the help that could be gained from a study of the context, the circumstances of utterance, and the character of the speaker in each case. The results of our comparison of the two tenses, with such help alone, may be summed up as follows: Out of the 194 instances of the perfect optative and volitive subjunctive referring to the future, there is not one which precludes the possibility of the speaker's uttering it under the influence of emotion or a desire to speak with unusual vigor, and in nearly all of them (exceptions being very rare) the emotion is so evident that every

one must recognize its presence at once. On the other hand, out of the 2046 instances of the present tense there are 1987 in which there is clearly no emotion whatever and no indication that any especially vigorous utterance was intended. There remain then only 59 instances, out of a total of 2046, in which the utterance is emotional, or especially vigorous, and in 16 of these the meaning of the verb is opposed to the idea of energetic action (belonging under (a)), which fact would, according to my theory, preclude the use of the perfect tense. This leaves 43 instances. And even in most of these instances we have detected that the emotion of the speaker is less pronounced and his utterance less vigorous than in the instances of the perfect with which they have been compared. Allowing, however, that in each one of these cases the speaker is under the influence of emotion as strong as in the most emotional passage in the list of perfects, this will not weaken in the least my theory of the force of the perfect tense in such expressions. It seldom happens that every word and every phrase of a man aroused by emotion is the strongest word and the strongest phrase that could possibly have been chosen. The difference in such cases between the two tenses seems to be that the perfect carries in itself an indication that the speaker is under the influence of emotion; while in the case of the present tense the emotion must be detected by other means.

But, strong as my case seems to be already, the evidence for the truth of my theory is by no means exhausted. It must be remembered that emotion and vigorous action are not the only characteristics which the theory claims as essential features of this use of the perfect tense. That tense also points to prompt completion, prompt cessation in the future (see pp. 9-11). With however much emotion such ideas as "may he remain," "may he be brave," etc., might be uttered, I should never expect to find them expressed in Latin by the perfect tense, because the idea of prompt completion never in the nature of things accompanies such conceptions. It has been with a view of testing that part of my theory which attributes the idea of "prompt completion" to the Latin perfect subjunctive in its future uses, that I

have divided all verbs into the three classes indicated above by (a), (b), and (c). Before reading what is now about to follow, one should have clearly in mind all that has been said on pages 9-13 regarding these different classes of verbs. In order that the significance of the facts about to be presented may be fully appreciated, the reader should also bear in mind that this classification divides all the verbs in the Latin language into two classes, (a) and (b) comprising those whose meanings are absolutely opposed to the idea of energetic action promptly completed, or do not readily lend themselves to that idea, and (c) comprising all other verbs. At first thought one might suppose that the number of verbs in the Latin language to be classed under (a) and (b) is small as compared with those falling under (c). It is important at this point to appreciate the fact that (a) and (b) form in reality a very large class. Indeed, they include, together, nearly 40% of all the verbs in the language.¹ Not to go outside of verbs beginning with the letter A, there are 144 different verbs of this sort¹, while those to be classed under (c) number only 235.

¹ For fear this statement may seem unwarranted, I append here a list of all such verbs found in Harper's Latin Dictionary under the letter A. The proportion of such verbs among those beginning with other letters would not be likely to vary greatly. In making the following classification, I have accepted in each case the definition given in the Dictionary, even where I should personally question the justness of such a definition.

(a) Absolutely opposed :

Abdo (when meaning "keep hidden"), abhorreo ("keep aloof from", "be inconsistent with"), abludo ("be unlike"), abolesco, abominor, abstineo, absum, abundo, accedo (when meaning "be like"), acclino, accolo, accredo, accubito, accubo, accumbo (when meaning "lie", rather than "lay one's self"), actito ("be much, or often, employed in"), adaequo ("be equal"), adamo, addubito, adhaereo, adhaeresco, adhibeo ("hold to"), adiaceo, adiuuo, (when meaning "be of use"), administro, admiror, admurmuro, adnitor, adquiesco (when meaning "rest", "be satisfied with"), adrepo, adrideo, adsector ("wait upon"), adsentio (when meaning "be in agreement with"), adsentior, adseruio ("be of service to"), adseruo, adsideo, adsisto, adsoleo, adsuefacio, adsuesco, adsum, adulo, adulor, adluecto ("convey often"), aduesperascit, aduigilo, aegresco ("be troubled"), aegroto, aemulor, aequipero, (when meaning "rival"), aequo, (when meaning "be equal to", "rival"), aestimo (when meaning "hold", "esteem", "regard as"), aestuo, aggrauesco, agito (frequentative), ago (when meaning

If then there is no essential difference between the two tenses with reference to this idea of prompt completion, or prompt cessation, we should expect to find about the same proportion of verbs belonging under (a) and (b) in the perfect tense as in the present tense—about the same proportion, I mean, of the entire number of verbs found in each tense; for it has been solely with reference to this one idea of "prompt completion" that the verbs under (c) have been separated from those under (a) and (b). What light is thrown then by the verbs found in the list of perfects, as compared with those found in the list of presents? The following table will be found useful in seeking the answer to this question :

<i>Perfect Tense.</i>		<i>Present Tense.</i>	
Independent Clauses.	Number of instances.	Independent Clauses.	Number of instances.
<i>Without a Negative.</i>		<i>Without a Negative.</i>	
FIRST PERSON :		FIRST PERSON :	
(a)	0	(a)	63
(b)	0	(b)	150
(c)	0	(c)	421
SECOND PERSON :		SECOND PERSON :	
(a)	0	(a)	66
(b)	0	(b)	12
(c)	3	(c)	121
THIRD PERSON :		THIRD PERSON :	
(a)	1 (?)	(a)	382
(b)	0	(b)	42
(c)	49	(c)	599

"deliberate", "treat of", "be at stake", etc.), albeo, albico, algeo, alo, alterco, altercor, alterno, alucinor, ambigo, amo, amplector (when meaning "cling to", etc.), amplexor ("be fond of"), amplio ("reserve a decision"), ampullor, anheo, antecedo ("have precedence of"), antecello, antehabeo, antepono ("value above"), anteuenio ("exceed"), antisto, appareo, apploro, approbo "favor"), apricor, arbitror, arceo, ardeo, ardesco, areo, aresco ("languish"), arguto, aspecto, aspernor, aspicio, astipulor ("agree with"), asto, astupeo, attineo, attingo (when meaning "be related to", "resemble"), aucupor, aueo.

(b) Unfavorable :

Aberro, acclamo (of continued or repeated shouting), accresco (of gradual growing), accuro, adaugesco ("grow", "thrive"), adbibo ("listen to attentively"), adblatero, adedo ("nibble"), adhortor, adiuto (frequentative), adnumero (when meaning "count among"), adoleasco (of slow growth),

I. Tenses in Volitive and Optative Expressions. III

Perfect Tense.

With a Negative.

FIRST PERSON :		
(a)	0	
(b)	0	
(c)	0	
SECOND PERSON :		
(a)	16	
(b)	3	
(c)	81	
THIRD PERSON :		
(a)	4	
(b)	0	
(c)	11	

Dependent Clauses.

Without a Negative.

FIRST PERSON :			0
SECOND PERSON :			
(a)	0		
(b)	0		
(c)	5		
THIRD PERSON :			
(a)	0		
(b)	0		
(c)	6		

With a Negative.

FIRST PERSON :		
(a)	0	
(b)	0	
(c)	3	
SECOND PERSON :		
(a)	0	
(b)	0	
(c)	2	
THIRD PERSON :		
(a)	0	
(b)	0	
(c)	10	

Present Tense.

With a Negative.

FIRST PERSON :		
(a)	5	
(b)	0	
(c)	0	
SECOND PERSON :		
(a)	50	
(b)	11	
(c)	54	
THIRD PERSON :		
(a)	35	
(b)	4	
(c)	32	

adolesco (inchoative from adoleo, "burn"), adoro, adrodo, adrogo (when meaning "claim"), adsero (when meaning "claim"), adseuero (when meaning "insist on"), adsimulo ("pretend"), adumbro, adurgeo, aduersor, aggemmo, ambio (when meaning "canvass", "court"), ambulo, ango, ("squeeze", "choke", "trouble"), animaduerto ("attend to" "regard"), anquiro, anteo, antefero, antegredior, appeto ("strive after", "desire"), applaudo, appono ("deem"), apprecor, apprimo, aro, aspiro, attendo, attrecto, auctito (frequentative), audeo (when meaning "be bold"), audio ("listen to"), auguror (when meaning "act as augur").

Let us consider first the passages without a negative. Of these there is not one verb in the list of perfects that certainly belongs under (a) or (b); the verb *amassint* in Curc. 578 (*bene me amassint*) forms no exception to this statement, if understood in the sense of "bless", a meaning that is distinctly recognized for it by Harpers' Dictionary. But in the lists of presents there are no less than 715 verbs belonging under (a) and (b). This is nearly 39% of the whole number of instances and about what we should expect as a matter of probability, in view of the fact that the verbs belonging under (a) and (b) form about 40% of the whole number of verbs in the Latin language, and that the present tense is equally appropriate for all three classes of verbs, (a), (b) and (c). If there is no difference of meaning between the two tenses, we should expect to find in the perfect tense about the same proportion of verbs belonging under (a) and (b). Instead of this we find not one, if *amassint* be understood in the sense of "bless". Why such an abundance of verbs of this class in the present, such a dearth of them in the perfect?

Let us now consider the instances accompanied by a negative. We have noticed above (pp. 12-13) that the addition of a negative in most cases has the effect of removing the verb from the class (a) or (b) to the class (c). We should, therefore, expect to find the perfect tense of the verbs in (a) and (b) reappearing among negative expressions, if the utterance is emotional; and this is just what we do find. Among negative expressions there are in the list of perfects 23 instances (2 of them with *caue*) of verbs belonging to (a) and (b), against 105 in the list of presents. That is, 11% of the entire number of instances of the perfect with the negative¹, and nearly 6% of the whole number of instances of the present with the negative, belong to (a) and (b).

The full significance of the line of argument which has just been presented and its bearing upon the general question of the

¹ The instances of the perfect in *dependent* clauses are disregarded in calculating the percentage as I have collected no corresponding statistics for the present tense in dependent clauses.

force of the future uses of the Latin perfect subjunctive will not be appreciated until we come to the discussion of similar phenomena in the use of tenses in the Subjunctive of Contingent Futurity, where the instances of the perfect tense are more numerous and comprise a larger variety of verbs.

To sum up the results of my discussion thus far, we have, on the one hand, in support of my theory, the absolute lack of certain classes of verbs ((a) and (b) when not accompanied by a negative) in the perfect, and on the other, the presence of 715 of these verbs in the present tense. All the other verbs found in the present it would seem as natural to use with the one tense as with the other, and they accordingly have no testimony to offer on either side in this connection, as far as the meaning itself of the verb is concerned. Even these passages, however, as has been seen above, give the most decided support to my theory when considered with reference to the emotional, or non-emotional character of the passages. It seems to me, therefore, that the discussion has demonstrated beyond all possibility of reasonable doubt that, so far at least as volitive and optative expressions are concerned, (1) the perfect subjunctive indicates emotion, unusual energy, or rapidity of action, and (2) that the present tense is almost entirely confined to expressions of more ordinary types.

We may now pass to the consideration of expressions of contingent futurity.

II.

TENSES IN EXPRESSIONS OF CONTINGENT FUTURITY.¹

In attempting to determine the distinction between the tenses in expressions of contingent futurity, we may start with the same general principles which I have laid down in Part I in discussing the volitive subjunctive. In the present tense we may still look for progress and deliberate action; in the perfect for a hurried leap over the beginning and the progress of the act and a concentration of the attention upon its full and complete accomplishment in the future. However, the application of this fundamental idea to these particular expressions would lead one to expect, in the perfect tense, results somewhat different from those reached by its application to volitive expressions. In the latter expressions, the act was one which, while intensely desired by the speaker, was to be performed not by the speaker himself but by some one else, whose action he was commonly trying to influence. The action was beyond the speaker's control except so far as the earnestness or vehemence of his plea could influence another's action. The attitude of the speaker and his feeling of comparative helplessness in matters of importance to himself would naturally tend to make emotion and excitement the prevailing characteristics of the aoristic conception as applied to such conditions. In the expression of a command or a wish the attitude of the speaker is, in the nature of things, always one of opposition. *He sets himself against* the non-happening of something which he wishes to happen, or the happening of something

¹ This term has been used by Bennett in the Appendix to his Latin Grammar. Cf. Delbrück, *Synt. Forsch.* IV, p. 117. Hale calls this use of the subjunctive the "Subjunctive of Ideal Certainty" (e. g., in *The Anticipatory Subjunctive in Greek and Latin*, page 8, note).

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 115

which he does not wish to happen. And this attitude of opposition is favorable to outbursts of passion, according to the degree of opposition, or to the degree of fear of the consequences that would follow a failure to have a prayer fulfilled, or an order obeyed. Now with the Subjunctive of Contingent Futurity, the case is somewhat different. It is in its very nature subjective in character. It deals exclusively with what, under certain circumstances, the speaker himself would do, or what, according to his own views, some one else would do, *e. g.*, *credam*, "I should believe;" *non putes*, "you would (I feel sure) not suppose," etc. Under such circumstances, the aorist would not, perhaps, so often as in the case of the volitive, mean that the speaker was excited, angry, anxious, or in fear. The application of the fundamental idea of the Latin aorist (in its future uses), as outlined above, would lead us to expect the aorist here to be prompted oftentimes merely by unusual earnestness, or by a desire to emphasize the rapidity, the facility, or the certainty and decisiveness, with which the act would be performed and finished, though even here the earnestness is frequently due to the fact that the speaker is unusually aroused.

Owing to the peculiar nature of the Subjunctive of Contingent Futurity, as just indicated, we shall, in attempting to get at the difference in tone between the two tenses, be aided less by the context than we were in examining the volitive expressions, where the usually dialogistic character of the passages often threw much light upon the tone of the utterance and the moods of the speakers. Here the speaker is expressing rather his own individual beliefs and convictions, or indicating what his own conduct would be, and the form of his utterance depends in every case upon the tone which he prefers to adopt. And the tone or earnestness with which such an expression as *non putauerim* is uttered may not always be clearly indicated by the context. Still the study of the context, even in these passages, is very fruitful. It will be noticed that the context in which the perfect tense is found is, in the majority of cases, clearly marked by a tone of braggadocio, extravagant or threatening language, or other indications of a desire to

speak with unusual emphasis or to represent the act as one to be performed with unusual rapidity or ease. This tone is very often made clearer by the addition of appropriate modifiers, as will be pointed out more explicitly in my general remarks at the end of the chapter. It will be well to examine the passages first with special reference to the context and to the mood and character of the speaker in each case. After such an examination we will pass to the consideration of the abundant items of testimony of other sorts—all pointing in one direction, all going to show that, to the Roman mind, there was a perfectly clear-cut and important distinction between the tenses and that this distinction was observed on all occasions with the utmost care.

The instances of the perfect tense, which immediately follow, are grouped under the same heads as the instances of the volitive, with reference to the meaning of the verbs, and these groups are similarly indicated by (a) **Absolutely opposed**, (b) **Unfavorable** and (c) **Indifferent**.

Perfect Tense.

Without a Negative.

[*Rhetorical questions, equivalent to negative expressions, are classed below under "With a Negative".*]

FIRST PERSON:

(a) **Absolutely opposed:**

The discussion at the end of Part II will, I think, make it seem certain that all of the instances here cited, which represent correct readings, really belong under (c). I cite them here merely because they might be thought at first sight to belong here; and I wish to avoid all possibility of suspicion that I am straining points in favor of my theory. As they have an important bearing upon the theory I am attempting to establish, each passage will be fully considered, as soon as we get before us the complete material which must form the basis of our discussion.

Cicero: *Tusc. disp.* IV, 22, 50. fortasse *dubitarim*, where *dubitarim* is unquestionably, as I shall attempt to prove below, an incorrect reading for *dubitarem*.

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 117

Brut. 83, 288. *consuerim*.

ad fam. 1, 7, 3. *quod facile intellexerim*.

Hor. Od. II, 13, 5. *crediderim*.

Sat. I, 1, 79. *optarim*, an incorrect reading for *optarem*. See the consideration of the passage, below.

Tibull. 1, 6, 74. *optarim*.

Propert. 1, 1, 23. *crediderim*.

(b) Unfavorable :

No example.

(c) Indifferent :

Plautus : Am. 511. *Edepol ne illa si istis rebus te sciat operam dare,*

Ego faxim ted Amphitruonem esse malis quam Iouem.

Unusual earnestness is here indicated by the nature of the thought and by the use of *edepol*, *ne* and *ego* and by the position of words.

Trin. 221. *Pauci sint faxim* qui sciant quod nesciunt,

Occlusioremque habeant stultiloquentiam.

A tone of utter disgust runs through this whole passage.

Asin. 491. *Praefiscini hoc nunc dixerim.*

The speaker has been quarreling with the ass-dealer and applying to him the most abusive epithets. The vigorous tense of *dixerim* is quite in keeping with the general tone of the conversation and betrays the speaker's indignation : *I would have you understand once for all*. However, Cramer (pp. 53-54) regards this *dixerim* as an optative.

Merc. 826. *Ecastor faxim.*

Plures uiri sint uidui quam nunc mulieres.

These are the words of the old slave Syra. She and her mistress, upon returning unexpectedly from the country, have discovered that the latter's husband has, during their absence, brought home a harlot with whom he is now living. Syra is thoroughly aroused at such perfidy ; *cf.* her words upon first discovering it, 681 : *Disperii ! perii misera ! uae miserae mihi !* She has just been present at a quarrel between her mistress and

the faithless husband and is now soliloquizing on the hard lot of her sex. The words before us are a threat against men who are guilty of such practices.

Poen. 1088 (1091). Male *faxim lubens*.

This is the reply of Hanno to Milphio's query as to whether the former could play a trick upon a foe of Agorastocles. Hanno has just discovered, to his great delight, that Agorastocles is his lost relative and he accordingly speaks with great feeling.

ib. 1090. Male *faxim lubens*.

This is like the *faxim* in 1088 (1091) and is similarly prompted by Hanno's feeling toward Agorastocles.

Aul. 420. Homo nullust te scelestior qui uiuat hodie

Neque quoui ego de industria amplius male plus *lubens faxim*.

Congrio has just rushed out of Euclio's house crying that they have been mauling him with clubs, and calling to the bystanders for help. Euclio comes rushing out after him and the quarrel continues. The words quoted are uttered by Euclio in reply to Congrio's expressed regret that he did not stab the former.

ib. 494 (486). Ego *faxim* muli pretio qui superant equos
Sint uiliores Gallicis cantheriis.

Megadorus is here descanting upon existing wrongs; *he* would set things right in a trice if he could have *his* way.

Persa 73. Si id fiat, ne isti *faxim* nusquam appareant,
Qui hic albo rete aliena oppugnant bona.

The parasite, Saturio, is here boasting, in the bombastic manner characteristic of those of his calling, of what *he* would do, if the management of things were only in *his* hands.

Truc. 348-349. . . . si qua mihi obtigerit hereditas
Magna atque luculenta, nunc postquam scio,
Dulce atque amarum quid sit ex pecunia ;
Ita ego illam edepol seruem itaque parce uictitem,
Vt—nulla *faxim* cis dies paucos siet.

Ego istos, qui nunc me culpant, *confutauerim*.

These are the words of a dissipated, impetuous youth who is waiting to see his mistress. His speech is made up of extravagant

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 119

expressions and exclamations and the whole point of *ut nulla faxim*, etc., clearly lies in the promptness with which the act would be performed.

ib. 620 (629). Ego tecum, bellator, arbitrum aequom *ceperim*.

The speaker has been having a war of words with Stratophanes. Each has called the other the most insulting names and each has threatened to cut the other to pieces (*cf.* 604 (613), 605 (614), 612 (621), 615 (624), 617 (626)). With the words quoted, the speaker withdraws in great haste and badly frightened, though he keeps up a courageous appearance. This passage is, however corrupt, and the classification of *ceperim* is uncertain.

ib. 697 (707). . . . Si non peream, *plane interierim*.

The dissipated Diniarchus has been thrown into an ecstasy of delight by the message just received from his mistress. His whole speech is in keeping with his emotions. (This reading, however, is not recognized by Goetz and Schöll, the passage being marked as corrupt.)

Cas. 424-426. Si nunc me suspendam, meam operam *luserim*

Et praeter operam restim sumpti *fecerim*

Et meis inimicis uoluptatem *creauerim*.

The speaker has been fighting in the preceding scene and the conversation has been in keeping with the action. Chalinus has just been deprived of his intended wife and is considering the advisability of committing suicide. However, these subjunctives may be true future perfect subjunctives, in which case they would not belong here.

Terence: And. 203. Vbiuis *facilius passus sim* quam in hac re me deludier.

The combination here of *passus sim* with *deludier* shows that it is here used of an act that can be promptly finished and not in the sense that it sometimes has of *permanently permitting*. Compare remarks on *sino* and *liceat* (p. 12).

Heaut. 316. Hoc uide! in mea uita tu tibi laudem is quaesitum, scelus,

Vbi si paululum modo quid te fugerit, ego *perierim*?

The speaker is suddenly startled by a threatened danger. Compare the exclamatory character of his utterances last preceding.

Adelph. 887. Seruom haud inliberalem praebes te, et tibi
Lubens bene faxim.

Demea, who has hitherto been harsh and morose in manner, has seen the folly of his ways and has now decided to show to everybody the utmost possible cordiality (*cf.* 877 ff.). The humor from this point to the end of the play consists entirely in his excessive cordiality and his extravagant expressions and behavior.

ib. 897. *Lubens bene faxim.* See remarks on 887.

Hec. 424. . . . denique hercle *aufugerim*.

Potius quam redeam, si eo mihi redeundum sciam.

The speaker is describing his terrible experiences at sea, where he was constantly expecting death at any moment (*cf.* 422).

Lucretius : de rerum nat. II, 178. *ausim* ("venture") confirmare.

Cicero : pro Mur. 29, 60. . . . sed peccas : te regere possum. At ego non te : *uerissime dixerim* te nihil neque ulla in re te esse huius modi, ut corrigendus potius quam leuiter inflectendus esse uideare.

Phil. II, 46, 118. . . contempsi Catilinae gladios, non pertimescam tuos : quin etiam corpus *libenter obtulerim*, si repraesentari morte mea libertas ciuitatis potest.

This is from one of the most impassioned passages in all the works of Cicero.

ib. XII, 9, 22. Tres uiae sunt ad Mutinam—quo festinat animus, ut quam primum illud pignus libertatis populi Romani, D. Brutum, aspicere possim ; cuius in complexu *libenter* extremum uitae spiritum *ediderim*, cum omnes actiones horum mensum, omnes sententiae meae peruenerint ad eum, qui mihi fuit propositus, exitum.

de orat. III, 41, 163. Deinde uidendum est ne longe simile sit ductum : 'Syrтим patrimoni' ; scopulum *libentius dixerim*.

Crassus is here criticising the metaphor in "Syrтим patrimoni" as one to be avoided ; *scopulum* is by all means the word to use instead of *Syrтим*.

Brut. 6, 25. Laudare igitur eloquentiam et quanta uis sit eius exponere . . . neque propositum nobis est hoc loco neque necessarium ; hoc *uero sine ulla dubitatione confirmauerim* . . . rem unam esse omnium difficillimam.

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 121

ib. 50, 187. Qua re tibicen Antigenidas dixerit discipulo sane frigenti ad populum 'mihi cane et Musis': ego huic Bruto dicenti, ut solet, apud multitudinem 'mihi cane et populo, mi Brute', *dixerim*, ut qui audient, quid efficiatur, ego etiam, cur id efficiatur, intellegam.

orat. 47, 157. Et 'posmeridianas quadrigas' quam 'postmeridianas' *libentius dixerim* et 'mehercule' quam 'mehercules.'

de nat. deor. I, 20, 51. Hunc deum rite beatum *dixerimus*, uestrum uero laboriosissimum.

This *dixerimus*, however, is probably the future perfect indicative.

ib. I, 21, 60. Vt enim modo dixi, omnibus fere in rebus, sed maxime in physicis, quid non sit, *citius*, quam quid sit, *dixerim*.

He then goes on to emphasize the extreme difficulty of saying *quid sit*.

de div. I, 55, 125. Quin etiam hoc *non dubitans dixerim*.

de fin. II, 3, 8. Ego quoque *didicerim libentius*, si quid attuleris, quam te reprehenderim.

Tusc. disp. I, 17, 40. Ego ipse cum Platone *non inuitus errauerim* ("go astray").

ib. II, 20, 46. quod quidem *citius dixerim* solum quam non summum bonum.

ib. II, 24, 57. sin erit ille gemitus elamentabilis . . . ei qui se dederit, uix eum uirum *dixerim*.

de rep. III, 33, 45. Ac nullam quidem *citius negauerim* esse rem publicam, quam, etc.

de legibus. I, 4, 13. M. In longum sermonem me uocas, Attice; quem tamen, nisi Quintus aliud quid nos agere mauolt, suscipiam et, quoniam uacui sumus, dicam. Q. Ego uero *libenter audierim*.

ad Att., VI, 2, 1. . . et respondebo primum postremae tuae paginae, quae mihi magnae molestiae fuit . . . in quo hoc molestissimum est, Statium dicere a me quoque id consilium probari. Probari autem? de isto hactenus. *Dixerim* me uel plurima uincla tecum summae coniunctionis optare, etsi sunt amoris artissima; tantum abest, ut ego ex eo, quo astricti sumus,

laxari aliquid uelim. Illum autem multa de istis rebus asperius solere loqui saepe sum expertus, saepe etiam leniui iratum.

Cicero is very much disturbed over a report that has reached Atticus reflecting upon his sincerity and fidelity. This *dixerim* is an emphatic declaration of his real feelings intended to counteract the effect of such reports. The loss of Atticus' friendship would have been a serious blow to Cicero.

ib. XIV, 17, A, 4. Quamquam, mi Dolabella, . . . libentius omnis meas, si modo sunt aliquae meae, laudes ad te transfuderim, quam aliquam partem exhauserim ex tuis: nam cum te semper tantum dilexerim, quantum tu intellegere potuisti, tum his tuis factis sic incensus sum, ut nihil umquam in amore fuerit ardentius.

This letter is written throughout in the most extravagant tone.

ad fam. V, 21, 1. . . . hoc uero tempore, cum alii interierint, alii absint, alii mutati uoluntate sint, unum medius fidius tecum diem *libentius posuerim* quam hoc omne tempus cum plerisque eorum, quibuscum uiuo necessario.

ib. VII, 23, 3. Ista quidem summa ne ego multo libentius emerim deuersorium Tarracinae, ne semper hospiti molestus sim.

Cornificius: ad Her. III, 11, 19. . . . egregie magnam esse utilitatem in pronuntiatione *audacter confirmauerimus*.

Horace: Sat. I, 3, 64. Simplicior quis et est, qualem me saepe
libenter

Obtulerim tibi, Maecenas.

ib. I, 4, 39. Primum ego me illorum dederim quibus esse poetis
Excerptam numero.

Vergil: Catalepton 9 (11), 56. Non nostrum est tantas, non,
inquam, attingere laudes,

Quin *ausim*¹ hoc etiam dicere, uix hominum est.

Georg. 2, 289. *Ausim*¹ uel tenui uitem committere sulco.

Ovid: Am. I, 14, 33. Formosae periire comae, quas uellet
Apollo,

¹ *Ausim*, with the infinitive, seems to be used, as a rule, in the sense of "venture" and I have accordingly classified it here under (c).

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 123

Quas uellet capiti Bacchus inesse suo.
Illis *contulerim*, quas quondam nuda Dione
Pingitur umentis sustinuisse manu.
ib. II, 16, 21. Cum domina Libycas *ausim*¹ perrumpere Syrtes.
Met. VIII, 77. Et cur ulla foret me fortior? ire per ignes
Et gladios *ausim*¹.
Heroid. VII, 126. Quid dubitas uinctam Gaetulo tradere Iarbae?
Praebuerim sceleri bracchia nostra tuo.
Est etiam frater, cuius manus impia possit
Respergi nostro, sparsa cruore uiri.

Such expressions as *bona tua uenia dixerim* are not included among the instances of this use. I agree with Cramer in regarding *dixerim* in such cases as a true future-perfect tense of the optative mood.²

¹ See note on p. 122.

² The expressions *bona tua uenia dixerim*, *pace tua dixerim*, and the like, occur in the following passages:

Cicero: de orat. I, 57, 242. . . a quo cum amentatas hastas acceperit, ipse eas oratoris lacertis uiribusque torquebit. Nisi uero—*bona uenia* huius optimi uiri *dixerim*—tu libellis aut praeceptis soceri tui causam M'. Curi defendisti, non adripuisti patrocinium aequitatis et defensionem testamentorum ac uoluntatis mortuorum.

Cicero: Mil. 38, 103. O me miserum! O me infelicem! . . . Omnes in me meosque redundant ex fonte illo dolores. . . qui possum putare me restitutum esse, si distrahar ab his per quos restitutus sum? Vtinam di immortales fecissent—*pace tua*, patria, *dixerim*: metuo enim ne scelerate dicam in te quod pro Milone dicam pie . . . O di immortales! fortem et a uobis, iudices, conseruandum uirum "Minime! minime!" inquit, etc.

de div. I, 15, 25. *bona tua uenia dixerim*.

de fat. 3, 5. *pace magistri dixerim*.

ad fam. 7, 17, 1. . . litteris tuis uehementer commouebam, quod mihi interdum—*pace tua dixerim*—leuis in urbis urbanitatisque desiderio, interdum piger, interdum timidus in labore militari, saepe autem etiam, quod a te alienissimum est, subimpudens uidebare.

de off. 10, 41. *pace uel Quirini uel Romuli dixerim*.

de leg. III, 12, 29. *pace tua dixerim*.

ib. III, 15, 34. *bona tua uenia dixerim*.

ib. III, 16, 35. *pace familiae dixerim*.

There can be little doubt that Cramer is right in holding (*de perf. coni*, etc., pp. 54-55) that such uses should be classed under the optative subjunctive; and that the tense is a true future perfect subjunctive and

SECOND PERSON :

(a) Absolutely opposed :

No example.

(b) Unfavorable :

No example.

(c) Indifferent :

Plautus : Trin. 1054. [Vel illud quod credideris perdas uel illum amicum amiseris?] *i. e.*, "would lose that friend *in short order*".

Cicero : Brut. 9, 35. Tum fuit Lysias ipse quidem in causis forensibus non uersatus, sed egregie subtilis scriptor atque elegans, quem iam *prope audeas* oratorem perfectum dicere : nam *plane quidem* perfectum et cui nihil admodum desit Demosthenem *facile dixeris*.

Notice the contrast here between the present *prope audeas* and the perfect *facile dixeris* (*cf.* the preceding *plane quidem*), and see remarks at the end of Part II.

THIRD PERSON :

therefore does not belong to the phenomena at present under discussion. The expression *pace tua dixerim* means "may I have said what I am about to say, without offense to you", or, more freely, "I hope you will not be offended after I have said what I am going to say". There are serious objections to understanding this expression as an instance similar to those under discussion above. In the first place, it does not make good sense. If so interpreted, *pace tua dixerim* would have to be translated "I should say without offense to you", where "should", of course, would merely indicate the conclusion of an unexpressed contingent-future condition. The expression would then mean "my words would not offend you (if I were to say so and so)". But such an idea would make no sense in any of these passages. To be sure, the translation "I would say without offense to you" makes good sense, but such a translation not only treats *dixerim* as a volitive subjunctive, but it also presupposes a use of the volitive subjunctive that is not found. "I would" differs from "I should" (this "should", of course, having nothing to do with the idea of obligation) in the same way that "I will" differs from "I shall". "I will" and "I would" deal with volition, "I shall" and "I should" (in the uses now under consideration), with mere futurity. The ideas of "I will" and "I would" are not expressed by the Latin subjunctive (*cf.* my note on p. 72). Another and an equally serious objection to interpreting *dixerim* in these passages as an expression of contingent futurity lies in the fact that the perfect subjunctive, in such uses, is shown later on in this paper to denote energetic action performed in a quick or decided manner, an idea manifestly inappropriate in this instance.

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 125

(a) Absolutely opposed:

No example.

(b) Unfavorable :

No example.

(c) Indifferent :

Plautus : Rud. 978. Ne [tu homo's] inpudenter inpudens :

Nam si istuc ius sit quod memoras, piscatores, *perierint*.

Trin. 753. Ut ego nunc adulescenti thesaurum indicem

Indomito, pleno amoris ac lasciuiæ ?

Minume, minume hercle uero : . . .

Locum quoque illum omnem ubi situm *comederit*.

i. e., he would make short work of it. The speaker is aroused by fear of losing a treasure.

ib. 1023. ST. †Truchus fuit, Cerconicus, Crinnus, Cercobulus, Collabus,

Oculicrepidae, cruricrepidae, ferriteri, mastigiae :

Quorum eorum unus *surpuerit* currenti cursori solum.

CH. Ita me di ament, graphicum furem.

The *surpuerit* is quite in keeping with the tone of the rest of the passage : “(all those rascally jail birds) any one of whom, by heaven, would snatch the sole of his shoe from a running footman”. Goetz and Schöll, however, here read *surrupuit*.

Poen. 885. Si erus meus me esse elocutum quoiquam mortali sciat,

Continuo is me ex Syncerasto Crurifragium *fecerit*.

The speaker is here extremely angry with his master (*cf.* the beginning of the scene) and wants to bring about his ruin ; still he fears the results of betraying him. Anger and fear are the prevailing characteristics of nearly all that he says in this scene.

Cicero : de off. III, 6, 29. Nonne igitur sapiens, si fame ipse conficiatur, *abstulerit* cibum alteri, homini ad nullam rem utili ?

This is classed here because it is equivalent to an affirmative assertion.

Vergil : Aen. 2, 600. . . . ni mea cura resistat,

Iam flammae *tulerint*, inimicus et *hauserit* ensis.

With a Negative (expressed or implied).

FIRST PERSON :

A. Negative Statements.

(a) Absolutely opposed :

Cicero : de orat. I, 36, 167. Ego uero istos . . . *non modo* oratores nomine sed *ne* foro *quidem* dignos *putarim* (an expression of *not thinking*, i. e., of promptly rejecting the thought).

Scaevola thus replies to a question put by Crassus—a question to which sensible men would all give the same answer. Scaevola emphatically repudiates the intimation that he could hold such absurd views. The first three words with which he begins his reply (*ego uero istos*) betray a certain amount of irritation at the suggestion.

de re pub. I, 4, 7. *Non dubitauerim* me grauissimis tempestatibus obuium ferre.

Vergil : Georg. 2, 338. *Non* alios prima crescentis origine mundi
Inluxisse dies aliumue habuisse tenorem
Crediderim.

Ovid : Met. XV. 260. *Nil* equidem durare diu sub imagine eadem
Crediderim.

Tibullus III, 4, 83. *Nec* tibi *crediderim* uotis contraria uota
Nec tantum crimen pectore inesse tuo.

(b) Unfavorable :

No example.

(c) Indifferent :

Plautus : Mil. 316. *Non* ego tuam *empsim* uitam uitiosa nuce.

Palaestrio is endeavoring to frighten Sceledrus. In his last utterance he had insinuated that the latter's eyes were to be gouged out, and in vs. 318 he insinuates that his tongue ought to be cut off.

Asin. 503. *Hau negassim*.

The speakers have been quarreling and abusing each other, though they have now calmed down somewhat.

Aul. 474. Iam hunc *non ausim*¹ *praeterire* quin consistam et conloquar.

¹ See note on p. 122.

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 127

These are the words of the hot-tempered Euclio, whose speech is throughout the play characterized by extravagant, energetic expressions. He has just told (469 ff.) how he took a club and knocked off the head of a cock for scratching around where his money was buried. Just now he suspects that the cooks have designs upon his treasure, and, while still thoroughly aroused at the threatened danger, he sees Megadorus approaching, whereupon he uses the words above quoted.

Cicero : de fin. II, 8, 24. hos ergo asotos quidem uiuere aut beate *numquam dixerim*.

Tusc. disp. III, 5, 11. Graeci autem *μὰνίαν* unde appellant *non facile dixerim*.

Brutus 5, 18. 'At uero' inquam, 'tibi ego, Brute, non soluam nisi prius a te cauero amplius eo nomine neminem, cuius petitio sit, petiturum'. '*Non mehercule*', inquit, tibi repromittere *istuc* quidem *ausim*¹ (cf. 9, 35 quem iam *prope audeas*)

ib. 13, 52. '*Ista uero*', inquit, 'quam necessaria fuerint *non facile dixerim*'.

ib. 41, 151. *Non enim facile* quem *dixerim* plus studi quam illum et ad dicendum et ad omnis bonarum rerum disciplinas adhibuisse.

ib. 47, 173. Duobus igitur summis, Crasso et Antonio, L. Philippus proximus accedebat, sed longo interuallo tamen proximus ; itaque eum, etsi nemo intercedebat, qui se illi anteferebat, *neque* secundum tamen *neque* tertium *dixerim* : nec enim in quadrigis eum secundum *numerauerim* aut tertium, qui uix e carceribus exierit, cum palmam iam primus acceperit ; nec in oratoribus, qui tantum absit a primo, uix ut in eodem curriculo esse uideatur.

The extravagant illustration here used shows the emphasis with which the words are uttered.

ib. 76, 264. Sed *neque* uerbis aptiorem *cito* alium *dixerim* *neque* sentiis crebriorem.

The speaker has just mentioned certain objectionable characteristics of the oratory of C. Visellius Varro. He wishes now to

¹ See note on p. 122.

counteract the impression thus made by emphasizing its merits and placing these above its demerits.

ib. 78, 272. Studio autem neminem nec industria maiore cognoui, quamquam *ne* ingenio *quidem* qui praestiterit *facile dixerim* C. Pisoni genero meo.

orat. 47, 157. *Nec uero reprehenderim* "scripsere alii rem".

de nat. deor. III, 38, 91. Vtrum poetae Stoicos deprauarint, an Stoici poetis dederint auctoritatem, *non facile dixerim*.

de orat. III, 38, 153. *Neque* enim illud *fugerim* dicere, ut Caelius 'qua tempestate Poenus in Italiam uenit', nec 'prolem', etc.

de re pub. I, 3, 6. Sed *haud facile dixerim*, cur, etc.

ad Brut. I, 15, 10. Hoc bello uictores quam rem publicam simus habituri, *non facile adfirmarim*; uictis certe nulla umquam erit.

Verr. II, 4, 43, 94. . . . ibi est ex aere simulacrum ipsius Herculis, quo *non facile dixerim* quicquam me uidisse pulchrius.

Cornificius: ad Her. III, 11, 19. Nos quidem unum de quinque rebus plurimum posse *non facile dixerimus*.

Horace: Sat. I, 5, 44. *Nil ego contulerim* iucundo sanus amico.

ib. I, 10, 5. *Nec* tamen hoc tribuens *dederim* quoque cetera.

ib. I, 10, 48. *neque* ego illi detrahere *ausim*¹

Haerentem capiti cum multa laude coronam.

Vergil: Ecl. 3, 32. De grege *non ausim*¹ quicquam deponere tecum.

Georg. 2, 102. *Non* ego te, dis et mensis accepta secundis,
Transierim, Rhodia.

Aen. 11, 164. *Nec* uos *arguerim*, Teucrici, nec foedera nec quas
Iunximus hospitio dextras: sors ista senectae
Debita erat nostrae.

These are the impassioned words of a father who has thrown himself upon the corpse of his son and is now clinging to it, groaning and weeping.

¹ For the classification of *ausim* with the infinitive, see note on p. 122.

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 129

Ovid : ex Pont. IV, 16, 41. Te tamen in turba *non ausim*¹, Cotta,
silere,

Pieridum lumen praesidiumque fori.

Am. II, 4, 1. *Non* ego mendosos *ausim*¹ defendere mores.

ib. III, 1, 39. *Non* ego *contulerim* sublimia carmina nostris.

Remed. Am. III, 700. *Non* ego Dulichio furialis more sagittas,

Nec raptas *ausim*¹ tinguere in amne faces.

Met. VI, 561. Hoc quoque post facinus—uix *ausim*¹ credere—
fertur

Saepe sua lacerum repetisse libidine corpus.

The awful character of the crime is enough to account for the
tense of *ausim*.

Propertius : II, 5, 24. *Nec* tibi conexos iratus carpere crines

Nec duris *ausim* laedere pollicibus.

III, 12 (19), 21. *Non* tamen ut uastos *ausim* temptare leones.

B. Rhetorical Questions, Equivalent to Negative Statements.

(a) Absolutely opposed :

No example.

(b) Unfavorable :

No example.

(c) Indifferent :

Plautus : Most. 923. TH. At enim ne quid captionis mihi
sit, si dederim tibi.

TR. Egone te ioculo modo *ausim*, dicto aut facto fallere ?

Tranio is trying to rescue Philolaches from his dilemma by de-
ceiving the old man Theopropides. Everything depends upon the
success of his efforts. Nearly everything that Tranio has said
thus far is extravagant assertion and in part exclamatory in char-
acter. He now says (803) : “ I *venture for a moment* to deceive
you (the idea !) ? ”

¹For the classification of *ausim* (“venture”) with the infinitive, see p. 122.

SECOND PERSON :

A. Negative Statements.

(a) Absolutely opposed :

Ov. Trist. V, 14, 43. *Nec te credideris*¹, quia non facis, ista moneri.

ex Ponto, I, 8, 29. *Nec tu credideris*¹ urbanae commoda uitae
Quaerere Nasonem.

ex Ponto, IV, 9, 101. *Nec mihi credideris*¹.

Epist. Acont. XIX (XX), 151. *Nec mihi credideris*¹.

Ars. Am. III, 685. *Nec cito credideris*¹.

Met. XII, 455. *Nec tu credideris*¹ tantum cecinisse futura
Ampyciden Mopsum.

ib. XIII, 825. *Nil mihi credideris*¹.

Tibullus : II, 2, 13. *Nec tibi malueris*.

(b) Unfavorable :

Ovid : Am. II, 2, 26. *Nec tu, linigeram fieri quid possit ad Isim,*
Quaesieris.

(c) Indifferent :

Plautus : Trin. 627. *neque te occultassis*² mihi.

Cicero : de leg. III, 1, 1. Tu uero eum *nec nimis ualde umquam*
nec nimis saepe laudaueris.

This passage is cited here only because *laudaueris* has been regarded as a perfect subjunctive. There can be little doubt that it is really a future perfect indicative. See the discussion of this passage in Part III.

Horace : Od. IV, 8, 22. . . . *neque*

Si chartae sileant quod bene feceris,

Mercedem tuleris.

ib. IV, 9, 45. *Non possidentem multa uocaueris*

Recte beatum.

This *uocaueris*, however, is probably a future perfect.

¹ See note on p. 46.

² For this subjunctive see American Journ. of Philology, XV, p. 319.

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 131

Sat. I, 4, 39. *neque enim concludere uersum*

Dixeris esse satis.

Livy : 49, 40. *nec facile dixeris.*

Ovid : ex Pont. IV, 10, 21. *Nec tu contuleris urbem Laestrygonis*
umquam

Gentibus.

Am. I, 8, 81. *numquam dederis.*

This is probably a prohibition. Notice the preceding *irascere*.

Heroid. VIII, 23. *Nec tu mille rates sinuosaque uela pararis.*

Ars. Am. II, 391. *Nec dederis munus, cognosse quod altera*
possit.

Catullus : 66, 91. *Vnguinis expertem non siris esse tuam me.*

There can be no doubt that we should read *non* here instead of
ne. See American Journal of Philology, XV (Latin Prohibi-
tive), p. 319.

B. Rhetorical Questions, Equivalent to Negative Statements.

(a) Absolutely opposed :

Plautus : Mil. 669. *Quid ad illas artis optassis, si optio eueniat*
tibi?

Periplocomenus has been discoursing in the most extravagant
manner upon his own good qualities. As he finishes, Palaestrio
turns to Pleusicles with the words before us ; in view of such
wonderful qualities as that, how would anyone for a moment wish
for anything more?

(b) Unfavorable :

Lucretius : VI, 412. *An hoc ausis numquam contendere factum,*
Ut fierent ictus uno sub tempore plures?

The idea of the infinitive seems here to have as much to do
with determining the classification as does that of *ausis* itself.

(c) Indifferent :

Cicero : de nat. deor. II, 6, 16. . . . *est igitur id, a quo illa*
conficiuntur, homine melius.

Id autem quid potius dixeris quam deum? . . . est igitur
profecto deus.

THIRD PERSON :

A. Negative Statements.

(a) Absolutely opposed :

No example.

(b) Unfavorable :

No example.

(c) Indifferent :

Plautus : Mil. 11. Tam bellatorem Mars se *haut ausit*¹ dicere
Neque aequiperare suas uirtutes ad tuas.

These are the words of a parasite who wishes to flatter the braggart captain. The tone of the whole conversation at this point is extravagant in the extreme.

Cicero : de fin. 1, 16, 53. *ne iustitiam quidem recte quis dixerit* per se ipsam optabilem.

Tusc. disp. II, 13, 32. te uero ita affectum *ne uirum quidem* quisquam *dixerit*.

de orat. I, 59, 251. Tamen *nemo suaserit* studiosis dicendi adulescentibus in gestu histrionum more elaborare.

The speaker has just said that an orator should have the *gestus et uenustus* of a Roscius. This assertion implies exactly what the speaker does not mean, and, for fear of being misunderstood, he now says that, in spite of this fact, no one would for a moment think of giving young orators the preposterous advice to take actors as their models in preparing for oratory.

Cato Maior 23, 83. Quo quidem me proficiscentem *haud* sane quis facile *retraxerit nec* tamquam Peliam *recoxerit*.

de off. III, 30, 110. Quare ex multis mirabilibus exemplis *haud facile* quis *dixerit* hoc exemplo aut laudabilius aut praestantius.

Horace : Epod. 2, 49. *Non* me Lucrina *iuuerint* conchylia
Magisue rhombus aut scari.

Propertius : II, 5, 22. *Nec* mea praeclusas *fregerit* ira fores.

¹For the classification of *ausit* and *ausim* with the infinitive, see note on p. 122.

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 133

B. Rhetorical Questions, Equivalent to Negative Statement.

(a) Absolutely opposed :

No example.

(b) Unfavorable :

No example.

(c) Indifferent :

Cicero : de fin. I, 10, 32. quis autem uel eum iure *reprehenderit*, etc?

IV. quis enim tibi primum illud *concesserit*?

V, 31, 93. quis nostrum *dixerit*, etc?

Tusc. disp. I, 36, 87. ecquis id *dixerit*?

de orat. I, 9, 36. cetera . . . adsentior Crasso . . . sed illa duo, Crasse, uereor ut tibi possim concedere . . . quis enim tibi hoc *concesserit* aut initio genus hominum in montibus ac siluis dissipatum non prudentium consiliis compulsus potius quam disertorum oratione delentum se oppidis moenibusque saepsisse?

The speaker is here engaged in an argument with Crassus. The fact that he uses a rhetorical question, instead of an assertion, shows that he is somewhat shocked (or pretends to be) that anyone can hold such absurd views as those advocated by his opponent.

de nat. deor. II, 38, 97. Quis enim hunc hominem *dixerit*, qui cum tam certos caeli motus, tam ratos astrorum ordines tamque inter se omnia conexas et aptas uiderit, neget in his ullam inesse rationem eaque casu fieri dicat?

de div. I, 8, 14. Quis igitur elicere causas praesensionum potest? Etsi uideo Boethum Stoicum esse conatum, qui hactenus aliquid egit, ut earum rationem rerum explicaret, quae in mari caeloue fierent. Illa uero cur ueniant, quis probabiliter *dixerit*?

Par. Sto. 6, 2, 46. Quis unquam hunc uere *dixerit* diuitem?

de rep. II, 26, 48. . . . qui, quamquam figura est hominis, morum tamen inmanitate uastissimas uincit beluas. Quis enim hunc hominem rite *dixerit*, . . . qui denique cum omni hominum genere nullam iuris communionem, nullam humanitatis societatem uelit?

Catullus: 61, 65. Quis huic deo compararier *ausit*?

ib. 70. Quis huic deo compararier *ausit*?

ib. 75. Quis huic deo compararier *ausit*?

Horace: Od. I, 6, 14. Quis Martem tunica tectum adamantina
Digne scripserit?

This *scripserit*, however, is probably in the future perfect indicative.

Tibullus: IV, 1, 90. Quis tardamue sudem melius celeremue
sagittam

Iecerit aut lento *perfregerit* obuia pilo?

The following instances occur of the perfect subjunctive in rhetorical questions *accompanied by a negative and equivalent to affirmative statements*:

(a) **Absolutely opposed**:

No example.

(b) **Unfavorable**:

No example.

(c) **Indifferent**:

Cicero: de div. II, 50, 103. 'Quod finitum est,' inquit, 'habet
extremum.'

Quis hoc non *dederit*?

Livy: 44, 38. Quis, pro deum fidem, ita comparatus, uel iners
atque imbellis, fortissimum uirum non *uicerit*?

Ovid: ex Pont. II, 7, 55. Quis non *horruerit* tacitam quoque
Caesaris iram?

Horruerit is here regarded as being the perfect of *horresco*, "to become frightened at". For instances of this use in Augustan and later poets, see the dictionary.

It will be seen that the perfect, even in the subjunctive of contingent futurity, is wont to be accompanied by animation or some kind of emotion. This characteristic of the perfect tense will seem more clear and striking when the passages just given are compared in this respect with those in which the present tense is used.

For the purpose of facilitating a comparison between the perfect and the present tenses it will be well, without further delay, to get all the instances of the present tense before us.

Present Tense.

A very large number of these instances are modest expressions of a wish, a preference, or a polite request. Under this head come the use of *uelim*, *mauelim*, *nolim* and *peruelim* with the subjunctive, or with the infinitive. Many others are modest expressions of opinion, inclination and the like, *e. g.*, *putem*, *credam*, etc., "I should think"; or calm expressions of deliberate judgment as to what would happen, or what would be the condition of things in the future, under certain circumstances. Unfortunately some grammars set aside certain instances of this use in the first person as forming by themselves a distinct use of the subjunctive mood and name this use the "subjunctive of modest or softened assertion". This seems to me an unwarranted and unscientific procedure. As far as the function of the mood itself is concerned, there is no difference whatever between different persons; *putem*, *putes*, *putet*, "I should think", "you would think", "he would think", are all to be classed together as illustrating exactly the same force of the subjunctive mood. Each one of these, regardless of the person, is merely a calm, deliberate way of saying what would happen under more or less clearly defined circumstances in the future. Sometimes these circumstances are not merely clearly in mind, but are also definitely expressed by the use of a *si*-clause as a protasis; again these circumstances are definitely in mind, but not expressed; and still again no definite circumstances are present to the mind, the implication being merely that under certain possible circumstances, or "on occasion", the act would be performed, or the state of things would exist. To be sure, *uelim*, "I should like (wish)", and *putem*, "I should think", strike one at once as "modest assertions", but the "modesty" of the expression, as compared with *putes*, "you would think", and (*amicus*) *putet*, (my friend) "would think", is purely incidental and is due merely to the fact that the person speaking happens to be speaking of himself instead of someone else. The expression *putem* seems "modest" as compared with *puto*, because it implies that the speaker *at present* hardly ventures to have an opinion. In this case no *si*-

clause is commonly found as a protasis expressing the circumstances under which the act would take place, for the simple reason that the speaker is merely *pretending* that there are such circumstances and, to keep up the pretence, uses a form that seems to imply that there are some not mentioned. This implication of conditions of some sort not as yet fulfilled softens, of course, the statement. When one says, however, *nemo putet*, "no one would think", he is just as truly making a "softened assertion" as when he says *putem*. The only reason why it does not seem like a "modest assertion" is that the speaker uses the expression with reference to someone else.

All of these expressions are included below. I should, however, call attention to the fact that I have not included the instances of the present tense in unreal conditions (for the present tense seems to be sometimes used in such conditions in early Latin) nor, as a rule, the instances of conclusions to so-called "less-vivid-future" or "ideal", conditions *in which the si-clauses are expressed*. It was my original intention to omit all such apodoses of protases formally expressed by *si*-clauses. This was not because I regarded them as representing a different function of the subjunctive mood, but because the wealth of material afforded by the other clauses seemed fully sufficient for the purpose of establishing my contention. I afterwards regretted that these clauses had not been included and I have accordingly added many of them. The omission of most of the instances of these formal clauses can have no influence whatever upon the results to be attained by the present investigation. Nothing but the omission of instances of the perfect tense could have any serious effect upon my results, and, as regards the perfect, my list is, I believe, complete. It may at first thought seem surprising that instances of the perfect tense in conclusions of "less-vivid-future" or "ideal" conditions, in which the *si*-clauses are expressed, are so rare as compared with the frequency of the present tense in such conclusions and as compared even with the use of the perfect tense in cases like *dixerim* used alone without any expressed protasis. This

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 137

will seem not in the least surprising, if my theory of the difference between the two tenses be adopted. Conditional sentences in which both the protases and the apodoses are expressed are formal syllogisms logically and deliberately thought out and expressed. One would not so often expect the tense of vigor and emotion in stating formal logical conclusions drawn from definite premises, and in such cases one nearly always finds the present tense. Still, in my list of perfects will be found several instances of the perfect tense in cases where it is desired to lay particular stress upon the promptness with which the conclusion would follow.

The main heads of the classification below are made according to the general meaning of the verb with reference to its opposition to, or harmony with, the idea of prompt, energetic accomplishment. This scheme of classification, identical as it is with that adopted for the perfect tense, will enable anyone at a glance to see the remarkable difference between the character of the verbs found in the present and that of those found in the perfect. The instances of the present tense of the Subjunctive of Contingent Futurity (with the exception of the clauses indicated) are as follows :

Without a Negative.

FIRST PERSON :

(a) Absolutely opposed :

Here belong all the instances of *uelim*, *malim*, *nolim*, illustrated by Plaut. Am. 86. Mirari *nolim* uos, quapropter Iuppiter Nunc histriones curet; Capt. 858. ERG. Vin te faciam fortunatum? HE. *Malim* quam miserum quidem; Cic. ad fam. 1, 8, 6. Tu *uelim* tibi ita persuadeas; *ib.* 1, 9, 18. Sic enim te existimare *uelim*. As the calm and deliberate character of such expressions will, in almost every instance, be recognized at a glance, it does not seem necessary to quote in full the sentences, or the context, in which they stand. I content myself, therefore, with giving mere references :

Plautus : Am. 86 ; 834 ; 1058 ; Capt. 858 ; Mil. 1356 ; Rud. 211 ; 511 ; 570 ; 580 ; 662 ; 878 ; 1067 ; Trin. 58 ; 351 ; 433 ;

762; As. 273; 624; 811; 895; Bacch. 334; 460; 490: 514; 530; 603; Curc. 83; 102; Ps. 598; 1061; Stich. 191; 587; 613 (where, in spite of the apparently abusive words, the speaker is really on excellent terms with the person addressed. The latter has merely refused to accept his advice); Cist. 497; Epid. 120; 536; Men. 909; Merc. 356; 539; 889; Aul. 120; 504; 661; 670; Cas. 235; 287; 559; 862; Most. 218; 266; 632; 1074; Pers. 4; 629; Poen. 151: 570; 727; 1150; 1184; 1206; 1214; 1288; Truc. 260; 363; 422; 481; 742; Vid. 110.

Terence: Eun. 66; 979; 1069; Phorm. 449; 658; 855; Hec. 783; Ad. 519; 681; 727.

Cicero: Epist. ad fam. I, 8, 6; 9, 18; 9, 21; 9, 24; 10; II, 3, 1; 4, 1; 11, 2; 12, 1; 14, 1; 16, 3; 16, 5; 16, 6; 18, 3; III, 1, 2; 2, 2; 3, 1; 5, 6; 7, 6; 8, 10; 9, 3; 9, 4; 12, 2; 13, 2; IV, 2, 4; 10, 2; 14, 3; 14, 4; 14, 4; V, 2, 4; 2, 4; 2, 6; 6, 3; 8, 3; 8, 5; 8, 5; 11, 2; 12, 1; 12, 10; 14, 3; 16, 6; 20, 1; 21, 5; VI, 1, 7; 2, 1; 2, 3; 4, 5; 5, 4; 10, 1; 10, 6; 17, 1; 20, 3; 22, 3; VII, 2, 2; 5, 3; 9, 1; 10, 3; 10, 4; 13, 2; 17, 3; 18, 1; 23, 2; 23, 3; 30, 3; 33, 2; VIII, 3, 3; 8, 10; 8, 10; IX, 1, 2; 9, 3; 12, 2 (twice); 13, 2; 15, 4; 15, 5; XI, 5, 3; 6, 3; 17, 2; 18, 3; 19, 1; 21, 4; XII, 1, 2; 2, 3; 6, 2; 7, 1; 12, 5; 13, 1; 14, 4; 14, 5; 17, 2; 17, 3; 21; 22, 4; 25, 7; 29, 2; 30, 7; XIII, 1, 4; 1, 6; 3; 6a, 3; 7, 2; 7, 4; 12, 2; 18, 2; 24, 2; 26, 4; 27, 3; 28a, 1; 28a, 2; 28b, 2; 29, 4; 29, 7; 31, 1; 32, 2; 43, 2; 45; 56, 2; 56, 3; 57, 2; 65, 2; 72, 2; 73, 2; 75, 1; XIV, 2, 4; 3, 5; 4, 5; 5, 1; 6; 7, 3; 9; 10; 12; 14, 2; 18, 2 (twice); 19; 23; XV, 3, 2; 4, 11; 4, 16; 11, 2; 13, 3; 14, 5; 15, 4; 19, 4; 21, 5; XVI, 9, 3; 18, 3; 21, 8; 24, 1.

ad Att. I, 4, 3; 6, 2; 7; 8, 2; 10, 3; 11, 3; 12, 4; 15, 2; 16, 18; 19, 9; 20, 3; II, 1, 6; 1, 12; 2, 3; 4, 1; 4, 2; 5, 3; 7, 2; 7, 4; 13, 2; 16, 4 (twice); 17, 3; 22, 5; III, 4; 10, 3; 12, 2; 13, 3; 14, 1; 15, 8 (twice); 17, 3; 20, 3; 22, 4; 23, 1; 23, 4; 23, 5; 24, 2; IV, 4b, 1; 5, 3; 8a, 2; 8, 4 (twice); 9, 1 (twice); 10, 1; 10, 2 (twice); 11, 1 (twice); 11, 2; 12; 13, 1; 14, 1; 14, 2; 15, 10; 16, 9; V, 1, 5; 2, 1 (twice); 2, 3; 5, 2; 8, 2; 9, 1;

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 139

10, 5; 11, 7; 12, 3; 14, 3; 17, 6; 20, 10; 21, 3; 21, 9; VI, 1, 7; 1, 23; 1, 24; 1, 26; 2, 2; 2, 10; 3, 4; 3, 10; 5, 1; 6, 1; 8, 5; VII, 3, 2; 3, 11; 7, 7; 11, 1; 11, 5; 12, 3; 12, 6 (twice); 13a, 3; 13b, 3; 14, 3 (twice); 20, 2; 22, 2; VIII, 1, 4; 2, 1; 3, 6; 5, 2; 9, 2; 11, 7 (twice); 12, 4; 12, 5; 12, 6; 12A, 4; 14, 3; 15A, 1; IX, 1, 4; 3, 1; 7B, 3; 9, 4; 16, 3; 17, 2; 19, 4 (twice); X, 3a, 2; 5, 3; 10, 10; 12b, 2; 15, 4; 16, 1; 16, 2; 17, 4; XI, 2, 4; 3, 3; 4, 2; 5, 3; 6, 6; 7, 3; 7, 5; 7, 6; 8, 2; 9, 3; 11, 2 (twice); 12, 4; 13, 4 (twice); 13, 5; 14, 2; 15, 1; 15, 2; 16, 5; 17, 3 (twice); 18, 2; 19, 1; 19, 2; 21, 3; 23, 3; 24, 2; 24, 5; 25, 1; 25, 2; XII, 3, 1; 4, 2; 5, 3; 7, 1; 8; 13, 2; 14, 2; 14, 4; 17 (three times); 18, 1; 19, 2 (twice); 20, 2; 23, 3; 24, 1; 24, 2 (twice); 28, 3 (twice); 31, 2; 32, 2 (twice); 33, 1; 34, 2 (35, 1); 37, 2 (twice); 45, 1; 48; 49, 2; 51, 2; 52, 1 (twice); 53; XIII, 3, 2; 4, 2; 8, 1 (twice); 12, 3; 13, 1 (twice); 14, 2; 16, 2; 18; 20, 1; 23, 3; 25, 2; 30, 2; 32, 2; 34; 39, 2; 44, 3; 45, 3; 47a; 47b, 1; 48, 2 (twice); XIV, 5, 1; 5, 3; 8, 1; 10, 4; 11, 1; 11, 2; 13B, 5; 15, 3; 16, 4; 17, 6; 19, 6; 20, 2; 21, 4; 22, 2; XV, 1b, 2; 2, 3; 2, 4; 4, 3; 4, 4; 8, 2; 13, 3; 14, 3; 15, 4; 16a; 17, 1; 18, 2; 20, 2; 20, 4 (twice); 24; 25; 26, 1; 26, 5 (twice); 28; 29, 1; 29, 2; XVI, 3, 2; 3, 6; 6, 3; 7, 3; 7, 8; 11, 4; 13b; 13c, 1; 13c, 2; 15, 2 (three times); 16A, 7; 16E, 16.

ad Brut. I, 3, 3; 5, 4; 9, 1; 10, 5; 13, 2; 16, 6; II, 1, 3; 5, 6.

ad Quint. Fratr. I, 2, 4, 14; 3, 1; 3, 5 (twice); 3, 10 (twice); 4, 5; II, 2, 4; III, 1, 3, 7; 3, 4; 4, 5; 6, 7; 8, 2; 9, 2; 9, 3.

de pet. cons. ad M. Fratr. 14, 58.

Phil. II, 10, 24; 16, 41; XIII, 10, 22.

pro Quinct. 5, 19.

de orat. II, 6, 25; 73, 297; III, 22, 83; 26, 101; Brut. 49, 184; topica 7, 30 (twice); orat. 71, 238.

pro A. Caec. 34, 100; de harus. resp. 24, 50; Tusc. disp. I, 6, 15; 11, 24; II, 26, 63; III, 20, 48; de nat. deor. I, 7, 16; 7, 17 (twice); 22, 61; II, 1, 2; III, 16, 42; de div. II, 48, 100; 62,

128 ; de fin. II, 2, 5, 8 ; 2, 3 ; IV, 2, 3 ; de off. I, 1, 2 ; de prov. consul. 20, 47 ; de amicit. 1, 5.

pro Sull. 7, 23 ; 16, 46.

The above list of references includes only the verbs *uelim*, *malim*, *nolim*, *peruelim*, which have been thus grouped by themselves only for the sake of convenience. The instances of the other verbs may now be given. They are to be regarded as belonging essentially to the same use as those of the verbs just given, the only difference being that *uelim*, *malim*, etc., happen to be words dealing with the speaker's wish or preference. The difference between them and the following verbs is purely one of word-meaning ; the function of the mood remains the same in both cases.

Plautus : Merc. 125 : Perii : animam nequeo uortere : nimis nil(i) tibicen *siem*.

Aul. 230 ff. Nunc si filiam locassim meam tibi, in mentem uenit,

Te bouem esse et me esse asellum : ubi tecum coniunctus siem,

Vbi onus nequeam ferre pariter, *iaceam* ego asinus in luto :
ib. 482. Et nos minore sumptu *simus* quam sumus.

Bacch. 1103. Si alibi plus perdiderim, minus aegre *habeam*.

Cicero : ad fam. VII, 5, 3. *Simus* enim putidiusculi ; †quam per te uix licet ; uerum ut uideo, licebit.

pro Sex. Rosc. Amer. 20, 55. *possim* aliquo modo.

(b) **Unfavorable :**

Plautus : Aul. 230. Et te *utar* iniquiore.

ib. 482. Et inuidia nos minore *utamur* quam utimur.

Cicero : de fin. V, 27, 80. Illud *urgeam*, non intellegere eum, etc.

(c) **Indifferent :**

Plautus : Am. 161. . . . ita peregre huc adueniens

Puplicitus ego hospitio *accipiar*.

Trin. 758. ME. Quo pacto ergo igitur clam dos depromi potest ?

CA. Dum occasio ei (rei) reperiatur, interim

Ab amico alicunde mutuom argentum *rogem*.

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 141

Pseud. 319. BA. Tibi ego credam? PS. Quor non? BA. Quia pol qua opera credam tibi

Vna opera *alligem* fugitiuam canem agninis lactibus.

Cicero : pro Cluentio 192. *paene dicam*.

pro Sex Rosc. Amer. 6, 16. *paene dicam*; *ib.* 24, 68. *paene dicam*.

Verr. II, 3, 34, 78. Huius Tertiae plus etiam quam Pipae, plus quam ceterarum ac *prope dicam* tantum apud istum in Siciliensi praetura auctoritas potuit quantum in urbana Chelidonis.

SECOND PERSON :

(a) Absolutely opposed :

Plautus : Aul. 520. Ducuntur, datur^t aes : iam hosce absolutos *censeas*,

Quom incedunt infectores corcotarii.

Bacch. 914. Si non est, *nolis* esse.

Capt. 599. HE. Quid, si hunc comprehendi iusserim? TY. *Sapias* magis.

Cas. 562. . . . quom aspicias tristem, frugi *censeas*.

Most. 278. Quid olant, *nescias*, nisi id unum, ut male olere intellegas.

Pseud. 1176. Vbi suram aspicias, *scias* ("one would know") posse eum gerere crassas conpedis.

Stich. 294. Ad me adiri et supplicari egomet mihi aequom censeo.

An uero nugas *censeas* nilue esse ego quod ego nunc scio?

Trin. 671. Quom inopias, *cupias*; quando eius copias, tum non *uelis*.

ib. 914. . . . fieri istuc solet :

Quod in manu teneas atque oculis uideas, id *desideres*.

Terence : Heaut. 1063. Heia, ut elegans est ! *credas* animum ibi esse.

Cicero : ad Att. I, 16, 10. "Domum", inquit, "emisti". "Putes", inquam, "dicere : iudices emisti".

de div. II, 21, 48. Sed cum multa sunt detracta et ad liniamenta oris peruentum est, tum *intellegas* illud, quod iam expolitum sit, intus fuisse.

ib. II, 57, 117. De uino aut salsamento *putes* loqui, quae euanescent uetustate.

Phil. III, 6, 15. Trallianam aut Ephesiam *putes* dicere.

ib. VII, 2, 5. *Faueas* tu hosti? . . . et te consularem aut senatorem, denique ciuem *putes*.

de orat. II, 53, 214. Non enim, sicut argumentum, simul atque positum est, adripitur alterumque et tertium poscitur, ita misericordiam aut inuidiam aut iracundiam, simul atque intuleris, *possis* commouere.

Verr. II, 1, 15, 39. Nam eum, qui palam est aduersarius, facile cauendo uitare *possis*.

The following negative question is equivalent to a positive assertion :

de nat. deor. II, 6, 17. An uero, si . . . uideris, non *possis* adduci, etc.?

(b) Unfavorable :

Plautus : Aul. 506. Nunc quoquo uenias plus plaustorum in aedibus

Videas quam ruri quando ad uillam ueneris.

Poen. 585. Nam istorum nullus nefastus, comitiales sunt meri.

Ibi habitant, ibi eos *conspicias* quam praetorem saepius.

Those who are inclined to translate *conspicias* by "can see", are referred to Part III of this discussion.

ib. 836. Ibi tu *uideas* litteratas fictiles epistulas,

Pice signatas : nomina insunt cubitum longis litteris.

For this use of *uideas*, sometimes translated by you "can see", see Part III.

Terence : Adelph. 254. Abs quiuis homine, quom est opus, beneficium accipere *gaudeas*.

(c) Indifferent :

Plautus : Am. 572. Merito *maledicas* mi, si (non) id ita factumst.

Asin. 813. Ain tu? apud amicam munus adulescentuli

Fungare, uxori *excuses* te et *dicas* senem?

Praeripias scortum amanti atque argentum *obicias*

Lenae? *suppeiles* clam domi uxorem tuam?

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 143

Men. 794. . . . Vna opera prohibere ad cenam ne promittat
postules .

Neue quemquam accipiat alienum apud se. Seruirin tibi
Postulas uiros? Dare una opera pensum *postules*,
Inter ancillas sedere *iubeas*, lanam carere.

Most. 259. Vna opera ebur atramento candefacere *postules*.

Trin. 1052. Quom repetas, inimicum amicum *inuenias* bene-
facto tuo.

[Si mage exigere occipias, duarum rerum exoritur optio :
Vel illud quod credideris *perdas* uel illum amicum *amiseris*.]

Terence : Eun. 1080. facile *pellas* ubi uelis.

Cicero : Verr. II, 41, 118. Sic iniurias fortunae, quas ferre ne-
queas, defugiendo *relinquas*.

Aratea 61 (Müller). Obstipum caput at tereti ceruice reflexum
Obtutum in cauda maioris figere *dicas*.

Brut. 9, 35. Iam *prope audeas* oratorem perfectum dicere.

THIRD PERSON :

(a) Absolutely opposed :

Plautus : Am. 871. Nam mea *sit* culpa, quod egomet contrax-
erim,

Si id Alcumenae innocenti expetat.

Mil. 736. Qui deorum consilia culpet, stultus inscitique *sit*.

ib. 878. Stultitia atque insipientia *†*mfalsta haec *sit*.

Rud. 473. Set autem quid si hanc hinc abstulerit quispiam
Sacram urnam Veneris? mi *exhibeat* negotium.

Trin. 692. Tibi *sit* emolumentum honoris : mihi quod obiectent
siet.

Asin. 560. Ne ille edepol pro merito tuo memorare multa *possit*.

ib. 601-602. Qui sese parere apparent huius legibus, profecto
Numquam bonae frugi sient dies noctisque *potent*.

Bacch. 97. Ego opsonabo : nam id flagitium meum *sit*, mea te
gratia

Et operam dare mi et ad eam operam facere sumptum de
tuo.

Merc. 405. . . . Flagitium *sit* sei sequatur, quando incedat per
uias.

Contemplant, conspiciant omnes, nutent, nictent, sibilent,
 Vellicent, uocent, molesti *sint, occentent* ostium :
 Impleantur elegeorum meae fores carbonibus :
 Atque ut nunc sunt maledicentes homines, uxori meae
 Mihique obiectent lenocinium facere.

Truc. 221. Vortentur sese memoriae—stultus *sit*, qui id miretur.

Vid. 49. (p) aullum *mereat*.

Terence : Hec. 742. Nam qui post factam iniuriam se expurget,
parum mi prosit.

And. 814. . . . *clamitent*

Me sycphantam, hereditatem persequi
 Mendicum.

Eun. 387. An potius haec patri aequomst fieri, ut a me ludatur
 dolis?

Quod qui rescierint, culpent ; illud merito factum omnes
putent.

Cicero : topic. 4, 23. Quod in re maiore ualet, *ualeat* in minore
 . . . Quod in minore ualet, *ualeat* in maiore . . . Quod in re
 pari ualet, *ualeat* in hac, quæ par est . . . *Valeat* aequitas, quæ
 paribus in causis paria iura desiderat.

pro Murena 14, 30. Quod si ita est, cedat, opinor, Sulpici,
 forum castris, otium militiae, stilus gladio, umbra soli : *sit* de-
 nique in ciuitate ea prima res, propter quam ipsa est ciuitas
 omnium princeps.

These subjunctives (*cedat* and *sit*) I regard as subjunctives of
 obligation or propriety, but for my present purpose I make no
 separate class of such uses. On this use of the subjunctive, see
 the note on p. 72 and also the discussion of similar uses in Part
 III.

de amicitia 14, 50. Quam ob rem hoc quidem . . . *constet*, ut
 opinor, bonis inter bonos quasi necessariam beneuolentiam, qui est
 amicitiae fons a natura constitutus.

Tusc. disp. IV, 8, 17. qui . . . doleat . . . is *inuideat* pro-
 fecto.

pro Sex. Rosc. Amer. 20, 55. *uideatur*.

Verr. II, 1, 12, 33. *patiatur* eius uita reliqua me hanc tantam
 acturam criminum facere.

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 145

ib. 2, 60, 148. Hoc postulat de statu ridiculum esse *uideatur* ei, qui rem sententiamque non perspiciat.

ib. 59, 122. praesens enim poena *sit*.

de prov. consul. 8, 19. *sit*.

pro A. Caec. 19, 56. pro nihilo *putet*.

ad fam. VII, 2, 3. *Vix* ueri simile *fortasse uideatur*.

Those who understand *uideatur* here in the sense of "may seem" are referred to the discussion of such uses in Part III.

The following rhetorical questions, accompanied by a negative, are equivalent to affirmative assertions.

Cicero : pro Q. Rosc. Com. 1, 4. Quod in codicem iniuratus referre nolit, id iurare in litem *non dubitet*?

Verr. II, 5, 6, 14. Quis *non pertimescat*?

de nat. deor. I, 20, 54. Quis enim *non timeat* omnia providentem et cogitantem et animaduertentem et omnia ad se pertinere putantem curiosum et plenum negoti deum?

de leg. I, 16, 44. cur ius ex iniuria lex facere possit, bonum eadem facere *non possit* ex malo.

(b) Unfavorable :

Plautus : Aul. 230. Et te utar iniquiore et meus me(d) ordo *irrideat*.

Stich. 297. *Vix* ipsa domina hoc, si sciat, exoptare ab dis *audeat*.

The verb *audeat* with an infinitive has, as a rule, been classed under (c). I have classed this instance here because, when thus used with *exoptare*, the combination *exoptare audeat* does not seem to lend itself naturally to the idea of energetic action promptly completed.

Vid. 49. Multum *laboret*.

(c) Indifferent :

Plautus : Am. 161. Ita quasi incudem me miserum homines octo ualidi *caedant*.

Aul. 232. Asini me mordicibus *scindant*, boues *incursent* cornibus.

Merc. 406 ff. . . . *nutent, nictent, sibilent,*

Vellicent, uocent, molesti sint, occentent ostium :

Impleantur elegeorum meae fores carbonibus :

Atque ut nunc sunt maledicentes homines, uxori meae

Mihique *obiectent* lenocinium facere.

Mil. 1369. PY. Vix reprimor quin te manere iubeam. PA.

Caue istuc feceris.

Dicant te mendacem nec uerum esse, fide nulla esse te :

Dicant seruorum praeter me esse fidelem neminem.

Rud. 476. Nempe optumo (me) iure in uinculis *eniket*

Magistratus, siquis me hanc habere uiderit.

Trin. 441. Ego quoque uolo esse liber : nequiquam uolo.

Hic postulet frugi esse : nugas *postulet*.

ib. 703. Mea opera hinc proterritum te meaque auaritia *autument* :

Id me commissurum ut patiar fieri ne animum induxeris.

ib. 740. . . . Non temere ("not without good reason") *dicant*
te benignum uirgini :

Datam tibi dotem ei quam dares eius a patre :

Ex ea largiri te illi, neque ita ut sit data

Columem sistere illi, et detraxe *autument*.

Vid. 49. paullum *edi(t)*.

ib. 50. *faciat*.

Terence : Eun. 387. Quod qui rescierint, *culpent*.

Cicero : pro A. Caec. 19, 56. At uero ratio iuris interdictique
uis . . . et hominum prudentium consilium et auctoritas *respuat*
hanc defensionem.

pro Murena 14, 30. Quod si ita est, *cedat* . . . forum castris,
otium militiae, etc.

This *cedat* is a subjunctive of "obligation or propriety", of
which I here make no separate class. See note on page 72 and
also the discussion of similar uses in Part III.

pro Cluent. 68, 193. Nemo erat illorum, *paene dicam*, quin
. . . arbitraretur.

de leg. agr. I, 5, 14. *accipiant* quod cupiunt, *dent* quod retinere
uix possunt.

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 147

de re pub. I, 26, 41. . . . quaedam quasi semina, neque reli-
quarum uirtutum nec ipsius rei publicae *reperiatur* ulla institutio.

The following rhetorical questions, accompanied by a negative,
are equivalent to affirmative assertions.

Cicero : Brutus 80, 279. *Quis enim non fateatur?*

de off. III, 19, 76. *Non igitur faciat* . . . quod utile sit, quod
expediat?

de nat. deor. II, 4, 12. *Haec* . . . qui uideat, nonne *cogatur*
confiteri deos esse?

With a Negative (expressed or implied).

FIRST PERSON :

A. Negative Statements.

(a) **Absolutely opposed.**

Cicero : Brut. 83, 287. *Nec uelim fortasse*, si possim.

(b) **Unfavorable :**

Cicero : de fin. V, 27, 80. *Non pugnem* cum homine cur, etc.

(c) **Indifferent :**

Plautus : Trin. 994. Ego ob hanc operam argentum accepi : te
macto infortunio.

Ceterum qui sis, qui non sis, floccum *non interduim*.

Aul. 570. MEG. Potare ego hodie, Euclio, tecum uolo.

EVC. *Non potem* ego quidem hercle.

Cicero : Verr. II, 3, 14, 37. *Non tollam* potius, quam paciscar

B. Rhetorical Questions Equivalent to Negative Statements.

(a) **Absolutely opposed :**

Plautus : Pseud. 236. quonam pacto animum uincere *possim?*

ib. 290. Egon patri subrupere *possim* quicquam, tam cauto seni?

This is a question to which the answer is self-evident, but it is
probably contrary to fact in present.

SECOND PERSON :

A. Negative Statements.

(a) Absolutely opposed :

Plautus : Aul. 230. Vbi onus nequeam ferre pariter, iaceam
ego asinus in luto :

Tu me bos magis *haud respicias*, gnatus quasi nunquam
siem.

Bacch. 476. ipse neque amat *nec* tu *creduas*.

ib. 914. Lippi illic oculi seruos est simillumus :

Si non est, nolis esse *neque desideres* :

Si est, abstinere quin attingas *non queas*.

Capt. 118. Semel fugiundi si datast occasio,

Satis est : post illam *numquam possis* prendere,

"you would never be able", etc.

Trin. 606. CA. Sine dote ille illam in tantas diuitias dabit ?

Non credibile dicis. ST. At tute edepol *nullus creduas* :

Si hoc non credis, ego credidero . . . me nihili pendere.

Terence : And. 787. Hic est ille : *non* te *credas* Dauom ludere.

Eun. 1080. *Neque* istum *metuas* ne amet.

Cicero : topic. 10, 43. Quemadmodum . . . finibus regundis
adigere arbitrum non possis, sic . . . aquae pluuiarum arcendae ad-
igere *non possis* arbitrum.

ib. 11, 46. *Non* quemadmodum quod mulieri debeas, recte ipsi
mulieri sine tutore auctore soluas, item, quod pupillo aut pupillae
debeas, recte *possis* eodem modo soluere.

(b) Unfavorable :

No example.

(c) Indifferent :

Plautus : Mil. 688. "Eme, mi uir, lanam, unde tibi pallium

Malacum et calidum conficiatur . . . " :

. . . hoc *numquam* uerbum ex uxore *audias*.

ib. 761. . . . "Remoue, abi aufer" : *neminem* eorum haec
adseuerare *audias*.

Terence : And. 460. Ita pol quidem res est, ut dixisti, Lesbia :

Fidelem *haud ferme* mulieri *inuenias* uirum.

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 149

B. Rhetorical Questions Equivalent to Negative Statements.

(a) Absolutely opposed:

Cicero: ad Att. IX, 6, 5. quid tu autem *possis*? aut quid homo quisquam?

Phil. II, 4, 8. Qui *possis*?

ib. VII, 2, 5. *Faueas* tu hosti? . . et te consularem aut senatorem, denique ciuem *putes*?

(b) Unfavorable:

No example.

(c) Indifferent:

Plautus: Asin. 628. Tun *uerberes* qui pro cibo habeas te *uerberari*?

Cicero: de lege agraria, I, 1, 3. siluam uero tu Scantiam *uendas* nobis consulibus atque hoc senatu? Tu ullum uectigal *attingas*? Tu populo Romano subsidia belli, tu ornamenta pacis *eripias*?

Verr. II, 1, 15, 40. Tum, cum quaestor ad exercitum missus sis custos non solum pecuniae, sed etiam consulis, etc., habitus sis in liberum loco, sicut mos maiorum ferebat, repente *relinquas*, *deseras*, ad aduersarios *transeas*?

ib. II, 3, 84, 193. . . . angulum mihi aliquem *eligas* prouinciae reconditum ac derelictum? *iubeas* ibi me metiri, quo portare non expediat?

Cicero; pro Planc. 16, 44. Tu *deligas* . . . *notes* . . . *adiungas* . . . *effundas*?

Phil. II, 6, 15. ad eum de re publica nihil *referas*; *referas* ad eos, qui, etc.?

ib. VII, 2, 5. *Faueas* tu hosti? ille litteras ad te mittat, etc.? eas tu laetus *proferas*, *recites*, describendas etiam *des* improbis ciuibus, eorum *augeas* animos, bonorum spem uirtutemque *debilitas*, et te consularem aut senatorem, denique ciuem *putes*?

THIRD PERSON :

A. Negative Statements.

(a) Absolutely opposed :

Plautus : Am. 157-158. Inde cras quasi e promptaria cella depromar ad flagrum,

Nec causam *liceat* dicere mihi *neque* in ero quicquam auxili *siet*

Nec quisquam *sit* quin me malo omnes esse dignum deputent.

ib. 1060. *Nec* me miserior feminast *neque* ulla *uideatur* magis.

Capt. 208. *haud* nos id *deceat*

Fugitivos imitari.

Asin. 602. *Numquam* bonae frugi *sient*.

Bacch. 139. Non par uidetur *neque sit* consentaneum,

. . . paedagogus ut *siet*.

Stich. 24. Noui ego illum : ioculo istaec dicit :

Neque ille sibi *mereat* Persarum

Montis qui esse aurei perhibentur,

Ut istuc faciat quod tu metuis.

Curc. 284. *Nec* quisquam *sit* tam opulentus, qui mi obsistat in uia.

Goetz and Schöll, however, here read *est* for *sit*.

Cicero : ad fam. XI, 24, 2. *nihil* tibi *sit* antiquius.

de amicit. 23, 87. tamen is pati *non possit*.

in Verr. I, 10, 29. quem *minime expediat* esse in eo consilio, quod conemur aliqua ratione corrumpere, etc.

de div. II, 71, 147. *Neque* coniectura, quae in uarias partis duci possit, non numquam etiam in contrarias, quicquam *sit* incertius.

(b) Unfavorable :

No example.

(c) Indifferent :

Plautus : Aul. 498. *Nulla* igitur *dicat* : equidem dotem ad te adtuli.

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 151

B. Rhetorical Questions Equivalent to Negative Statements.

(a) Absolutely opposed :

Plautus : Merc. 352. Nunc si dico ut res est atque illam mihi
me

Emissis indico, quem ad modum *existimet* me ?

Mil. 614-615. Quodne uobis placeat, *displiceat* mihi ?

Quis homo *sit* magis meus quam tu's ?

Pseud. 1095. BA. Is secum abduxit mulierem hau multo prius

SI. Bonan fide istuc dicis ? BA. Vnde ea *sit* mihi ?

Cicero : ad Att. V, 2, 2. Hunc hominem parum gratum quisquam *putet* aut non in eo ipso laudandum, quod laudari non laborarit ?

de finibus I, 4, 11. Qua de re cum sit inter doctissimos summa dissensio, quis alienum *putet* eius esse dignitatis, quam mihi quisque tribuat, quid in omni munere uitae optimum et uerissimum sit, exquirere ?

paradoxa VI, 2, 48. Quis igitur, siquidem, ut quisque, quod plurimi sit, possideat, ita diuitissimus habendus sit, *dubitet* quin in uirtute diuitiae sint ?

in Pisonem 40, 96. Quis enim te aditu, quis ullo honore, quis denique communi salutatione dignum *putet* ?

Phil. VI, 3, 5. ille se fluuio Rubicone et ducentis milibus circumscriptum esse *patiatur* ?

Verr. II, 1, 59, 154. Te *putet* quisquam . . . sociis temperasse . . . ?

orat. 9, 29. Dicat igitur Attice . . . Lysias—quis enim id *possit* negare ?

de orat. I, 2, 7. Quis autem *dubitet* quin belli duces praestantissimos ex hac una ciuitate paene innumerabiles, in dicendo autem excellentes uix paucos proferre possimus ?

ib. 4, 16. Quibus de causis quis non iure *miretur* ex omni memoria aetatum, temporum, ciuitatum tam exiguum oratorum numerum inueniri ?

de amicit. 15, 53. Quis enim aut eum *diligat* quem metuat, aut eum, a quo se metui *putet* ?

Tusc. disp. IV, 17, 37. Quid enim *uideatur* ei magnum in rebus humanis, cui . . . sit?

ib. 26, 57. Mediocritates autem malorum quis laudare recte *possit*?

ib. V, 15, 45. quae qui habeat, miserrimus esse *possit*?

Verr. II, 5, 6, 14. . . . Quis *dubitet* quin seruorum animos summa formidine oppresserit, cum uiderent, etc.

ib. 25, 72. Quid eo *possit* esse praestantius, etc.?

Brut. 83, 288. Num igitur, qui hoc sentiat, si is potare uelit, de dolio sibi hauriendum *putet*? minime.

de orat. III, 14, 53. Quis enim *putet* uim aut celeritatem ingeni L. Bruto illi nobilitatis vestrae principi defuisse?

de nat. deor. III, 10, 25. homini autem praestare quis *possit* nisi deus?

pro rege Deiotaro 13, 37. quae fortuna . . . *possit* . . . ?

de legibus I, 16, 44. aut cur ius ex iniuria lex facere *possit*, bonum eadem facere non possit ex malo?

(b) **Unfavorable :**

No example.

(c) **Indifferent :**

Plautus : Asin. 627. L.E. Quisnam istuc *adcredat* tibi, cinaede calamistrate?

Pseud. 205. . . . illine *audeant*

Id facere, quibus ut seruiant

Suos amor cogit?

Trin. 692. Quis me inprobior *perhibeatur* esse?

Cicero : ad Att. VII, 21, 2. Urbe relicta, redeant? Quo praesidio? Deinde exeant? Quis *sinat*¹?

ib. XIV, 16, 2. Mihi quidem uidetur Brutus noster iam uel coronam auream per forum ferre posse; quis enim *audeat* laedere proposita cruce aut saxo, praesertim tantis plausibus, tanta approbatione infimorum?

Phil. VII, 2, 5. ille litteras ad te *mittat*, etc.?

¹ For the classification of this word, see p. 12,

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 153

ib. XII, 10, 25. Quis enim *audeat* luci, quis in militari uia . . . aggredi?

de orat. 59, 251. Quis *neget* opus esse oratori in hoc oratorio motu statuque Rosci gestum et uenustatem?

orat. 51, 172. Quis ergo istos *ferat*, qui hos auctores non probent?

de domo sua 43, 112. Hanc deam quisquam uiolare *audeat*.

Tusc. disp. IV, 4, 8. metusne *conturbet*?

Verr. II, 4, 9, 19. *Negent* isti onerariam nauem maximam aedificatam esse Messanae? . . . *Negent* ei nauis senatorem Mamertinum publice praefuisse?

Phil. VI, 3, 5. An ille id faciat? . . . Huic denuntiationi ille *pareat*?

ib. XII, 12, 29. quonam modo *accipiant* seueritatem meam?

ib. XIII, 21, 48. Ad te quisquam *ueniat* nisi Ventidi similis?

We now have before us all the instances of the perfect tense to be found prior to the beginning of the Silver Age of Latin literature and all those of the present tense (except formal apodoses to *formally expressed* conditions) to be found in a very large portion of the same literary monuments, including the most important and extensive authors. We are accordingly now in position to make advantageously a further comparison between the two uses.

In the first place it seems necessary to say—and upon this point I lay the greatest possible emphasis—that no one can hope to study the differences between the two tenses with any degree of success without divorcing himself absolutely and completely (for the moment) from the idiom of his own language. It seems all the more necessary to lay the utmost emphasis upon the necessity of doing this, because many even of the writers of our Latin grammars have apparently been influenced in their views by their feeling for the modern idiom. Their failure to divorce themselves from the idiom of their own language has had the serious result, it seems to me, of preventing them from understanding their Latin. The only reason apparently why an Englishman or

an American should not look for a difference between *non putauerim* and *non putem* is that he translates both expressions by "I should not think." At any rate, I can not conceive how anyone could, from a study of the Latin alone, reach the conclusion that the two tenses were used by the Romans as equivalents. The manner in which expressions are handled in translations into a foreign language is not of the remotest consequence in determining the force of expressions in the original. Translations are, of course, frequently important for illustrative purposes, but they are absolutely worthless and often even wholly misleading in determining the exact force of original idioms. In expressions like that just quoted, "I should not think," the English idiom admits of only one tense. The Latin admits of two tenses. Now Latin tenses are not, any more than those of other languages, idle playthings to be used merely for the sake of variety, without change of meaning. If Cicero, for instance, says sometimes *non putauerim* and sometimes *non putem*, it is not merely probable, but it is even practically certain, before we begin our investigation at all, that the one tense differed in meaning from the other. And it is certain, too, that the Romans considered the difference an important one, for they clung to it through all periods of their literature. Whether we have preserved a corresponding difference in the tense systems of our modern languages, or whether we now adopt other means of making the distinction, is a question that has not the remotest possible bearing upon the point. Let us then at once divorce ourselves from every influence of our English idiom and study the differences between the two tenses from a purely Roman point of view. The question that we shall need to ask ourselves—and the only question that concerns us at all in settling the question we are discussing—is this: Did the Romans use these tenses indiscriminately as the grammars claim, or was the perfect tense reserved for special conditions; did it have associations wholly distinct from those of the present tense, or is no difference to be detected in this respect? Answers to this question come from several different directions and always with such force as to be quite conclusive.

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 155

We have already had considerable light thrown on this question by a study of the context. We have already seen that the majority of passages in which the perfect tense is found are clearly marked by a tone of braggadocio, by extravagant or threatening language, or by other indications of unusual emphasis; while those in which the present tense is used are commonly mere softened expressions of a wish, a preference, a polite request, or of a calm, deliberate judgment or belief. We need not, therefore, dwell longer upon this particular feature, but pass at once to other points of evidence.

I have above expressed the view that the perfect tense in this use indicates absolute decisiveness, prompt accomplishment, or rapidity. If this view is correct, there are certain adverbial expressions which we should not expect to find with the perfect tense. I refer to those adverbs which imply reservation, hesitation or moderation in expressing one's views, *e. g.*, *paene*, *prope*, *fere* (*ferme*), *parum*, *vix*, *fortasse*, etc. If, for instance, *negauerim* means "I should *instantly, absolutely and decisively* deny," as I claim that it does, then we should not expect ever to find it modified by such an adverb as *paene*, *uix*, *fortasse*, or the like, because such adverbs express ideas absolutely opposed to the meaning of the perfect tense. Submitted to this test, the theory I am advancing finds abundant confirmation. Not a single undoubted instance of any adverb that implies reservation, hesitation or moderation is found with the perfect tense (in this use), from the earliest times down to the authors that mark the beginning of the period of decline.¹ Even

¹ It is probable, especially in view of the absence of similar adverbs elsewhere with the perfect tense, that the *uix* in Tusc. disp. II, 24, 57. (*uix eum uirum dixerim*) spends its force upon *uirum*. The meaning will then be "I should *without the slightest hesitation* call him scarcely a man." Cf. Tusc. disp. II, 13, 32. *te . . ne uirum quidem quisquam dixerit*, where *ne . . quidem* spends its force in the same way on *uirum*. So again in de fin. I, 16, 53. *ne iustitiam quidem . . quis dixerit*. There can be no reasonable doubt, as I shall show below, that *fortasse dubitarim*, which some editors read in Tusc. disp. IV, 22, 50, is a wrong reading for *fortasse dubitare*.

The only clear instance of such an adverb, with the perfect tense, that will

after the beginning of the decline and of the breaking up of classical standards, the use of such adverbs with the perfect subjunctive of contingent futurity seems to be extremely rare. The only instance I know of before Tacitus is *uix ausim*, found in Ov. Met. VI, 561, and again in Liv. 7, 13, 6. Now compare with this condition of things the frequent use of such adverbs with the present tense, *e. g.* :

Plautus: Stich. 296 (297). *uix* audeat; Bacch. 1103 *aegre* habeam.

Terence: Hec. 742. *parum* prosit; And. 460 *haud ferme* inuenias.

Cicero: pro Cluentio 68, 192. *paene* dicam; pro Q. Roscio 6, 16 *paene* dicam; pro Sex. Roscio 24, 68 *paene* dicam; Brutus 9, 35 *prope* audeas; in Verr. III, 34, 78 *prope* dicam; ad fam. VII, 2, 3 *uix* ueri simile *fortasse* uideatur; Brutus 83, 287 nec uelim *fortasse*, si possim; pro Sex. Roscio 20, 55 possim *aliquo modo*; in Verr. II, 57, 141 qua *uix* tuto transire posse uideatur (?); Phil. II, 114 quae (gloria) *uix* caelo capi posse uideatur (?).

I should state that this list of examples is made up entirely from only three different authors, and not from an exhaustive search even in these, for the conclusions of *si*-clauses have not, as a rule, been examined with reference to this particular point. The same three authors undoubtedly contain other instances. Now with this partial list of instances from only three authors before us, let us recall the fact that a systematic search through *the whole body of Latin literature* down to the time of Livy and Ovid has discovered **not one undoubted instance** of such an adverb with the perfect tense. The fact that, from the time of Livy on, such adverbs came to be occasionally (very rarely) used with the per-

be found in the list of perfects given above is in Ovid (Met. VI, 561. *uix ausim* credere). It is, of course, not necessary to remind the reader that the writers of the time of Ovid and Livy are characterized by all sorts of violations of classical usage. This late use of *uix* with *ausim* may perhaps be accounted for by supposing that the consciousness that *ausim* was an aorist tense was, by this time, dying out. It may have come to be classed with such present forms as *duim*, *uelim*, *creduim*, *notim*, etc.

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 157

fect of the Subjunctive of Contingent Futurity, can cause little surprise in view of the otherwise loose use of moods and tenses during the period of decline. During this period tenses were freely used in a way that showed little regard for the strict standards of earlier times¹.

But we may approach this same question from an opposite direction. While we should not expect to find moderating adverbs used with the perfect, we should on the other hand, if my theory be true, expect to find intensifying adverbs (or equivalent adjectives) used much more freely with the perfect tense than with the present. For I claim that the speaker who uses the perfect tense is especially bent on expressing himself in the most emphatic, absolute and energetic manner possible, and on representing the act (for the perfect in this sense is never used of states or conditions) as one that would be performed and finished promptly and without the slightest hesitation. If this is the idea which he is attempting to bring out as forcibly as possible, we should expect to find frequently coupled with the perfect tense such adverbs as *cito*, *facile*, *plane* (in the sense of *absolutely*, *most assuredly*, etc.), *lubenter* (or an equivalent adjective, *lubens*), *sine ulla dubitatione* (or *non dubitans*), *non inuitus*, *repente*, *continuo*, *audacter*, *fortiter*, etc. Still, it must be remembered that there is nothing in

¹ Even here, however, in the period of decline, it would, in my opinion, be a great mistake to suppose that the perfect was felt as an equivalent of the present. Indeed, the fact that it differed from the present was the one consideration that led to its use. Everyone who is versed in Silver Latin, or who has read literary histories of that period, will not need to be told that the authors of that period are constantly striving to say something striking, and to say it in the most striking way. Indeed, this often seems to be their principal aim—to say something unusual—and, in order to do this, they use strange constructions, unusual words, extravagant expressions. They often seek to arrest attention merely by the striking sound of their phrases, apparently without much reference to the thought itself. They frequently sacrifice sense to sound. Every compendium of the history of Roman literature lays a good deal of stress upon this characteristic of Silver Latin. Even here, however, such expressions as *uix obstiterit* in Tac. H. 1, 79 and *paene dixerim* in Tac. Dial. 32 seem to be extremely rare.

the present tense that would prevent the occasional use of such adverbs with this tense, the tense in such cases leaving the emphasis to be expressed entirely by the modifiers. If we now examine the passages again with reference to these adverbs, we find once more exactly what we should expect. Out of the 771 instances in the list of presents, only 10 have modifiers of this class: *una plaga*, Plaut. Am. 705; *profecto*, Plaut. As. 601; Cic. Tusc. disp. 4, 8, 17; *lubens*, Plaut. Bacch. 46; Stich. 592; *facile*, Ter. Eun. 1080; Cic. Verr. 1, 15, 39; *repente*, Cic. Verr. 1, 15, 40; *plane*, Cic. ad Att. XI, 9, 3; XVI, 7, 8. Out of only 155 instances of the perfect tense, such modifiers occur 45 times, as follows:

Plautus: Poen. 886. *Continuo* is me ex Syncerasto Crurifragium fecerit; 1088 (1091) faxim *lubens*; 1090 (1093) faxim *lubens*; Aul. 412 (420) *lubens* faxim; Truc. 697 (707) *plane* interierim (marked by Goetz and Schöll as corrupt); Trin. 1023 surpuerit *currenti cursori solum* (Goetz and Schöll have *surrupuit*).

Terence: Ad. 887. *lubens* faxim; 896 *lubens* faxim; And. 203 *facilius* passus sim.

Cicero: Phil. II, 46, 118. *libenter* obtulerim; XII, 9, 22 *libenter* ediderim; de orat. III, 41, 163 *libentius* dixerim; de leg. I, 4, 13 *libenter* audierim; ad Att. XIV, 17A, 4 *libentius* transfuderim; ad fam. V, 21, 1 *libentius* posuerim; VII, 23, 3 *libentius* emerim; Brut. 9, 35 *facile* dixeris; 13, 52 *facile* dixerim¹; 41, 151 *facile* dixerim¹; Brutus 76, 264 *cito* dixerim; 78, 272 *facile* dixerim; orat. 47, 157 *libentius* dixerim; de nat. deor. 1, 21, 60 *citius* dixerim; 3, 38, 91 *facile* dixerim¹; Verr. II, 4, 43, 94 *facile* dixerim¹; de off. 1, 18, 59 *citius* adiuueris; 3, 30, 110 *facile* dixerit¹; ad fam. 1, 7, 3 *facile* intellexerim; Brut. 1, 15, 10 *facile*

¹ Some of the instances of *facile* are accompanied by a negative: *non* (*haud*) *facile* dixerim (or in one instance *adfirmaverim*). This expression occurs in seven passages: Brut. 13, 52; 41, 151; 78, 272; de nat. deor. 38, 91; Verr. 2, 4, 43, 94; leg. I, 3, 6; ad Brut. I, 15, 10. At first glance this phrase may seem opposed to my theory, since *non facile* may seem to mean *with difficulty*, an idea which on my theory ought not to be found with the perfect subjunctive of prompt, ready action. A little thought, however, will

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 159

adfirmarim ; 6, 25 *sine ulla dubitatione* confirmauerim ; de div. I, 55, 125 *non dubitans* dixerim ; Tusc. disp. I, 17, 4 *non inuitus* errauerim ; de re pub. I, 3, 6 *facile* dixerim ; de re pub. III, 33, 45 *citius* negauerim ; III, 38, 91 *facile* dixerim ; Brut. 9, 35 *plane quidem facile* dixeris ; orat. I, 38 *citius* gubernarit ; de sen. 23, 83 *facile* retraxerit ; *ib.* *facile* recoxerit ; pro Mur. 29, 60 *uerissime* dixerim ; Cornif. ad Her. III, 11, 19 *facile* dixerimus ; III, 11, 19 *audacter* confirmauerimus.

Horace : Sat. I, 3, 64. *libenter* obtulerim.

Ovid : Ars. Am. III, 685. *cito* credideris.

Livy : 39, 40. *facile* dixeris (my statistics for Livy are not complete).

Even when stated in this absolute way, the contrast between the two tenses with reference to the modifiers is striking enough, but it is still more so when one considers that the list of presents contains 771 instances, while the list of perfects contains only 155. There are, then, about five times as many instances of the present as there are of the perfect. If the use of such modifiers were as

show that, instead of regarding the expression *non facile* as the modifier of *dixerim*, we must rather regard the *non* as a modifier of the complex idea *facile dixerim*, *facile* alone modifying the *dixerim*. If *non* were to be taken merely with *facile*, then *non facile*, "with difficulty," would have to be regarded as expressing the manner in which the act *dixerim* was to be performed, implying or rather expressly stating that the act of *dixerim* was to be performed, but that it was to be performed *non facile*, which is manifestly not the meaning of the writer. He means rather, in each case, that the *easy saying* of the thing is *not possible* and therefore he will not say it at all. The truth of all this becomes particularly clear wherever the negative is *nec* instead of *non*, as in *nec facile dixeris* (e. g., Livy 39, 40). Here the *nec* may always be translated by *nor*, i. e., *nor would you easily say*, in which no one could possibly feel the negative as belonging to *easily* alone. It can be felt only as negating the whole expression. *Non facile dixeris* is, in this respect, exactly like *nec facile dixeris*, but there is unfortunately no unambiguous English form by which it can be expressed with equal clearness in translating. In such expressions the perfect was originally used with *facile*, *libenter* (*lubens*) and similar adverbs *only in affirmative expressions*. Then the idea *easily said*, etc., came to be occasionally negated as a whole. Such negative expressions are, however, rare, and do not, I believe, occur at all before Cicero.

natural with one tense as with the other, we should expect the proportion to remain about the same with the two tenses. If, then, such modifiers are found in 45 out of 155 instances of the perfect, we should expect, among the 771 instances of the present, to find 223 or more instances; as a matter of fact, there are only 10 instances. But even such a showing is unfair to my side of the argument. It would be fairer in this computation to leave out of consideration those instances which are accompanied by a negative. If, as I claim, *nec credideris*, for instance, is equivalent to "nor would you *for an instant* believe", or some similarly absolute, unhesitating and emphatic statement, such modifiers as *cito*, *sine ulla dubitatione*, *repente*, *continuo*, *audacter*, or in fact any of those given in the list on p. 157, would not seem so natural with negative expressions of this type as with the corresponding affirmative expressions. In fact, the presence of such adverbs would tend to counteract and reverse the very idea which the perfect is, according to my theory, intended to express. For instance, *non sine ulla dubitatione negauerim*, or the like, would seem to imply that I might *after some hesitation* deny, an idea which reverses the meaning of prompt, unhesitating and absolute denial which I claim for *non negauerim*. The only instances of such modifiers that we should expect to find in negative expressions of this type, would be the rare cases in which an adverb is felt as belonging solely to the verb, the verb and the adverb together then forming a concept which is, as a whole, negated. As a matter of fact, the only instances of these negative expressions which are accompanied by any modifiers of the class referred to are those of *non facile dixerim* (*dixeris*) and the one in Cic. Brut. 76, 264, *neque uerbis aptiorem cito alium dixerim neque sententiis crebriorem*. For the first of these expressions, see p. 158, note. In the other, the negatives spend their force chiefly upon *uerbis aptiorem* and *sententiis crebriorem*. Leaving negative expressions out of consideration for the moment, let us make our calculation again. Of the affirmative expressions, there are 68 instances under the perfect tense, and 675 under the present. Of the 68 instances of the perfect, 30 are accompanied by modifiers of the class referred

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 161

to. If, then, such modifiers were as natural with the present tense as with the perfect, we should expect to find them in about 300, out of the 675, instances of the present. But instead of 300 instances, we find only 9. Instructive in this connection is the occasional use of the present and perfect tenses side by side, the former with a moderating, the latter with an intensifying, or heightening, adverb. An instance of this kind is found in Cic. Brut. 9, 35 : Tum fuit Lysias . . . egregie subtilis scriptor atque elegans quem iam *prope* audeas oratorem perfectum dicere : nam *plane* quidem perfectum . . . Demosthenem *facile* dixeris. Again, with this *audeas*, the present, modified by the moderating *prope*, compare the aorist tense of the same word below (*ausim* in 9, 35) with the intensifying *non mehercule quidem*.

It is often dangerous to draw too many inferences from arguments of the nature of those just adduced, but such a truly remarkable contrast as that to which attention has just been called must surely mean something. The only reasonable explanation for it that suggests itself to me, in view of all the facts presented in these pages, is this : That adverbs (and other modifiers) denoting rapidity, promptness, facility, or decisiveness of action, are coupled with such remarkable frequency with the perfect tense only because the perfect tense is not used except when the speaker is intensely in earnest, or wishes to express himself with the utmost possible energy. Such a mood on the part of the speaker would, at one and the same time, account for the intensifying modifiers and for the tense of the verb. On the other hand, it seems equally clear, from the remarkable absence of such modifiers with the present tense, that, when one uses that tense, there is almost invariably an absence of all desire, or intent, to speak with any particular emphasis or decision.

Emphasis should further be placed upon the fact that, *so far as the perfect tense is concerned*, there is no such thing as a "subjunctive of modest assertion". There is nothing "modest", or "softened", about the perfect tense. That tense is the tense of self-confidence, decided opinions and fearless assertion. For the

real "subjunctive of modest assertion", reference should be made to the instances of the present tense.

I hope it will be generally agreed that the evidence already adduced in favor of my contention is sufficiently conclusive. But there is other evidence to be offered, and evidence which is, perhaps, of a still more remarkable character. I refer to that presented by the character of the verbs found in the perfect and present tenses respectively, under (a) and (b) on the one hand, and under (c) on the other. The following table will be of service in examining this evidence.

<i>Perfect Tense.</i>		<i>Present Tense.</i>	
	Number of instances.		Number of instances.
<i>Without a Negative.</i>		<i>Without a Negative.</i>	
FIRST PERSON :		FIRST PERSON :	
(a) $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{All of these} \\ \text{strictly belong} \\ \text{under (c). See} \\ \text{below.} \end{array} \right\}$	5	(a)	558
(b)	0	(b)	3
(c)	53	(c)	7
SECOND PERSON :		SECOND PERSON :	
(a)	0	(a)	20
(b)	0	(b)	4
(c)	3	(c)	17
THIRD PERSON :		THIRD PERSON :	
(a)	0	(a)	35
(b)	0	(b)	3
(c)	7	(c)	28
<i>With a Negative.</i>		<i>With a Negative.</i>	
FIRST PERSON :		FIRST PERSON :	
A. Neg. Statement.		A. Neg. Statement.	
(a)	5	(a)	0
(b)	0	(b)	1
(c)	32	(c)	3
B. Rhet. Quest., Equiv. to Neg. Statement.		B. Rhet. Quest., Equiv. to Neg. Statement.	
(a)	0	(a)	2
(b)	0	(b)	0
(c)	1	(c)	0
SECOND PERSON :		SECOND PERSON :	
A. Neg. Statement.		A. Neg. Statement.	
(a)	8	(a)	10
(b)	1	(b)	0
(c)	10	(c)	3

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 163

<i>Perfect Tense.</i>		<i>Present Tense.</i>	
<i>B. Rhet. Quest., Equiv. to Neg. Statement.</i>		<i>B. Rhet. Quest., Equiv. to Neg. Statement.</i>	
(a)	1	(a)	4
(b)	1	(b)	0
(c)	1	(c)	19
THIRD PERSON :		THIRD PERSON :	
<i>A. Neg. Statement.</i>		<i>A. Neg. Statement.</i>	
(a)	0	(a)	13
(b)	0	(b)	0
(c)	9	(c)	1
<i>B. Rhet. Quest., Equiv. to Neg. Statement.</i>		<i>B. Rhet. Quest., Equiv. to Neg. Statement.</i>	
(a)	0	(a)	24
(b)	0	(b)	0
(c)	15	(c)	16
<hr/>			
<i>Rhet. Quest. with non, Equiv. to Affirmative Statement.</i>			
(a)	0		
(b)	0		
(c)	3		

Before considering the remarkable condition of things presented by this classification, I must again throw out a word of caution against regarding negative expressions as parallel with affirmative expressions. So far as the classes (a), (b) and (c) are concerned, I have, merely as a matter of form, classed every verb according to its meaning, quite regardless of the presence or the absence of a negative. Strictly speaking, however, the addition of a negative here, as well as in volitive expressions (see pp. 12-13 and 112) gives rise to an idea that removes the expression from (a) or (b) and makes it belong properly under (c). For instance, *putem*, "I should think", (*i. e.*, "have an opinion", not "draw a conclusion") clearly belongs to that class of verbs whose meanings are opposed to the idea of quick or energetic action, promptly completed; but *non putem*, "I should not think", *i. e.*, "I should refuse to think", refers to an act that can be energetically performed and promptly completed. Similarly *teneam*, "I should keep", "I should hold", expresses a notion in its nature opposed to the idea of quick or energetic action promptly completed; but *non teneam*, "I should not

keep", *i. e.*, "I should let go", is not at all opposed to such an idea and must be classed in the other category. In view of the considerations just presented, we should not expect to find such expressions as *dubitauerim*, *putauerim* (unless we suppose that this verb is used in the sense of "form a conclusion"). "I should instantly think", in the sense of "have an opinion and then promptly cease having it", would not be a natural conception¹; but we need not be surprised to find occasionally the corresponding negative expression, *non putauerim*, "I should not for an instant think", *i. e.*, "I should without an instant's hesitation refuse to think". Still, the fact that such verbs are not used in the perfect tense in affirmative expressions might not unnaturally lead to a rather limited use of such verbs in that tense also in negative expressions. It will be further noticed in this connection that certain rhetorical questions are really in the nature of negative assertions and should be classed with them. For instance *quis crediderit?* means in effect *nemo crediderit*; the two expressions are to be classed together, not under *verbs of thinking*, but under *verbs of refusing to think, rejecting the thought*, which is for our present purpose, an essentially different class; the perfect tense is in both cases to be explained in the same way.

Bearing these considerations in mind, let us now examine some of the facts which our classification brings into prominence. For this purpose, I wish here to subdivide into two classes the verbs included throughout the paper under (a). The first of these two classes will include all those verbs which never have meanings that are opposed to the idea of prompt action promptly finished.

¹ I regard the assumption that the aorist sometimes has an "ingressive" force, in the sense in which that expression is commonly used to describe the force of the tense in *ἔβασιλευσα* ("I became king"), etc., as without foundation, in spite of the fact that it has the authority of such names as Brugmann, Goodwin and others. My reasons for rejecting such claims will be given in another paper. [Since the above was written, Delbrück (*Vergl. Synt.* II, p. 234) has expressed his dissent from the view that would ascribe an ingressive force to such aorists as *ἔδευσα*].

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 165

Such verbs, for instance, are *teneo*, *sum*¹, *dubito*, *haereo*, *uolo*, etc., etc. Under the present tense will be found (see above) hundreds of instances of just such verbs as this, and these instances are far more common in affirmative sentences than in negative. Under the perfect tense there is *not a single instance* of such a verb before the period of decline, except when it is modified by a negative, or when it is in a rhetorical question equivalent to a negative statement. I say this with the utmost confidence, because I consider it certain that the common reading *fortasse dubitarim an*, etc., in Cic. *Tusc. disp.* IV, 22, 50, is a wrong reading for *fortasse dubitarem. An*, etc. As *dubitarim* would be in direct violation of my theory, it will be necessary at this point to state my reasons for rejecting this reading. The passage is as follows: De L. Bruto *fortasse dubitarim an* propter infinitum odium tyranni ecfrenatus in Arruntem inuaserit. Against *dubitarim* are to be urged the following objections:

(1) There is, as has just been pointed out, not a single instance anywhere in Latin (either in prose or in poetry), prior to the end of the Augustan period, of this use of the perfect tense of any verb belonging to this class, except where negated, or used in a rhetorical question equivalent to a negative statement. That this cannot be due to any scarcity of verbs of this class is shown by the fact that there are hundreds of instances of such verbs found in the present tense, and that, in general, this class of verbs forms a

¹ Karl Kunst (*Bedeutung und Gebrauch der zu der Wurzel fu gehörigen Verbalformen bei Sallust*) recognizes two distinct meanings for *fuam*, viz., "had been" and "had become". Schmalz seems to accept this view (*Berl. Phil. Wochenschrift*, 26 Dec. 1896, col. 1644). Blase very properly, as it seems to me, rejects it (*Archiv* 10, p. 300). This view of Kunst seems to me based upon the common fallacy which I shall point out in Part III of this volume. Kunst has failed to recognize the difference between equivalence of meaning and what I shall there call the "equivalence of adaptability". Undoubtedly "*fuam*" is often used where "I had become" would make perfectly good sense in translating, and possibly even where it would seem to us rather more natural than "I had been". But that does not prove that the Romans ever felt *fuam* as indicating a *coming into existence* rather than a *being in existence*.

large percentage of the entire number of verbs in the language (*cf.* p. 109, with note). More than this,

(2) The adverb *fortasse* is never found with this use of the perfect tense of any verb whatever, prior to the end of the Augustan period, and the same is true of any other adverb that indicates reservation, moderation or a softening of the tone, except one or two instances of *uix ausim* in the time of Ovid¹. It will be definitely proved in Part III of this volume that the verb in *fortasse quispiam dixerit* is in the future-perfect indicative.

(3) Again, while I have not examined systematically the entire body of literature with reference to this particular point, I believe that no instance can be found of this use of the particle *an* even with the present tense, *dubitem*. The phrase is, so far as I can find, invariably *dubito an*, "I doubt whether", never even *dubitem an*, "I should doubt whether". It is certainly never *dubitarim an*, or *dubitauerim an*.

(4) Cicero never uses the contracted form *dubitarim* except in his Letters. The full form *dubitauerim* (with a negative) occurs, *e. g.*, in *de re pub.* I, 4, 7.

It appears, then, that this expression, *fortasse dubitarim an*, violates not merely Ciceronian, but even Latin usage in general (whether in prose or poetry), at almost every possible point. From whatever point of view the expression is approached, the verdict is always the same, viz., that it is without a parallel. Clearly the reading cannot stand in the face of such evidence as this. I should without hesitation read *dubitarem*. Palaeographically this would involve only a very simple and very common change, even if there were no manuscript authority for it; but such manuscript authority actually exists (see Moser's note on this passage where he says "pro *dubitarim* cod. Rehd. male *dubitarem*"). There are numerous parallels both for this use of the imperfect subjunctive and for the use of *fortasse* in the conclusion of a condition contrary to fact, *e. g.*, *ad Att.* 16, 15, 1 *dubitassem fortasse*; *de nat. deor.* II, 22 *dubitares*; *ad fam.* II, 16, 2 *fortasse*

¹ For a possible explanation of *ausim* with *uix*, see note on p. 156, note.

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 167

non nollem ; pro Balb. 29 *dubitarent* ; Phil. XII, 4 *audirem fortasse* ; Flacc. 35 *dicerem fortasse* ; har. resp. 25 *fortasse monerent* ; pro Ligar. 30 *fortasse ualerent* ; Phil. III, 25 *fortasse uellent* ; Catil. II, 13 *dubitaret* ; pro Milone 30 *dubitaret* ; Phil. V, 37 *dubitaret* ; Caecin. 46 *dubitaretis* ; and elsewhere. The reading *dubitarem* will, of course, necessitate the placing of a period after *dubitarem*, and an interrogation point after *inuaserit*, thus :

De L. Bruto fortasse dubitarem. An propter infinitum odium tyranni ecfrenatius in Arruntem inuaserit ?

I advocate this punctuation with all the greater confidence from the fact that it has already been suggested by Nissen (see Moser's note above referred to), though Nissen's reasons for adopting it differ from my own. With this punctuation, *inuaserit* will be a future perfect indicative referring to a *future decision, or conclusion*, regarding an act that is past at the time of speaking, and the meaning will be : "Or will it be claimed that it has been on account of his extraordinary hatred of the tyrant that he attacked Arruns?" For other similar uses of the future perfect indicative, *cf.* :

Cicero : ad Quintum frat. I, 4. Sin plane occidimus, ego omnibus meis exitio *fuero*, *i. e.*, it will in the future become clear that I have (prior to the time of writing) been the ruin of my own.

Vergil : Aen. 9, 782. Vnus homo tantas strages impune per urbem *ediderit*? Iuuenum primos tot *miserit* Orco, *i. e.*, will it turn out in the future that he has done all this with impunity? *Cf.* also Aen. IV, 591 ; Juv. 1, 3, and see Roby's Latin Grammar, § 1484. For similar uses of the perfect subjunctive, see p. 32, note. It seems certain, then, that we should in this passage read *dubitarem*. If this reading be accepted, there will be left, in the first of the two classes into which we are for the moment dividing the verbs included under (a) in the preceding pages, *not a single instance of the perfect tense*.

The second of the classes into which we are dividing the verbs under (a) includes those verbs which, in some of their meanings, are opposed to the idea of prompt action, promptly completed, but which, nevertheless, frequently have meanings

which are not opposed to it. Such words are *credo*, which means not merely "to believe", "to have confidence in" (when it belongs under (a)), but also "to make a loan", "to consign, or intrust to" (when it belongs under (c)); *censeo*, which means not merely "to think", "to have an opinion" (when it belongs under (a)), but also "to express one's opinion" "to vote", "to advise", (when it belongs under (c)). If the strict and accurate use of the perfect tense which, as I have shown, was very carefully observed all through the ante-classical and the classical period—if this strict use is to break down at all (and there are evidences in Silver Latin that it has, by that time, broken down to a certain extent), we should expect this breaking down to begin with these verbs that have the two classes of meanings. The expression *censuerim*, when that verb is used in the sense of *advise*, represents a perfectly legitimate use of the perfect tense. But the frequent use of this form in that sense might, in the course of time, lead to the use of the same form in the other sense, especially at a time when the feeling for the nice distinctions of classical times was becoming less and less keen. And as a matter of fact, it is in just such verbs that the beginning of a loose use of the perfect tense seems to be first noticed. However, this beginning was not made till late times. There is, in fact, *not a single indisputable instance*, before the beginning of the period of decline, of a verb even of this class used in a meaning that clearly belongs under (a). The only instances in prose that might at first sight seem exceptions to this statement are the following :

Cicero : Brutus 83, 288. Sic ego istis *censuerim* et nouam istam quasi de lacu feruidam orationem fugiendam, etc.

Cicero : ad fam. 1, 7, 3. Pompeium . . . scis temporibus illis non saepe in senatu fuisse ; cui quidem litterae tuae, quas proxime miseras, quod facile *intellegerim*, periucundae fuerunt.

But in the former of these passages, *censuerim* is not used in the sense of "think", but in the sense of "advise", "recommend", and Watson correctly understands it in this latter sense. It, there-

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 169

fore, belongs under (c). For similar uses of the gerundive constructions, with verbs of advising, see, for instance, Harpers' Dictionary, under the verb *monere*.

In the other passage, *intellexerim* stands in a relative clause, which may possibly influence the construction; cf. the subjunctive in the similar relative clauses *quod interdum debeat* (Cic. de orat. I, 10, 40), *quod miserandum sit* (Cic. de nat. deor. III, 62), *quod debeat* (Tac. dial. 26, 4) and see Kühner, *Ausf. Gr. d. Lat. Spr.* p. 855 f. It would then be possible to understand *quod intellexerim* as meaning "a fact which I have easily comprehended." Another explanation, however, is also possible. The meaning of this word was not originally "understand", but rather "catch the meaning of", or something similar. This is made clear by the meaning of the simple verb with which it is compounded, viz., *lego*, "gather", "pick up". Compare the English use of "gather" in such sentences as "I gather from what you say". *Intellego* is apparently frequently used in this original sense, e. g., Cic. de senectute 65. *quae tamen omnia dulciora fiunt et moribus et artibus, idque cum in uita tum in scaena intellegi potest ex eis fratribus qui in Adelphis sunt*; ad Att. 6, 9. *intellexi ex tuis litteris, te audisse, etc.*, and frequently elsewhere in Cicero.

In poetry there is a similar dearth of instances of verbs of this class. There are, however, some three or four passages which seem to call for comment, and first the following two from Horace:

Sat. I, 1, 79. *Horum semper ego optarim pauperrimus esse bonorum*:

Od. II, 13, 5. *Illum et parentis crediderim sui*

Fregisse cervicem, etc.

In the first of these passages, if *optarim* is meant in the sense of "wish", "desire", there can be little, if any, doubt that it is an incorrect reading. In fact, the editors who write *optarim*, if they say anything about the reading at all, freely grant that the whole weight of manuscript authority is in favor of *optarem*. Kiessling, for instance, says: "*optarem* scheint besser überliefert wie *optarim*, liesse sich aber nur erklären durch 'wenn ich mich in deine Stelle versetze, so würde ich doch wünschen'; vorzuzie-

hen ist, auch wegen des zugesetzten *semper*, der Konj. Perf.". Anyone who wishes to see how vastly better attested *optarem* is than *optarim* will find the evidence concisely stated in the note of Kirchner-Teuffel. Not only has *optarem* better manuscript authority, but apparently also (see Kirchner-Teuffel) all the editions of Horace prior to the Aldine editions read *optarem*. The Aldine editions changed this to *optarim* and modern editors have followed this reading. This neglect of the manuscript evidence has resulted in giving up what was perfectly good Latin and putting in its place a construction for which there is not a single undoubted parallel prior to the period of decline.

Even, however, with the reading *optarim*, there would not necessarily be any violation of my theory, as this verb may well be taken here, as often, in the sense of "choose", in which case the verb belongs under (c). In fact, "choose" here seems to me to suit the sense rather better than "wish" or "desire". The same form, *optarim*, occurs again in Tibullus 1, 6, 74, where it admits of the same interpretation :

Non ego te pulsare uelim, sed, uenerit iste

Si furor, *optarim* non habuisse manus.

In the other passages from Horace, *crediderim* is certainly the correct reading and the only meaning, recognized in our dictionaries for this word, that seems to suit the sense, is "believe". The same is true of *crediderim* in Propertius 1, 1, 23 :

Tunc ego *crediderim* uobis et sidera et amnes

Posse Cytaines ducere carminibus.

These two instances of *crediderim*, one from Horace and one from Propertius, are then the only instances that might, with any high degree of plausibility, be insisted upon as illustrating this use, prior to the period of decline. Even these instances, however, disappear, if we may suppose that *credo* continued to be used occasionally with a force akin to its original meaning.¹ (See note

¹ It seems to me probable that Horace, in making this innovation, is using *credo* in the sense of "come to the belief" (instead of "believe", "have the belief"), rather than that he is using the perfect tense in a way hitherto

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 171

on p. 46). In Silver Latin *crediderim* is common enough. It occurs, for instance, several times in the *Agricola* of Tacitus alone, short as that production is.

unknown. The derivation of the word and its original meaning, "to give one's heart (*i. e.*, credence)", as a single act of giving (*dare* and *cre*, *i. e.*, **cred*; cf. **cord*, *καρδ-ία*; see Bréal et Bailly, *Dictionnaire Étymologique Latin*), seem to favor the possibility of its being occasionally used in this sense. However this may be, I wish to call attention to the support afforded my theory by the passage in Horace, as regards the vigorous force which I claim for the perfect tense—a force which seems to be entirely lost upon the commentators on this passage. The passage is as follows:

Illum et parentis *crediderim* sui
Fregisse ceruicem et penetralia
Sparsisse nocturno cruore
Hospitis; ille uenena Colcha, etc.

Horace is here depicting, in his matchless way, the detestable character of the man who planted the tree that came so near ending his life. Every word is chosen with the single view of heightening to the utmost the ugliness of the man's character. Notice, for instance, how the effect is heightened by the repetition, in these and the preceding verses, of *ille*, which, as it were, points the finger of scorn at the scamp and holds him at a distance; by the choice of *parentis* as the victim of the crime; by the use and also the position of *sui*, still dwelling upon the sacred relation between the two and aggravating the horror of the crime; by the choice of the expression *fregisse ceruicem*, pointing out the violent character of the death; by the choice of *penetralia*, the most sacred part of the house; by the choice of the word *sparsisse*, presenting the picture of blood spattering in all directions and sprinkling the sacred walls; by *nocturno*, indicating that it was done in the dead of night, when all were supposed to be peacefully sleeping; by *cruore*, a more horrible form of blood than *sanguine*; by *hospitis*, toward whom the obligations of a host were regarded as among the most sacred that could devolve upon a person, so sacred that at one time failure to fulfill them was punishable by death; by *uenena Colcha*, calling to mind the horrible practices of Medea. It would seem, then, according to the prevailing view, that the only word (except *et*) in the whole stanza that is not especially chosen with reference to unusual emphasis is the word *crediderim*. But this *crediderim* is said by our grammars not to differ in meaning from *credam* and, like the latter, it is regarded as a "modest", or "softened", assertion. But, if the force of this perfect be explained as I suggest, *crediderim* will do its share in adding strength and vigor to the picture. There is no way of conveying in English the real force of *crediderim*, for the reason that the briefest possible English expression, that would bring out this force, would be long and awkward and, therefore, correspondingly weak. *Crediderim* contains all the ideas of the English sentence "I should, without an instant's hesitation, give credence", concentrated and flashed upon the attention in one brief form.

In order to bring into prominence the full significance of these facts, I may now be allowed to summarize. Out of the 155 instances of the perfect tense, there is not, except when a negative modifier is expressed or implied, one indisputable instance of a verb whose meaning does not lend itself readily to the idea of prompt action promptly completed.¹

But when such a verb is modified by a negative, or is used in a rhetorical question equivalent to a negative statement, that is, just as soon it leaves class (a) and becomes akin to the verbs in class (c), then it at once begins to appear in the perfect tense. Fourteen instances of such verbs, when so used, will be found in the list above given.

Now let us turn to the present tense and note the contrast. A count of the list of presents will disclose the fact that there are 771 instances from the three authors examined. It is an almost startling fact that, out of these 771 instances, 677 are formed by just that class of verbs which, according to my theory, ought to be, and which, we have found, actually are, lacking in the perfect tense. But to make the comparison fair, we should not count the instances accompanied by negatives or used in rhetorical questions. Throwing these out, there remain 675 instances in all, of which number 623 are formed by the verbs that are so uniformly wanting in the perfect. If the two tenses were used indiscriminately, we should expect the ratio of this class of verbs to be approximately the same for the perfect tense as for the present. In that case, then, there ought to be, among the 155 instances of the perfect tense, at least 143 instances falling under (a) and (b). Instead of this, we find *not one indisputable instance*.

¹ The perfect subjunctives (*fuēris, attigeris, afueris*) in Cic. pro. Mur. 9, 21 (apud exercitum mihi *fuēris*, inquit, tot annos? forum non *attigeris*? *afueris* tam diu, ut, cum longo interuallo ueneris, cum iis, qui in foro habitant, de dignitate contendas) do not concern us here, as they are *true future perfect* subjunctives (if indeed they are subjunctives at all) referring distinctly to time prior to *contendas*.

Tenuerint in Tac. H. 2, 47, seems to refer to time prior to the present and Kühner so interprets it (*Ausführ. Gram. d. Lat. Spr.*, p. 132). The expression *petenda fuerit* in Liv. 21, 47, 5, is difficult (See Kühner, p. 133).

II. Tenses in Expressions of Contingent Futurity. 173

In the face of such facts as these, who will longer assert, or believe, that the Romans felt no appreciable difference between the two tenses in this use? The want of discrimination has been solely with post-classical and modern writers. The influence of the false teaching of our grammars is seen on every hand among the modern users of the Latin language. Such expressions as *crediderim putauerim, dubitauerim*, etc., are freely used in dissertations published under the eyes of the great Latinists of Germany. And even Cramer, who has devoted much care and time to the study of the very phenomena we have been discussing (*de perfecti conjunctivi usu potentiali apud priscos scriptores Latinos*), can refer approvingly (p. 5) to *crediderim* as representing an especially frequent use of "verba cogitandi"; can (on p. 60) discuss *uoluerim* (Brix's conjecture for *uolueram* of the manuscripts in Plaut. Capt. 306 [309]) without a hint that there is any objection to the tense of *uoluerim*¹; more than that, can even write (on p. 23) the sentence, *ad hoc quoque genus ualere putauerim, quod Madvig indicauit*, etc., wholly unconscious apparently that there is no warrant for such a use of the perfect tense in his large collection of statistics, or in fact anywhere else.

It may not be out of place here to express the belief that the method followed in this investigation is the one that must be adopted in studying similar phenomena in Greek, before thoroughly satisfactory conclusions will be reached regarding certain features of the Greek aorist. But, before one can profitably undertake such an investigation, one must make, as a basis for the work, a

¹ In the absence of independent examples to support the use of the perfect tense of a verb of this class, the passage in Plaut. Capt. Prolog. 53 (*Set etiamst paucis uos quod monitos uoluerim*) can not be appealed to as an instance of such a subjunctive. The *quod . . . uoluerim* is a characterizing clause, in which the *monitos uoluerim* represents *monitos uolui* and the passage means "There is still another matter about which I have wanted you informed." The manuscripts in Capt. 309 all read *hoc te monitum uolueram* and there can be no doubt of the correctness of this reading (*cf.* Cramer, p. 60, for parallel passages). Brix's conjecture, *uoluerim*, is still found in Niemeyer's revision (1897), and forms a fresh illustration of the disaster that threatens to follow every capricious tampering with the manuscripts.

thorough-going study of verb-meaning along the lines indicated in my classification by (a), (b) and (c). I have already begun a study of these phenomena and am convinced that the treatment accorded to verbs by dictionaries is in this respect very unsatisfactory. I believe, for instance, that it can be shown that βασιλεύω should have, among its definitions, "become king", as well as "be king"; that μένω should have "stop" as well as "stay"; etc. For the study of the tenses, accuracy in this respect is the all-important thing. The change of meaning from the idea of *entering into a state* to that of *being in a state*, as a result of entering it, is one of the most common phenomena connected with the development of verb-meaning. I could easily cite scores of verbs, from both Greek and Latin, that are duly recognized by our dictionaries as having passed through this development, and as being frequently used in both senses. I am satisfied that a similar development of meaning has taken place in many verbs in which it is not recognized by our dictionaries, and that a thorough-going study of the Greek verb, with this particular point in view, will clear up much that is now obscure in connection with the much-discussed and much-abused Greek aorist. The results of an investigation of this and related questions, I hope to be able to publish in the near future.

III.

THE SUPPOSED POTENTIAL USE OF THE SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD.

To my mind, no part of our Latin Grammars is less satisfactory than that which treats of the so-called "Potential Subjunctive". The sections devoted to this subject seem to me a conglomeration of misconceptions, groundless theories and false logic. In the first place, the term "Potential" itself, as used in our grammars, seems unwarranted. It is used to include the wide sweep of ideas covered by nearly all the various auxiliary verbs in the English language, indicating all the concepts represented by "may", "can", "might", "could", "would", "should", and "must".

The term "Potential" can properly, it seems to me, be used only of expressions denoting *possibility* or *ability*, the ideas of "may (possibly)" and "can (certainly)". No other meaning seems justified by the derivation of the word, and none other (that concerns us here) is recognized by English lexicographers. I am well aware of the process of reasoning by which the use of the term, as found in grammars, is justified, but it seems to me to be based upon false premises and to lead to false conclusions¹. The aim of the present discussion will be to show that there is no use of the subjunctive mood in Latin which offers any justification for the use of the term "Potential" and that this term ought to be dropped altogether from Latin grammars.

I have thought that the discussion might gain in clearness, if each one of the various ideas covered by the term "potential" in Latin Grammars were considered separately, with reference to its

¹See remarks on the omission of definite protasis under "*The would idea*", below.

supposed relation to the subjunctive mood. I have accordingly treated the subject under the various heads: "The may-idea", "The can idea", "The might idea", "The could idea", "The would idea", etc. Attention is invited first to

The "may (possibly)"-idea.

In what I am about to say in this connection, I must ask the reader to be constantly on his guard against taking expressions of permission as expression of possibility. It seems advisable to lay particular emphasis upon the necessity of avoiding confusion in considering such expressions, for the reason that even some editors and commentators have not done so. Our auxiliary verb, "may" is used in two distinct senses, (1) in the sense of "may possibly", "may perhaps", and (2) in the sense of "may, if you wish (*i. e.*, you are permitted)." The Latin subjunctive is often used as an expression of permission in both the second and the third persons. This subjunctive of permission represents a yielding of the speaker's will and belong to the volitive division of the subjunctive mood. Such a use is illustrated by *tu rideas, prior bibas, prior decumbas* (Ter. Phorm. 341). We are not at present concerned with such a subjunctive. The other use, namely, that of the subjunctive in the sense of "may possibly" is, as I shall attempt to show, absolutely unknown to the Latin language. There is in fact not the slightest real evidence in favor of the supposition that such a use exists. And the evidence against it is overwhelming and, to my mind, conclusive. The phrases that will, under the teaching of our grammars, naturally be the first to suggest themselves, as supposed instances of this use, are *aliquis dixerit* and *aliquis dicat*, which are quoted as meaning "someone may (perhaps) say", and *quaerat quispiam*, "someone may ask". Attention is accordingly invited to the consideration of these phrases and first to

aliquis (quispiam) dixerit: It is now nearly thirty years since Roby, in the preface to his Latin Grammar, gave cogent

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 177

reasons for believing that *dixerit* in this use is not a subjunctive, as had been supposed, but the future perfect of the indicative. For some reason, Roby's views and the arguments by which he supports them have apparently met with little or no approval. Later writers still cling to the old classification and, as a rule, without so much as hinting that it is open to any doubt. Roby, to be sure, might have made his case very much stronger than he really did, and he seems strangely diffident and reserved in expressing his views. But he deserves credit for throwing at least a ray of light upon a long accepted error. A little closer study of the material which Roby collected, together with a few other facts bearing upon the same question would, I feel sure, have resulted years ago in burying the common theory regarding this use beyond all possibility of resurrection.

I should state here that the one or two instances of *quispiam dixerit* introduced by *forsitan* are, for the present, omitted from the list of instances about to be given. The subjunctive after *forsitan* (*fors sit an*) is due merely to the feeling that the verb stands in an indirect question after *an*, and therefore has nothing to do with the phenomena we are now considering.¹

¹ It is universally agreed that *forsitan* is merely *fors sit an* fused into a single word, and that the subjunctive mood which invariably (until comparatively late times) follows this word must originally have been merely the subjunctive of indirect question, with no connection whatever with any supposed potential subjunctive. The expression *forsitan res sic se habeat* was then felt as meaning "it would be a matter of chance (or doubt) whether things are so." Cf. *fors fuat an* in Plaut. Pseud. 432 *fors fuat an istaec dicta sint mendacia*; Apul. Apol. 92 *fors fuat an ne sic quidem credat*; Symmach. Ep. 1, 39 *fors fuat an scripta sint*; Fronto de Eloq. p. 227 (Ed. Mai); etc. Strangely enough, however, even some of those grammarians who explicitly state that the subjunctive after *forsitan* is the subjunctive of indirect question, nevertheless proceed to classify *forsitan quaeratis* and similar expressions under the head of Potential Subjunctive. See, for instance, Allen & Greenough, § 311 a, Note 3; Kühner, § 147 (cf. with the examples under § 46, 2); see also Draeger, *Hist. Synt.*, p. 306. It seems to me practically certain that even after the original phrase *fors sit an* had been fused into *forsitan*, the *an* continued, till comparatively late times,

Omitting, then, the few instances referred to, *aliquis* (*quispiam*, etc.) *dixerit*, and other expressions of the same type, occur as follows:

Without fortasse.

Cicero: de off. III, 19, 76. "Non igitur faciat" *dixerit quis* "quod utile sit, quod expediat?"

ib. III, 27, 100. "O stultum hominem" *dixerit quispiam* "et repugnantem utilitati suae!"

ib. III, 28, 102. "Quid est igitur", *dixerit quis*, "in iure iurando?"

de nat. deor. III, 31 76. "quis enim te adhibuisset", *dixerit quispiam*, "si ista non essent?"

to retain enough of its original force to govern the mood as it originally did. My reasons for this belief are as follows:

(1) It continued, till comparatively late times, to be used only with the subjunctive, never with the indicative, thus following the use of *an* in indirect questions; while its synonym *fortasse* during the same period is never found with the subjunctive (except in conditional sentences), but only with the indicative (see discussion on pp. 185 ff). If they were both felt purely and simply as adverbs, with the meaning "perhaps", it would be difficult to account for this invariable difference of mood.

(2) If in *forsitan* the *an* was felt as introducing a question after a present tense (*sit*), we should then expect it to be followed only by the present and perfect tenses (for the rule for the sequence of tenses still seems to be in force, despite the assaults that have been made upon it). And this is exactly what we find. The use of any other tense with *forsitan* is as rare as it is with other forms of indirect questions after a primary tense. In fact I can find none at all except in Cic. de oratore II, 45, 189 and Verg. Georg. IV, 116, and even here the imperfect refers to present time, forming apodoses contrary to fact in the present. *Fortasse*, on the other hand, is freely used with all tenses (present, imperfect, future, perfect, future-perfect and pluperfect). Why is *forsitan* so closely confined to the primary tenses, unless it be for the reason I have assigned? Very instructive in this connection is the use of *fortassean* (or *fortasse an*). While *fortasse* confines itself so closely to the indicative, *fortassean* persists, until the time of Gellius, in taking only the subjunctive showing that the *an* is here performing the same function as in *forsitan*. The instances of *fortassean* prior to Gellius are Accius, ap. Nonium 138, 33; Sisenna, ap. Nonium 82, 6; Varro, de re rust. 3, 6, 1; 3, 16, 10; de lingua latina 5, § 34, 7; 7, § 40; 8, § 7. Cf. also the instances of *fors fuat an*, above cited.

(3) Another indication that the interrogative force of the *an* in *forsitan* long continued to be distinctly felt is that, while *fortasse* was at all periods

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 179

Phil. 14, 5. "Tu igitur ipse de te?" *dixerit quispiam*.

Catullus: 67, 37. *Dixerit hic aliquis*: "qui tu istaec, ianua, nosti?"

Ovid: ars. am. III, 7. *dixerit e multis aliquis*.

ex Pont. II, 2, 29. *dixerit hoc aliquis*.

Sallust: orat. Macr. 14. *aliquis* uostrum *subiecerit*.

Horace: Sat. II, 7, 39. *dixerit ille*.

Valerius Maximus: VI, 3, 5. hoc *aliquis* ponendum *dixerit*.

Seneca: contr. II, 1 (9), 10. *quaesierit aliquis*.

Ulp. Dig. II, 11, 4. pr. *dixerit aliquis*.

freely used to modify adjectives, adverbs, prepositional phrases, etc., *forsitan* was till late times used only with verbs. This strict use of *forsitan* is violated only once (Sall. Jug. 106, 3) before the time of Livy.

It might, however, be claimed—in fact it is claimed (*e. g.*, Allen & Greenough, § 311a note 3), that, while the subjunctive after *forsitan* was originally merely an indirect question, it came ultimately to be felt as a potential subjunctive. The argument of those who hold this view is that, inasmuch as *forsitan quaeratis* practically means, and may be translated by, "perhaps you may ask", this "may"-idea must be associated with the mood. The fallacy of such an argument is easily detected. One might as well say that, since *fortasse est*, or "perhaps he is", is practically equivalent to "he may be", the indicative *est* in Latin, or "is" in English, has a potential force. The potential idea that is conveyed by these expressions comes wholly from the *fortasse* and from the "perhaps", and these adverbs are used solely because the indicative cannot possibly express the potential idea that is wanted. So with *forsitan quaeratis* the entire expression practically means "perhaps you may ask", but this fact proves nothing whatever regarding the force of the mood itself. If it be claimed that this "may"-idea might ultimately, as the consciousness of the make-up of the word *forsitan* became less distinct, have become attached to the mood itself, the reply will be that it *might* have done so, but that it never did. At any rate, the evidence is all against the supposition. When the consciousness of the make-up of *forsitan* began to die out—when it was no longer distinctly felt that *an* in *forsitan* was an interrogative, then *forsitan* came to be used exactly like *fortasse*. That is, it began to be used freely with the indicative, and also with adjectives, adverbs, phrases, etc., etc. See Krebs-Schmalz, Antibarbarus, Hand's Tursellinus, etc. Exactly the same course of development is followed by *nescio quis* and *nescio an*, in which *quis* and *an* were originally felt as interrogatives and construed accordingly with the subjunctive of indirect question; but, later on, *nescio quis* came to be felt, and used, as an indefinite pronoun, and *nescio an* merely as an adverb. *Nescio quis* was then construed with the indicative mood, or merely with substantives without any verb; and *nescio an* could be used with the indicative; cf. Quintil. 6, 3, 6, *motu animi quodam nescio an enarrabili iudicatur*.

With fortasse.

Cicero: de senectute 3, 8. Sed *fortasse dixerit quispiam* tibi propter opes et copias et dignitatem tuam tolerabiliorem senectutem uideri.

de lege agr. II, 13, 32. *dixerit enim fortasse quispiam* "quid me ista laedunt, scribe, lictor, praeco, pullarius?"

Phil. X, 5, 12. "at ne Bruto quidem": id enim *fortasse quispiam* improbus *dixerit*.

de off. III, 26, 97. "at utile [ut *aliquis fortasse dixerit*] regnare et Ithacae uiuere, etc.

de orat. II, 24, 99. *riserit aliquis fortasse* hoc praeceptum.

Verr. II, 15. quod *fortasse non nemo* uestrum *audierit*, etc.

Tusc. disp. V, 4, 10. de disciplina aliud tempus *fuert fortasse* dicendi.

It will be noticed that, in the above list, I have separated the instances accompanied by *fortasse* from those that are not so accompanied. It will, I presume, be admitted by everybody that the mood is in both cases the same and that it is used in both cases with the same force. Grammars (including Roby) are indeed wont to cite promiscuously the instances with, and those without, *fortasse*, as representing exactly the same modal use; and all agree that the mood is the subjunctive, with the exception of Roby, who concludes his investigation of the subject with this very mild statement (page cvi): "In conclusion, without denying the possibility of *dixerit quis* in the expressions here treated of being subjunctive, I think the indicative is decidedly more probable." There are, all told, twenty instances of the type *aliquis dixerit*. Of these 20 instances, 7 are accompanied by *fortasse*. As we shall see in a moment, the fact that *fortasse* is thus found used with 35% of the entire number of instances is an all-important fact for our present purpose; indeed this fact really settles the question of mood with practical certainty. And yet, strangely enough, the importance of it does not seem to have been appreciated. Even Roby has nothing to say about it, but bases his conclusions on other considerations. We may throw a flood of light upon the question we are considering by ascertaining the use

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 181

of *fortasse*, with regard to the mood that accompanies it, in cases where the form of the verb leaves no possible doubt about the mood, as in *dicet, dicit, dicat*. An examination of such instances will lead to absolutely certain results, as the mood is in each case certain. *Dixerit*, on the other hand, may, as far as its form is concerned, be either the perfect subjunctive, or the future perfect indicative. The following statistics represent the condition of things in Cicero :

Fortasse with the Future Indicative.

Planc. 20. *erit tibi fortasse* etiam de nobis aliquid . . audiendum.

Cael. 19. *fortasse* . . . *commouebor*.

Scaur. 41. *fortasse credetur* (Sardis) aliquando.

div. in Caec. 40. *fortasse dices*.

Mur. 6. de officio defensionis meae ac de ratione accusationis tuae *fortasse* etiam alia in parte orationis dicendum nobis *erit*.

Flacc. 35. aliquid *fortasse* coram producti *dicent* in quo reprehendatur.

Sull. 84. *dicet fortasse* quispiam.

Phil. V, 14. qui *fortasse excusabuntur*.

ib. VIII, 19. me irasci *fortasse dices*.

Sest. 33. hominis desperati et proditoris rei publicae casum *lugebunt fortasse* qui uolent.

Cael. 42. huic homini ego *fortasse* et pauci deos propitios . . . *putabunt*.

Verr. I, 11. *erunt etiam fortasse* . . qui . . . putent.

ib. I, 25. hic tu *fortasse eris* diligens.

ib. III, 40. *fortasse quaeretis*.

ib. IV, 1. deinde *fortasse* non magno opere *quaeretis*.

ib. IV, 56. nimium *fortasse dicet* aliquis hunc diligentem.

ib. V, 173. a me . . . plus *habebunt* (ciues Romani) *fortasse* quam postulant.

ib. V, 179. *quaeret* aliquis *fortasse*.

imp. Pomp. 22. *requiretur fortasse*.

Marcell. 29. alii *fortasse* aliquid *requirent*.

Phil. V, 3. *erit fortasse* aliquid.

Balb. 62. illam . . . *fortasse* pertinaciam non nulli, uirtutem alii *putabunt*.

Catil. IV, 9. *fortasse* minus *erunt* . . . pertimescendi.

de leg. agr. II, 97. *fortasse* non continuo, sed certe, si paulum adsumpserint uetustatis ac roboris, non *continebuntur*.

Phil. V, 34. sed *fortasse* serius *decernetis*.

Catil. I, 31. *uidebimur fortasse* ad breue quoddam tempus cura et metu esse releuati.

Phil. V, 9. auspiciorum nos *fortasse* *erimus* interpretes.

de nat. deor. II, 65, 162. quod uterque uestrum *arripiet fortasse* ad reprehendendum.

de re pub. I, 19, 31. *contemnari* a te *fortasse*.

Acad. II, 81. *dicet* (deus) me acrius uidere quam illos pisces *fortasse*.

de off. I, 23. hoc *uidebitur fortasse* cuiuspiam durius.

ib. II, 20. *fortasse* *uidebitur*.

ib. III, 52. *respondebit* Diogenes *fortasse* sic.

ib. III, 120. (uoluptas) condimenti *fortasse* non nihil, utilitatis certe nihil *habebit*.

de fin. III, 40. mihi . . . *erit* isdem istis *fortasse* iam utendum.

de fin. I, 11. *scribentur fortasse* plura.

de fin. IV, 51. non *dabunt fortasse*.

de fin. V, 7. *fortasse* non *poterit*.

de re pub. III, 47. *fortasse* non tam illius te rei publicae *paenitebit*.

Tusc. disp. I, 101. hodie apud inferos *fortasse* *cenabimus*.

de fin. II, 22, 74. *fortasse* etiam . . . aliquid de maioribus tuis et de te ipso *dices*.

de leg. III, 13, 29. *dicemus* aliquid *fortasse*.

Tusc. disp. I, 24. *fortasse* *dissipabitur*.

de fin. V, 85. *fortasse* *dubitabunt*.

Tusc. disp. II, 43. *quaeres fortasse*.

Tusc. disp. III, 13. *relinquetur fortasse*.

Tusc. disp. IV, 47. *reperiam fortasse*.

de re pub. III, 45. *uidebuntur fortasse*.

Tusc. disp. III, 84. *fortasse* *tractabimus*.

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 183

de leg. I, 28. quae aliorum causa *fortasse complecteris*.

Tusc. disp. III, 18. *erit fortasse durius*.

ad fam. II, 16, 6; IV, 9, 1; V, 13, 4 (?); VII, 28, 2; IX, 2, 2; 23 (?); X, 11, 3; XIV, 13; XIV, 20; XIV, 22; XV, 4, 13; ad Qu. Fr. II, 2, 2; 13, 2 (twice); ad Att. I, 1, 2; II, 11, 2; 19, 1; IV, 15, 9; VII, 1, 5; VIII, 1, 4; 3, 5; 3, 7; IX, 5, 3; 6, 1; X, 8, 10; 10, 3; 11, 4; 16, 1; 18, 2; XI, 11, 2; 18, 1; 23, 3; XII, 18, 4; 53; XIII, 2, 3; 26, 2 (?); XV, 1, 5; XVI, 11, 6; ad Brut. I, 9, 3 (?); Brutus, 49, 183; Orat., 5, 19; 13, 40; de inventione, II, 22, 68.

Fortasse with the Present Indicative.

de leg. agr. I, 12. *fortasse arbitrantur*.

Verr. V, 10. *fortasse exspectatis*.

de har. resp. 55. *fortasse extimescunt*.

Catil. IV, 20. illi *fortasse minitantur*.

Verr. III, 54. *fortasse quaeritis*.

Planc. 93. *fortasse quaerunt*.

de leg. agr. II, 37. *fortasse reticentur*.

Balb. 61. *sunt* (alii) *fortasse* in sententia firmiores.

Phil. III, 23. haec leuiora *fortasse* (*sunt*).

Phil. III, 169. maior haec praeda *fortasse* (*est*).

Phil. XIII, 11. *sunt* alii plures *fortasse*.

Balb. 63. *est fortasse*.

Caecin. 6. *fortasse uidetur*.

Phil. II, 32. non *fortasse* satis . . . *intellegis*.

Planc. 7. *fortasse* non numquam *est*.

de off. II, 71. illum *fortasse adiuuat*.

de nat. deor. I, 11. sed lucem auctoris *fortasse desiderant*.

de off. III, 6. sustines . . . expectationem . . . magnam honorum, non nullam *fortasse* nominis.

de off. III, 11. *fortasse* disputari *potest*.

Tusc. disp. I, 30. *dolent fortasse et anguntur*.

Tusc. disp. II, 17. *exspectas fortasse*.

de div. I, 35. *latet fortasse*.

Tusc. disp. II, 67. *fortasse permanes*.

Tusc. disp. V, 63. *fortasse putas.*

Tusc. disp. IV, 59. *quaeris fortasse.*

de senect. 46. *est fortasse.*

Tusc. disp. I, 10. *fortasse terrent.*

de off. I, 136. *utendum est fortasse.*

de div. I, 130. *difficile est fortasse.*

Tusc. disp. I, 10. *haec fortasse metuis.*

de leg. III, 18. *est hoc fortasse uitium.*

Acad. II, 82. *maiora fortasse quaeris.*

de re pub. II, 67 *prudentem fortasse quaeris.*

de re pub. II, 20. *fortasse dicis.*

Tusc. disp. I, 12. *non dico fortasse.*

de nat. deor. II, 12. *fortasse non omnia eueniunt.*

de off. II, 12. *fortasse non aequè omnes egent.*

de div. I, 25. *fallit fortasse non numquam.*

de fin. V, 27. *primum fortasse . . . seruire debemus.*

de leg. III, 1. *saepius fortasse laudo, quam necesse est.*

de nat. deor. I, 81. *fortasse sic occurrit.*

ad fam. I, 9, 17; II, 13, 1; 2; 16, 6 (twice); III, 11, 2; IV, 1, 2; 9, 2; VII, 3, 6 (?); IX, 17, 2; X, 20, 2; XI, 3, 3; XV, 21; ad Quint. fratr. 1, 3, 5; ad Att. I, 18, 4; II, 19, 2 (?); 23, 3; V, 10, 2; 21, 7 (?); 21, 10 (?); VI, 3, 5; VIII, 11, 1; IX, 1, 1; X, 11, 3 (?); XI, 7, 3; 24, 4; XIV, 14, 6; XV, 6, 1; 12, 2 (?); de orat. II, 18, 76; 19, 77; orat. 42, 143; orat. 42, 146 (?); topica 6, 29; 17, 65 (?).

*Fortasse with the First Pers. Sing. of the
Future-Perfect Indicative.*

Cicero: ad Att. IX, 15, 3. *ego illum fortasse conuenero.*

Fortasse with Other Tenses of the Indicative.

Scaur. 32; Sest. 121; Flacc. 82; Cluent. 141; Planc. 34; prov. cons. 43; Phil. II, 108; Scaur. 44; Sull. 73; Sull. 80; Vatin 1; Verr. III, 190; har. resp. 61; Verr. III, 41; Verr. III, 194; 49; Mur. 21; Planc. 33; leg. agr. II, 51; Cluent. 131; de nat. deor. I, 77; de div. I, 112; de re pub. II, 57; Acad. II, 77; Tusc. disp. I, 111; Tusc. disp. I, 26; Tusc. disp. III, 53; Tusc. disp. III,

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 185

55; de fin. III, 19; de senect. 48; Tusc. disp. II, 75; Acad. II, 10; de div. II, 67; de off. I, 118; de fin. II, 81; de div. II, 43. ad fam. III, 10, 11 (?); VI, 1, 7; XII, 13, 2; ad Q. fr. 1, 2, 5; ad Att. I, 20, 2; II, 20, 6 (?); III, 8, 2; IV, 10, 1; V, 1, 4; VII, 4, 2 (?); VII, 11, 4; IX, 10, 3; X, 8, 5; XI, 8, 2; XII, 18a, 1; XIII, 15; 23, 3; 25, 2; 35 (36), 2; 38, 1; ad Brut. I, 15, 5 (?); de orat. I, 29, 131; II, 88, 361; III, 18, 67; Brut. 32, 123; 41, 151; 75, 262; 95, 327; orat. 2, 7; 43, 146; 62, 210; Inv. II, 23, 70; Brut. 58, 210.

Here, then, are 95 instances of *fortasse* with the future indicative, 75 with the present indicative, one with the first person singular of the future-perfect indicative (the other parts of this tense coincide with the subjunctive in form and can not therefore be included), and 69 with other tenses of the indicative, making in all 239 instances with the indicative from Cicero. My independent collection of statistics does not cover this use of the indicative mood outside of Cicero, but it will be readily seen that, if there are 239 instances of it in Cicero alone, there are from the earliest times up to, and including, Cicero, probably several hundred instances of *fortasse* with the indicative.

Now how many undisputed instances are there of *fortasse* with the independent subjunctive during this entire period? If we except passages in which *fortasse* is used in conditional sentences (*e. g.*, Cic. Phil. XII, 2, 4. Si iacens uobiscum aliquid ageret, *audirem fortasse*) there is, so far as I can find, *not one undisputed instance*. When *fortasse* is used with the subjunctive, it is nearly always with the imperfect or pluperfect tense in apodoses of the unreal or contrary-to-fact type. The only other instances I find of *fortasse* with the subjunctive are

Cicero: Brut. 83, 287. imitari neque possim, si uelim, nec *uelim fortasse*, si possim.

de natura deorum I, 21, 57. roges me, qualem naturam deorum esse ducam, nihil *fortasse respondeam*.

Verr. V, 7. durum hoc *fortasse uideatur* (Here, however, Merquet classifies this as an instance of *fortasse* with adjectives, taking it solely with durum).

Verr. III, 109. mirum *fortasse* hoc uobis aut incredibile *uideatur* (classed by Merguet as an instance of *fortasse* with adjectives).

Phil. VII, 20. quod *fortasse uideatur* satis esse (classed by Merguet as an instance of *fortasse* modifying an adverb).

ad fam. VII, 2, 3. postremo—uix ueri simile *fortasse uideatur*—oderam multo peius hunc quam illum ipsum Clodium.

ad fam. I, 7. *fortasse uideatur*.¹

The first two of these instances (*uelim fortasse* and *fortasse respondeam*) are clearly conclusions to "less-vivid future" ("ideal") conditions, and have no bearing upon the question under discussion, viz., the existence of a may-potential subjunctive. We have left then only the one expression *fortasse uideatur* that could possibly be appealed to as supporting the contention that *dixerit* in *fortasse quispiam dixerit* is in the subjunctive mood. And the *fortasse*, even in this expression, is in each case classified by Merguet as modifying not the verb, but some adjective or adverb in the sentence. Admitting, however, that *fortasse* in these passages is to be taken with the verb, it is vastly more probable that *fortasse uideatur* means "perhaps it would seem". It is in fact translated "would seem" even by those who believe in the "may-potential" use of the subjunctive, e. g., Bennett § 280, 2; Roby, p. 133. This interpretation makes *uideatur* an instance of the same use as in *fortasse uelim* and *fortasse respondeam*—a common, well attested use of the subjunctive mood, while, if taken in the sense of "may perhaps seem", *fortasse uideatur* would, as we have just seen, be wholly unparalleled.

Now in the face of such a condition of things as that indicated above, what becomes of the claim that *dixerit*, in the expression *aliquis fortasse dixerit*, is in the subjunctive mood? I have given above (p. 180) seven instances of the type *aliquis dixerit*, modified by *fortasse*. These are evidently all in the same mood and

¹ In de off. III, 18, 73. in quibus . . . *fortasse non putet* is a subordinate characterizing clause depending upon another subjunctive. Kühner § 147, 1, cites *fortasse credas* from Plaut. Pseud. 888, but the true reading here is *fortasse credis* (see Götz and Schöll).

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 187

tense, and must all be explained in the same way. That is, they are all either in the perfect subjunctive, or else all in the future perfect indicative. Those who claim that the *dixerit* in such cases is in the perfect subjunctive will, therefore, find themselves in an embarrassing dilemma. They will have to admit that, to offset the hundreds of unmistakable instances of *fortasse* with the indicative, in the sense of "will perhaps", there is not a single undoubted instance of *fortasse* with the present subjunctive, in the sense of "may perhaps", and still they will have to claim that all of the seven occurrences of *fortasse* with *aliquis dixerit* and similar expressions are without exception in the subjunctive, in the sense of "may perhaps say", and not one in the indicative, in the sense of "will perhaps have said." If they admit that any one of these is in the indicative, their whole case is lost. For they are all exactly alike.

The state of things then is this: In every one of the hundreds of cases in which *fortasse* occurs in expressions of possibility, and in which the mood is clearly indicated by a difference in form, the mood is, without a single probable exception, the indicative, the idea of possibility being expressed solely by the adverb *fortasse*. But there are seven instances in which the form of the verb, identical as it is in the two moods, does not in itself show whether the mood is indicative or subjunctive; and our grammars decide that all of these seven instances are, without exception, in the subjunctive! The inconsistency of such a claim is so self-evident and even glaring, when attention is once called to it, that I cannot believe that any one will be able to resist the conclusion that the mood in each one of the seven instances is, without the slightest doubt, the indicative. And as soon as one admits that we have the future-perfect indicative in these seven instances of the type *aliquis fortasse dixerit*, one must admit that we have that mood in all those of *aliquis dixerit*, without *fortasse*; for the expressions without *fortasse* clearly represent exactly the same modal use as those with *fortasse*.

It will be noticed that there is only one instance in Cicero of the first person of the future-perfect indicative with *fortasse*.

The fact that such instances are not more common can not be construed as supporting the view that the mood in *aliquis fortasse dixerit* is the subjunctive. If such expressions as this last are classed with the one in the first person as instances of the future-perfect indicative, we should then have 8 instances of the future-perfect indicative in Cicero. We should not expect more than one, or at most two, out of these 8 instances to be in the first person, since, among the 95 instances of the future tense, only 21 are in the first person. The proportion of instances of the first person would then be about the same for the future-perfect as for the future. Furthermore, while we have this one unassailable instance, *fortasse conuenero*, to urge in favor of interpreting *dixerit* in *aliquis fortasse dixerit* as an indicative, no instance of the first person of the perfect subjunctive (*e. g.*, *fortasse dixerim*, "I may perhaps say", *fortasse conuenerim*, or the like) can be found in support of the claim that *dixerit* is in the subjunctive. All the evidence that can be gained from such considerations as this is, then, unmistakably in favor of my interpretation.

The considerations already adduced seem to me to prove conclusively that the mood is the indicative. But additional evidence may nevertheless be given. If, as is commonly supposed, the mood in *aliquis dixerit* is invariably the subjunctive, and never the indicative, we should expect that, as a choice between the present subjunctive and the future indicative in corresponding expressions, we should always have the subjunctive *aliquis dicat* instead of the indicative *aliquis dicet*. The facts are as different as possible from the condition of things just indicated. In all Latin literature there are, if we may trust Roby's statistics, only eight instances of the type *aliquis dicat*, and I shall attempt to show below that not one of these can justly be explained as belonging to the potential mood. With this condition of things contrast the following instances of the indicative (given by Roby, pp. cii ff.) :

aliquis (quispiam) dicet : Corn. 4, 2, 6 ; Cic. Verr. 2, 23 ; 3, 46 ; 4, 5 ; 4, 7 ; 4, 25 ; Cael. 17 ; Sull. 30 ; Pis. 28 ; Tusc. disp. 3, 20 ; 3, 23 ; par. 1, 1, 19 ; 2, 23 ; 3, 2, 24 ; Sall. Jug. 31, 18 ; Hor. Ep. 1, 15, 13 *dicet eques* ; Liv. 21, 10, 11 ; Phaedr. 3 51 ;

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 189

Sen. rhet. contr. 2, 2 (9), 38; 7, 1 (16), 19; 10, 1 (30), 12; Sen. dial. 9, 14, 6; 12, 2, 2; clem. 1, 15, 5; ben. 2, 12, 2; 5, 6, 7; ep. 16, 4; 47, 18; 70, 13; 86, 12; Aug. c. d. 6, 10; Colum. 4, 1, 2; Stat. silv. 1 praef.; Plin. ep. 3, 9, 21; Fronto p. 152 (Naber); Ulp. (dig.) 32, 55, 7; 46, 4, 8 pr.

aliquis (quispiam) quaeret: Corn. 4, 9; Cic. par. 1, 1, 9; Arch. 7; Clu. 52; Verr. 5, 70; Agr. 8; Ulp. (dig.) 50, 16, 135.

aliquis (quispiam) inquiet: Cic. Verr. 2, 18; 3, 46; 4, 25; de off. 3, 12, 53 *inquiet ille*; Hor. sat. 2, 5, 42.

aliquis uocabit: Ov. rem. am. 419.

respondebit Diogenes: Cic. de off. 3, 12, 52.

dicet aduersarius: Quint. VII, 3, 27.

Here are 52 instances of the future indicative. This number might be greatly increased by including the instances of the second person of the future indicative (*dices, inquires, quaeres*, sometimes with, sometimes without, *fortasse* as a modifier) representing the same use. Roby cites (p. ciii) 25 such instances, chiefly from Cicero. The same writer cites 14 similar uses of the present tense of the indicative. Most of the instances of *inquit* (for *inquit aliquis*), very common in Cicero and Seneca, and those also of *inquiet ille*, are omitted from Roby's list, though they have a direct bearing upon the question in hand. Even without these, we can turn at once to over 100 instances of this use of the indicative, to set against the lack of subjunctive examples. And still, when the form of the verb, as in *aliquis dixerit*, is indecisive and leaves us free to choose between the subjunctive and the indicative, we are asked to regard it in every case as a subjunctive! To offset all this evidence for the indicative, there is, so far as I can see, not the slightest real evidence, of any character whatever, that *dixerit*, in the expression *aliquis dixerit*, is in the subjunctive mood. The only thing that can possibly be said in favor of this common view is that one who translates it by "some one may say" will find that his translation makes good sense. But this counts for nothing in face of the fact that the *dixerit* yields equally good sense when explained as an indicative, the translation then being "some one will have said (during this dis-

course)'. Indeed, Roby, after a careful examination of the instances, holds (p. cv) that they yield even much better sense when thus interpreted.

Let us now pass to the more particular consideration of the present tense. The only instances of this use cited by most grammars are

quaerat quispiam, aliquis dicat: Expressions of this type are given in our grammars along with *aliquis dixerit*, as though they were perfectly regular and common instances of a "potential" subjunctive, meaning "some one may (possibly) ask", "some one may (possibly) say."

As regards the first of these expressions, *quaerat quispiam*, we have only to say that this expression does not occur, so far as I can find, anywhere in the Latin language.¹ It seems to have crept into grammars from an earlier reading in Cic. *de natura deorum* II, 53, 133. But this reading was based solely upon the authority of one worthless codex and is now discarded. The whole weight of manuscript authority is in favor of *quaeret*, and that is now the accepted reading. On the reading *quaerat*, Müller has this contemptuous note (*Adnotatio Critica*, p. xi): *quaerat* vulg. unius codicis 'Regii Walkeri' auctoritate, *quae nulla est*. So much of the grammar-claims regarding this use must then be given up at the outset as unfounded.

Before beginning our consideration of the eight instances of *aliquis dicat*, I must plead for the recognition of a principle that seems to me so self-evident as to be axiomatic. It is this: that no separate division should be made, or recognized, for a mood,

¹ The following passages are found:

Propert. II, 5, 25. Nec tibi conexos iratus carpere crines

Nec duris ausim laedere pollicibus:

Rusticus haec *aliquis* tam turpia proelia *quaerat*.

Pliny n. h. XI, 17, 52. *Quaerat* nunc *aliquis* unusne Hercules fuerit et quot Liberi patres et reliqua vetustatis situ obruta!

But these are both volitive expressions and are so understood by translators and commentators.

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 191

unless there is at least one passage, somewhere in the literature, that cannot be satisfactorily explained in any other way. As applied to the case in hand, this principle may be stated as follows: If there is not at least one instance of the subjunctive mood that can be explained in no other way than by supposing it to have the force of "may (possibly)", or at least an instance that can be better explained by supposing it to have such a force than by explaining it according to some one of the recognized and indisputable uses of that mood, then there is no justification, or excuse, for supposing it to have that force. Now two uses of the subjunctive mood, to which I shall here appeal as "indisputable uses", are the volitive use, laying down an hypothesis (*e. g.*, *aliquis dicat*, "let some one say", "suppose some one says"), and the use represented in English by "(certainly) would" (*e. g.*, *aliquis dicat*) "some one would (certainly) say". There are numerous instances of each of these two classes of the subjunctive mood that cannot possibly be explained by assigning them to any other class. If then there is not a single instance of *aliquis dicat* (or a phrase of the same type) that must inevitably be understood as meaning "some one may (possibly) say"; if every instance will make equally good sense by treating it as belonging to one of the indisputable uses, then surely there should not be the slightest hesitation in assigning it to one of the latter classes. I do not see how there can be two opinions regarding this point.

Let us now examine the passages supposed to contain instances of the use I am combating. There are, all told, eight such passages (and only eight, if we may trust Roby) in Latin literature¹. Of these, 2 are in Terence, 1 in Horace, 2 in Livy, 1 in Ovid, 1 in Persius, 1 in Pliny.

¹ In Cornif. ad Her. II, 21, 34, and IV, 3, 5, *inquiet* is probably a wrong reading. In the first of these passages the weight of manuscript authority is very heavily against *inquiet*. Müller, Marx and others now write *inquiet*. In the second passage the manuscripts are divided between *inquiet* and *inquiet*. Priscian, however, quotes this passage and no one of his manuscripts has *inquiet*, though they vary between *inquit* (*inquit*) and *inquiet*.

The earliest of these passages, the two in Terence, are to be found in :

And. 640. Sed quid agam? adeamne ad eum et cum eo iniuriam hanc expostulem?

Ingeram mala multa? atque *aliquis dicat* "nil promoueris" :

Multum : molestus certe ei fuero, etc.

Modern grammarians would interpret this passage to mean : "And some one may (possibly) say 'it will do you no good' ; (I reply, yes it will)—much good".

Eun. 511. *Roget quis* "quid rei tibi cum illa? Ne noram quidem.

Here, again, modern grammarians would interpret "some one may (possibly) ask 'what had you to do with her?' (My answer would be) 'I did not even know (her).'"

One should notice, by the way, what a striking resemblance there is between this *roget quis* and the passage in Cic. de nat. deor. I, 21 *roges me, qualem naturam deorum esse ducam, nihil fortasse respondeam*. Everyone will, of course, admit that *roges* in this passage is volitive in character. It is a command addressed to an indefinite second person, "suppose you were to ask me", and this is used to represent a protasis, "if you should ask". In the *roget quis* of Terence, we have the same verb, but instead of the indefinite second person, we have the indefinite third person, *quis*. And it certainly makes as good sense to interpret this ; "suppose that someone should ask, etc. : my answer would be". However, we need not rely upon such comparisons of our own. If anyone may be supposed to have understood what Terence meant by this Latin, it is the ancient commentators on Terence, viz. Donatus and Eugraphius, whose vernacular was Latin and who had devoted much serious study to this particular author. And it is clear that both Donatus and Eugraphius understood *aliquis dicat* and *roget quis* in these passages as instances of the volitive use of the subjunctive, representing the same use as that represented by *roges* in the Cicero passage just quoted (*roges me*, etc., *nihil fortasse respondeam*). The comment of Donatus on *atque aliquis dicat* in the

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 193

first passage is: *Hoc dicit: Et si existat aliquis, qui mihi dicat 'Quid profeceris?' respondebo 'multum'*; and that of Euphrasius is: *Itaque quasi aliquis dicat frustra accusaturum esse Pamphilum: Si quis ergo est qui dicat, nihil promoueris: tanquam responsio subiungitur uerbum illud quod sequitur, 'Multum', hoc est 'multum promouero'*. On the *roget quis*, in the second passage, Donatus has no comment, but Euphrasius says it is equivalent to *si quis interroget, quid mihi cum meretrice sit, respondebo: ne noram quidem*. It is clear then that Donatus and Euphrasius felt nothing like a potential idea in either one of these passages. Such an interpretation seems to be an invention of modern grammarians. In the passage from Cicero, above cited, no one thinks of interpreting *roges* (with an indefinite subject corresponding to *aliquis*) otherwise than as a volitive, equivalent to a condition. Why should not everyone join the ancient commentators in interpreting *roget quis* and *aliquis dicat* in the same way? With the omission of the protasis *respondebo, respondeam*, or some similar expression, compare the same omission in such passages as Hor. sat. I, 2, 23. *Siquis nunc quaerat "quo res haec pertinet?" illuc: Dum uitant stulti uitia, in contraria currunt*.

The other six passages that might be claimed as instances of this use are very similar to the two just quoted from Terence, and may be interpreted as the ancient commentators interpreted the latter passages. They are as follows:

Hor. sat. I, 3, 19. . . noctis uigilabat ad ipsum
 Mane, diem totum stertebat; nil fuit umquam
 Sic inpar sibi. Nunc *aliquis dicat* mihi 'quid? tu
 Nullane habes uitia?' immo alia et fortasse minora.

"Now suppose some one says to me 'How is it—have you no faults.' (My reply will be) 'Oh, yes, but mine are different and of a less serious character perhaps.'"

Liv. IX, 4, 12. Sed hic patriam uideo, hic quicquid Romanarum legionum est. Quae nisi pro se ipsis ad mortem ruere uolunt, quid habent, quod morte sua seruent? Tecta urbis, *dicat aliquis*, et moenia et eam turbam, a qua urbs incolitur. Immo hercule produntur ea omnia deleta hoc exercitu, non

seruantur. "Suppose some one says 'They have the city homes and walls, etc., (to save by their death).' (My reply will be) 'Not at all! Depend upon it, all these things are lost, not saved, by the destruction of this army.'"

Liv. XXXVII, 53. "Quid ergo postulas?" *dicat aliquis*. Ego, patres conscripti, quoniam dicere utique uolentibus uobis parendum est, . . . nullos accolas nec finitimos habere quam uos malo . . . Sed si uobis decedere inde atque deducere exercitus in animo est, neminem digniorem esse ex sociis uestris, qui bello a uobis parta possideat, quam me dicere ausim.

Here again the same interpretation makes equally good sense.

Ov. *remed. am.* 225. Dura aliquis praecepta uocet mea.

Dura fatemur

Esse. Sed ut ualeas, multa dolenda feres.

"Suppose some one should call my precepts harsh (*i. e.*, if some one should call my precepts harsh), I admit the justice of the claim—I confess they *are* harsh."

This *uocet* is called by Roby (p. cii) "concessive."

Persius 3, 78. Hic *aliquis* de gente hircosa centurionum

Dicat "Quod satis est sapio mihi. Non ego curo

Esse quod Arcesilas aerumnosique Solones

."

His populus ridet, multumque torosa iuuentus

Ingeminat tremulos naso crispante cachinnos.

Pliny 36, 2. Marmora inuehi, et maria huius rei causa transiri, quae uetaret, lex nulla lata est. *Dicat fortassis aliquis*: non enim inuehebantur. Id quidem falso. Trecentas LX columnas M. Scauri aedililate ad scenam theatri temporarii, et uix uno mense futuri in usu, uiderunt portari silentio legum.

In this last passage, it is perhaps better to regard *dicat* as a subjunctive of contingent futurity than as a volitive. The meaning will then be: "To this remark someone would perhaps rejoin '(Naturally enough) for they were not imported (in those days)'. (If any one should say this, my reply would be), that is where you are wrong", etc. Even here, however, it would be possible to interpret: "Suppose that someone, perhaps, says", etc. In any case,

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 195

one must not suppose that the presence here of *fortassis* can lend the slightest support to the theory that *dicat* means "may say".¹ See my comments upon such fallacious reasoning, on p. 179 (note).

A close examination of the passages above will show that there is not one of them that precludes the possibility of classifying it otherwise than as a "may-potential", or one which it is at all awkward, or unnatural, to classify otherwise. To my mind, this fact should in itself be conclusive against establishing any such class as a "may-potential" subjunctive. Other objections are not wanting. It will be noticed that every instance that is claimed for this "may-potential" use really has the force of a mere supposition—is virtually a protasis; and in each case the apodosis at once follows, either expressed or distinctly and prominently implied. In all but two of these instances the apodosis is "my reply is (or would be)" (*i. e.*, if some one should make the remark indicated), and this is the apodosis felt by Donatus and Eugraphius in the passages quoted above from Terence. In the two exceptions, the *aliquis dicat* of Persius has for its apodosis *his populus ridet* and the *aliquis uocet* from Ovid has *dura fatemur esse*.

No instance of such a subjunctive can be found where the apodosis is not distinctly felt. If the Latin subjunctive has the power of expressing the idea of "may (possibly)", how does it happen that it has this power only when the speaker wishes to treat the possibility as a protasis which an apodosis is to follow? Why is it that this subjunctive is not occasionally used to indicate mere possibility (without such implications),—to express such ideas as, *e. g.*, "it may perhaps happen", "it may be true", "he may perhaps be at home", "it may rain", and hundreds of other similar ideas that are constantly meeting us in every period of the literature? Why in such cases do we invariably have *potest fieri*, *uerum esse potest*, *domi esse potest*, *pluere potest*, etc., etc., and not

¹ With the passages above cited, should be compared other instances of *aliquis dicat* and similar phrases, which not merely *may* be, but which *must* be, interpreted otherwise than as potential subjunctives—passages in which the may (possibly)-idea would be entirely out of place, *e. g.*, Ov. am. II, 10, 37; Propert. II, 5, 25; Pliny, n. h. XI, 17, 52.

once *fiat*,¹ *uerum sit*, *domi sit*, *pluat*, etc., etc.?" If we accept the common view that the Latin subjunctive really has the power of expressing the "may (perhaps) -idea", these questions will be difficult to answer. Is it not better to follow Donatus and Euphrasius and avoid such inconsistencies?

To sum up the results of this discussion, we may then, it seems to me, feel justified in claiming that, (1) wherever *aliquis dixerit* occurs in Latin, the *dixerit* is, without the slightest doubt, in the future perfect indicative, instead of the perfect subjunctive as commonly supposed; (2) that the eight expressions of the type *aliquis dicat* must be explained as protases, and accounted for otherwise than by making a separate division of the subjunctive

¹ In my treatment of Relative Clauses in the Appendix to Bennett's Latin Grammar, I have (§ 404, 2) classed the subordinate clause in *est unde fiat* as coming from an independent potential *fiat*, "it may be done". Further consideration has led me to change my opinion regarding the nature of this clause. The *unde fiat* does not mean "by means of which it *may possibly* be done", but either "by means of which it *may certainly* be done" (in which case the subjunctive is not potential at all, but volitive, in origin), or possibly, "by means of which it would certainly be done." At any rate, the expression leaves no room for a possible failure and "may possibly" expresses an idea very remote from that in *fiat*.

² There is so much doubt about the reading and interpretation of *fors et maneant* in Hor. od. I, 28, 33 that no argument can safely be based upon it. The passage runs as follows:

Neglegis inmeritis nocituram

Postmodo te natis fraudem committere? Fors et

Debita iura uicesque superbae

Te *maneant* ipsum.

While this is the reading commonly adopted by editors, it is perhaps open to question. There is, I believe, no instance of *fors et* in an adverbial sense in Horace, nor is there any parallel in any author for the present subjunctive with *fors et*. The correct reading may well be *forsan*. *Forsan* is the reading of the oldest manuscript of Horace (B), and this reading is supported by several other good manuscripts. The subjunctive would then be explained as due to the feeling that *an* introduced an indirect question (Cf. what has been said above, p. 177 (note), on the subjunctive after *forsitan*, *fortassean* and *fors fuat an*). If *fors et* is to be retained, we shall have to adopt the interpretation of Orelli-Hirschfeld and regard *fors* as a substantive (as in od. I, 9, 14; sat. I, 6, 54; II, I, 59, etc.) connected by *et* with *iura uicesque*, and *maneant* as an optative subjunctive.

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 197

mood for the purpose of accommodating them. If these conclusions are justified, then the may-potential division of the subjunctive should be dropped from our Latin grammars altogether. I can not think that any one will be able to doubt my conclusions regarding *aliquis dixerit*. If there are any who doubt them regarding *aliquis dicat* and who persist in interpreting this expression as having the force of "may possibly", still all such persons, it seems to me, must at least agree that the grammar treatment of this use should be very different from what it actually is. In view of the fact that there is not a single instance of such a use in prose prior to the time of Livy, and only three instances in poetry, or, if the authority of Donatus and Euphrasius be regarded as weighty enough to remove the Terence passages from the category, only one instance in poetry, and in view of the fact that there are only six or eight such passages in all Latin literature, such persons must surely agree that the may-potential should be taken from the prominent place it occupies in our grammars. At the very least, it seems to me, we ought to insist that it should be relegated to a note, and printed in the smallest type, as something of little or no practical importance to the average undergraduate college student, and certainly of none whatever to the preparatory student.

Whether such a use of the optative does, or does not, exist in Greek would have to be determined by a careful investigation, but I strongly suspect that the Potential Optative in Greek rests upon the same footing as the Potential Subjunctive in Latin, so far as the ideas of "may" and "can" are concerned. Even if there are indisputable instances of the Greek optative in the sense of "may possibly" (which I doubt, if they are tested in the same manner as I have tested supposed similar instances in Latin), that could have little or no weight in determining the force of the Latin expressions we have been considering, under the condition of things that I have shown to exist in the latter language.

Such uses as *putes*, *audires*, etc., will be considered later on.

The "can (certainly)"-idea.

In considering the question as to whether the Latin subjunctive has, or has not, the power of expressing the idea of "can (certainly)", I must insist again upon a principle laid down above (p. 190 f.) as self-evident and axiomatic. Unless at least one instance of the subjunctive can be cited which cannot possibly be explained except by assigning to it the force of "can", then there is not the slightest justification for claiming that the subjunctive has the power of expressing this idea. It does not matter how many instances can be found, in translating which one may make good sense by using the auxiliary "can"; if each one of these will make equally good sense, when translated in a way that brings it under some indisputable and common class of subjunctive uses, and if not one of them forces us to recognize the idea of "can", then we must, without hesitation, discard the idea of "can" in favor of the other equally appropriate interpretation.

Let us test some of the uses cited as instances of the potential subjunctive. One of the most common is illustrated by such questions as *quis dubitet?* This is variously translated by "who can doubt?" "who could doubt?" or "who would doubt?" as though it were really a matter of indifference which form of question is used in translating (*cf.*, for instance, Gildersleeve-Lodge, §§ 257 and 259; Allen & Greenough, § 268, and Greenough's note on Hor. sat. I, 10, 21; Landgraf, § 185, 6; Lattman u. Müller, § 136, etc.). From the point of view of scientific treatment, it seems to me really a matter of great importance. "Who can doubt?" is an entirely distinct idea from "who would doubt?" and is expressed in Latin by an entirely different mechanism. Anyone who would claim that these two questions are under any circumstances equivalent *in meaning*, would inevitably be forced in his English dictionary to include "can" among the *meanings* of "would", for, aside from these two words, the sentences are absolutely identical. But, says someone, "who would doubt?" implies "who can doubt?" That is true, but we are speaking now of the meaning actually expressed, and not

III. *The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive.* 199

of inferences that may be drawn from this meaning. In the Latin sentence *nemo potest dubitare*, "no one can doubt", there is a very distinct implication that "no one doubts", that "no one would doubt" and that "no one will ever doubt", but no teacher would ever think of accepting any of these latter sentences as an accurate translation of *nemo potest dubitare*. It is true that such an inference might in time, under favorable circumstances, have become the meaning proper, just as sentences of the type *Ille est quem omnes ament*, "he is a man whom all *would* love", came in time to mean "he is a man whom all *love*". All this *might* have taken place, but it never did. The error, as it seems to me, of those teachers who allow a student to think that "who can doubt?" makes as accurate a translation of *quis dubitet?* as does "who would doubt?" is that they fail to discriminate between *equivalence of meaning* and *equivalence of adaptability for certain purposes*. A man who has fallen overboard and is in danger of drowning may shout, "a rope!", or "a plank!", or merely "help!" Any one of these cries would, on every such occasion, serve the purpose perfectly and would be equally appropriate with the other expressions. But this does not imply that a rope is a plank, or that it has not characteristics very far removed from those represented by a plank. And if the man had shouted "a rope!", it would be manifestly wrong to report him as having shouted "a plank!" So it is with "who can doubt?" and "who would doubt?". Either question will be found perfectly appropriate, wherever the Latin has *quis dubitet?* In each case the writer might have used with propriety the question *quis potest dubitare?* But this fact has no necessary bearing whatever upon the *meaning* of *quis dubitet?* as it was felt by the Romans. And it would be quite as unjust to use this argument in an attempt to prove the equivalence of meaning of the two expressions, as it would to use a similar argument to prove that the drowning man said "a plank!", when he really said "help!" or "a rope!"

It seems to me that it is not a matter of indifference whether we translate *quis dubitet* by "who would doubt?" or "who can doubt?" and that the latter is, as a translation of *quis dubitet?*,

absolutely false and unjustifiable. My meaning will be made clearer by illustrations. Let us take the two English sentences "no sane man *would doubt* this truth" and "no sane man *would kill* his brother". "Would doubt" and "would kill" are expressions exactly corresponding to the use of the present subjunctive in *quis dubitet?* (or *nemo dubitet*). In the first of these sentences, we may substitute "can" for "would" with impunity and say "no sane man *can* doubt this truth". But we cannot make this substitution in the second sentence. To say that "no sane man *can* kill his brother" would not be true. And still there is not, I insist, the faintest shade of difference of meaning between the "would" in the first sentence and the "would" in the second sentence. The only reason why one would not object to the use of "can" in the first sentence is not because there is the faintest connection in meaning between "can" and "would" (for if it was a matter of meaning it would suit the other sentence equally well), but it is only because if one says "can doubt", the resulting sentence happens to be equally true and equally appropriate. The incorrectness of translating *quis dubitet?* by "who can doubt?" becomes clear when *quis dubitet?* is compared with such questions as *quis non iure miretur?* (Cic. de orat. 4, 16). The subjunctive clearly has exactly the same force in *miretur* as in *dubitet*, but the second sentence makes no sense at all if translated by "who *can not justly* wonder?", as the idea of "justly" would then be out of place. It seems to me that, when one has translated such a subjunctive by "would", he has told the whole story that the Latin tells *with all its implications*, and that this is the only auxiliary that should be suggested, as a translation, by grammars that lay claim to scientific accuracy. If the free, popular translator wishes, for the sake of convenience or variety, to substitute an implication for the expressed meaning, let him be allowed that liberty; but grammars should keep ever before the mind of the student the fundamental idea underlying each particular form of expression.

With these remarks by way of introduction, to indicate my

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 201

point of view, I wish now to consider other typical instances of the subjunctive, which one might at first sight be tempted to classify as instances of a can-potential use. It will not be necessary to cite every such instance in Latin literature. If all the different types of uses are included in the list, our conclusions will be as valid as though the list were complete. Probably such instances occur in no author more frequently than in Horace, and accordingly I wish to go through this author systematically, and consider every such instance there discovered. In considering these passages, the principle laid down above (p. 190 f.) as axiomatic must be kept constantly in mind, and it must be further remembered that the instances we are considering are as plausible instances as can be cited from any author in favor of the supposed existence of a can-potential subjunctive. The following list includes all the instances that any one might be tempted to translate by the use of "can." Instead of giving them, however, in the order in which they occur, I assign them at once to other classes to which, in the lack of evidence in favor of the can-potential, they seem to me to belong.

(1) *To be translated by "would" :*

This is, of course, one of the most common uses of the Latin subjunctive and occurs on nearly every page of the literature. It will be found perfectly appropriate and natural in each one of the following passages, that are sometimes translated by "can" :

od. I, 1, 13. Gaudentem patrios findere sarculo
Agros Attalicis condicionibus
Numquam *demouneas*, ut trabe Cypria
Myrtoum pauidus nauta secet mare.

Here *demouneas* is the conclusion of the condition implied in *Attalicis condicionibus*, "if you should offer him all the wealth of Attalus, you would never", etc.

ib. I, 6, 14. Quis Martem tunica tectum adamantina
Digne *scripserit*?

Here, however, *scripserit* is probably in the future perfect indicative.

ib. I, 24, 15. Quid si Threicio blandius Orpheo

Auditam moderere arboribus fidem?
 Num uanae *redeat* sanguis imagini,
 Quam uirga semel horrida,
 Non lenis precibus fata recludere,
 Nigro compulerit Mercurius gregi?

Here *redeat* is really felt as the conclusion of a conditional sentence, for which *si moderere* serves as a protasis.

ib. I, 29, 10. . . . Quis *neget* arduis
 Pronos relabi posse riuos
 Montibus et Tiberim reuerti,
 etc.?

ib. II. 4, 13. *Nescias* an, etc.

See the last passage cited below under this section.

ib. IV, 5, 25. Quis Parthum *paueat*, quis gelidum Scythen,
 . . . incolumi Caesare? quis ferae
 Bellum *curet* Hiberiae.

Here the subjunctive forms an apodosis to the protasis in *incolumi Caesare*.

ib. IV, 9, 45. Non possidentem multa *uocaueris*
 Recte beatum.

Perhaps, however, *uocaueris* is here in the future perfect indicative.

ib. IV, 14, 5. Quae cura patrum quaeue Quiritium
 Plenis honorum muneribus tuas,
 Auguste, uirtutes in aeuum
 Per titulos memoresque fastus
Aeternet?

Aeternet here forms the apodosis to a protasis involved in *plenis honorum muneribus*.

epod. 1, 15. *Roges*, tuum labore quid iuuem meo,
 Inbellis ac firmus parum?
 Comes minore sum futurus in metu
 etc.

Roges, "would you ask"? represents, in the second person, interrogatively, exactly the same use as seen in *rogem*, *uelim*, "I should ask", "I should wish".

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 203

ib. 16, 17. Nulla *sit* hac potior sententia, Phocaeorum
Velut profugit exsecrata ciuitas

.
Ire, pedes quocumque ferent, etc.

sat. I, 2, 19. . . . Vix credere *possis*,
Quam sibi non sit amicus.

"You would scarcely be able to believe", etc.¹

ib. I, 2, 94. Matronae praeter faciem nil cernere *possis*,
Cetera, ni Catiast, demissa ueste tegentis.

Compare the translation just above and the note upon it.

ib. I, 2, 103. Metiri *possis* oculo latus.
See just above.

ib. I, 3, 30 . . . rideri *possit* eo, quod
Rusticius tonso toga defluit, etc.

ib. I, 4, 125 . . . an hoc inhonestum et inutile factu
Necne sit *dubites*, flagret rumore malo cum
Hic atque ille?

ib. I, 5, 44. Nil ego *contulerim* iucundo sanus amico.

ib. I, 6, 50 . . . forsit honorem
Iure mihi *inuideat* quiuis.

ib. I, 6, 89. Nil me *paeniteat* sanum patris huius, eoque
Non, ut magna dolo factum negat esse suo pars,
Quod non ingenuos habeat clarosque parentes,
Sic me defendam.

Here *paeniteat* seems to mean literally "it would not (under any circumstances) repent me", *i. e.*, "I should never under any circumstances be ashamed of such a father as this." For a more

¹The potential idea felt in *possis* lies wholly in the meaning of the word and has no connection whatever with the mood. If the mood itself of *possis* had a potential force, we should have to translate it "you can be able," which would be a senseless doubling of the idea. It seems to me, therefore, that the Gildersleeve-Lodge grammar, for instance, is at fault when in § 257, 2, note 2, it translates *uitare possis* by "you can avoid." This translation seems to disregard altogether the mood of *possis*, being merely a translation of *potes*. The fact that it is addressed to an indefinite second person should not of course affect the translation in such cases.

careful consideration of such apodoses with indefinite omitted protases, see below under "*The would-idea*".

ib. I, 9, 24 . . . nam quis me scribere pluris

Aut citius *possit* uersus?

"Who would be able", etc.

ib. II, 1, 15 . . . neque enim quiuis horrentia pilis

Agmina nec fracta pereuntis cuspidē Gallos

Aut labentis equo *describat* uulnera Parthi.

"For it is not every (any) chance poet that would succeed in describing", etc.

ib. II, 2, 72 . . . nam uariae res

Ut noceant homini *credas*, memor illius escae

Quae simplex olim tibi sederit.

Here *memor* forms the protasis, *credas* the apodosis, of a conditional sentence.

od. II, 4, 13. *Nescias an* te generum beati

Phyllidis flauae decorēt parentes;

Regium certe genus, et penatis

Maeret iniquos.

I have left this passage till the last, because it might at first sight seem a more formidable instance in support of the can-idea. A closer examination, however, shows that it probably belongs to the same class as those already cited. The context makes it very clear that *nescias an* does not imply real doubt as to whether the idea of the *an*-clause is or is not true. The passage clearly means "*Very likely* your golden-haired Phyllis has well-to-do parents, who will be an honor to you as son-in-law; at any rate she is of royal blood", etc., and this is the usual interpretation of commentators, and translators (*e. g.*, Smith). This *nescias an* may be, then, exactly like *haud sciam an* (except that it is in the second person), and the expression may be interpreted "you would not know but", a softened form of "you don't know but" just as *haud sciam an*, "I should not know but," is a softened form of *haud scio an*, *nescio an*, "I don't know but". Compare such English expressions as "it would be easy to believe that", "one would suppose that", etc. The softened

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 205

form of these expressions is, however, extremely rare, the only instances I have noted before Fronto being *haud sciam an* in Cic. Lael. 14, 51 and Tusc. disp. 3, 23, 55, and *nescias an* in the present passage and in Ter. Heaut. 345. The *dubitet an*, cited by Kühner (*Ausf. Gram.*, etc., p. 1022) as another instance, stands in a characterizing *qui*-clause.

(2) *To be translated by "should" ("ought to")*:

This use of the subjunctive is slighted in our grammars, but it must, nevertheless, be recognized as an absolutely unassailable use of that mood. It will be seen later on in this discussion (see under "The should (ought to)-idea") that there are numerous passages that cannot possibly be interpreted at all except by a recognition of the fact that the Latin subjunctive does have the power to express, in the most distinct and unmistakable manner, the idea of obligation or propriety. The following passages should be examined in the light of what is said below (under "The should (ought to)-idea"). They will then seem to fall naturally into this class.

od. I, 24, 1. Quis desiderio *sit* pudor aut modus

Tam cari capitis?

sat. I, 10, 21 . . . O seri studiorum! quine *putetis*

Difficile et mirum, Rhodio quod Pitholeonti

Contigit?

Greenough calls this *quine putetis* the "despair of grammarians". I have elsewhere (Proceedings of American Philological Association, Vol. XXIII, p. XVIII) attempted to show that it means "why should you think?", etc., this *-ne* being sometimes appended to interrogative words that have also *non*-interrogative uses, to show at once that, in the passage concerned, the interrogative meaning is intended.

(3) *To be translated by "may", indicating permission ("it is permitted", etc.)*:

This use, of course, belongs to the volitive, rather than to a supposed potential, division of the subjunctive mood. It has already been seen in Part I (pp. 35 ff.) that the subjunctive of permission is very common. It would be possible, however, to re-

gard the instances below as belonging to the Subjunctive of Contingent Futurity. The translation of *uideas* will then be either "you may see (*i. e.*, it is permitted you to see)", or "you would see (if you should take the trouble to look)".

sat. I, 4, 86. Saepe tribus lectis *uideas* cenare quaternos,
E quibus unus amet quauis adspergere cunctos
Praeter eum qui praebet aquam.

sat. II, 2, 114. . . *Videas* metato in agello
Cum pecore et gnatis fortem mercede colonum,
"Non ego", narrantem "temere edi luce profesta
Quicquam praeter olus", etc.

(4) *To be translated as a subjunctive of deliberation :*

The speaker is here asking for directions, and the question belongs therefore to the volitive subjunctive :

Sat. I, 1, 63. Quid *facias* illi? Iubeas miserum esse, libenter
Quatenus id facit.

"What shall one do with a man of that stamp? Bid him be wretched", etc. Here *facias* belongs to the same general division of the subjunctive as the answer to the question.

These are the only passages from Horace that could tempt any one to the use of "can" in translating a subjunctive. We have found that each and every one of them may, easily and without violence to sense or construction, be interpreted according to other well established uses. And there is nothing in any other author, so far as I can find, that could afford any greater support to the advocates of a can-potential subjunctive than the passages we have been considering¹. Our verdict, then, regarding the

¹I may improve this opportunity to refer to what seems to me to be an erroneous interpretation of the passage in Cic. Leg. III, 1, 1. *Tu Platonem nec nimis ualde umquam nec nimis saepe laudaueris*. The Gildersleeve-Lodge grammar translates this (§ 257, 2) "you can't praise Plato too much nor too often." Although I have a very wholesome fear of differing from a scholar who is so seldom wrong as Professor Gildersleeve, I can not think that his classification of this *laudaueris* as a subjunctive is justified. There is more than one objection to such a classification. I try to show in these pages that the subjunctive never means "can." But if *laudaueris* in this passage were to be taken as a subjunctive, "can" seems to

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 207

claim that the subjunctive sometimes means "can", must be "not proven."

The "might (possibly)"-idea.

This use of the subjunctive rests upon the same kind of foundation as the supposed uses that have already been attacked. If those readers who have done me the honor to follow this discussion thus far will apply tests similar to those already applied to the "may-potential" and the "can-potential", the same verdict will be easily reached. I need not therefore go into any extended argument to prove that this use does not exist. I content myself merely with a few words regarding the various supposed instances of it cited in Latin grammars. The following are often cited in grammars as typical instances: *putes, putares; credas, crederes; uideas, uideres; cernas, cerneres*:

It is certain that in each of these expressions the imperfect tense is merely the present thrown back into the past, *i. e.*, *putares* represents the same idea as *putes*, but from a past point of view.

be the only auxiliary that yields good sense. At any rate any other interpretation seems awkward and forced, while in all indisputable instances of the subjunctive, *i. e.*, in those cases in which the form does not coincide with any indicative form, each one readily yielded to other interpretations. Furthermore, I have shown in the preceding pages that the perfect subjunctive referring to the future (except true future-perfects) always denotes unusual emphasis and energy. Every *bona fide* instance of the perfect subjunctive when accompanied by *nec* or *non* has been shown to be best translated by "nor would you for an instant", "you would not for a moment think of", or some similar expression. Such a translation of *laudaueris* would make no sense whatever. Indeed the translation "nor would you for an instant praise (or think of praising) Plato too much or too often", if it meant anything at all, would mean the exact opposite of what Cicero clearly intended to say. If *nec credideris* means "nor would you for a moment believe", *i. e.*, "you should not believe at all", *nec laudaueris* should mean "nor would you for a moment praise (think of praising)", *i. e.*, "you should not praise at all." No parallel instance can be cited for *nec laudaueris* as a subjunctive. There can, it seems to me, be no doubt that *laudaueris* is an instance of the *future perfect indicative*. The meaning will then be "you will have praised Plato neither too much nor too often", *i. e.*, "however much praise you lavish upon Plato, you will not have over overdone it."

Such expressions are frequently translated "one might think", "might have thought"; "one might see", "might have seen", etc. If this "might" is intended in the sense of "might possibly" (and this is the only idea with which we are at present concerned), it certainly does not reproduce the sense of the Latin. This will be clear, if we apply the interpretation to such a passage as that in Hor. sat. II, 8, 77. It will be remembered that Horace is describing the calamities that befell the host Nasidienus at the famous dinner he gave. The hangings had just fallen upon the table, bringing with them a cloud of dust. The guests, amused at the discomfiture of their host, began to exchange whispers. At this point Horace's words are *tum in lecto quoque uideres susurros*. Surely this can not mean "you might (possibly) have seen" the guests whispering to each other, but rather "you *would* (certainly) have seen it", *i. e.*, if you have been there. So *audires* means not "you might possibly have heard", but "you certainly would have heard". To be sure, if "might" in such translations is intended in the sense of "might, if you had chosen", *i. e.*, "you would have been permitted to", it would be perfectly appropriate, but in that case the subjunctive would be one of permission belonging to the volitive subjunctive, a class of expressions with which we are at present not concerned. Furthermore, even if "might (possibly)" did make good sense, this interpretation could not be accepted, since "would (certainly)" or "might" in the sense of "you would have been permitted to" makes equally good sense, and each of these latter translations represents perfectly well attested uses of the subjunctive, while no instance can be cited, in the translation of which the idea of "might (possibly)" is required.¹ So *putes* and *putares* correspond to our "one would think", "one would have thought" (the nearest expression we have for the past of *putes*).

¹ It is possible that some would regard "you might have seen" as an expression of ability (equivalent to "you could have seen"), rather than one of possibility. But the objections I have urged above against "can", as a translation of the subjunctive, apply with equal force to "could" and therefore to "might" in the sense of "could."

The "could (certainly)"-idea.

The auxiliary "could" is frequently used in translating various sorts of expressions, *e. g.*, *quis describat?*, *quis crediderit?* ("who could believe?", an idea which would be expressed by *quis possit credere?*), *haud facile discerneres* ("not easily could you have decided"), etc. As regards these expressions, I must refer merely to what I have said on earlier pages regarding the necessity of distinguishing "equivalence of adaptability" from "equivalence of meaning", and incidental implication from expressed meaning. An admirable instance to illustrate the danger of confusing the former with the latter is found in Cic. ad fam. 7, 30, 2. *Haec tibi ridicula videntur; non enim ades; quae si uideres, lacrimas non teneres.* It is difficult to avoid the temptation of translating *lacrimas non teneres*, "you could not restrain your tears"; but everyone must admit that *teneres* is exactly like any other apodosis of a condition contrary to fact in present time, and that, as far as the meaning itself is concerned, the expression contains no other idea than "you would not restrain your tears". Whatever other idea is suggested, as one reads the sentence, is purely and simply an incidental implication, without any essential connection with the meaning proper.

Another similar example is found in Hor. epist. II, 3, 5:

Humano capiti ceruicem pictor equinam
Iungere si uelit . . . risum teneatis amici?

And there is sometimes a very strong temptation to translate even the indicative mood in the same way, *e. g.*, Hor. epod. 16, 7:

Altera iam teritur bellis ciuilibus aetas,
Suis et ipsa Roma uiribus ruit:
Quam neque finitimi ualuerunt perdere Marsi,
.
Nec fera caerulea domuit Germania pube
Parentibusque abominatus Hannibal,
Impia perdemus deuoti sanguinis aetas.

Here one can hardly resist the temptation to translate *domuit* by "could conquer", and still everybody will readily admit that

"could conquer" is merely an implication of "did conquer", and is something entirely distinct, and even remote, from the real meaning of the indicative mood.

The "must"-idea.

It seems to me doubtful whether "must", if that auxiliary is used to indicate absolute necessity, in the strictest sense of that term, ever accurately represents the force of the subjunctive mood. It is sometimes used in translating some of the uses of the subjunctive mood that I have classed below under the "should"-idea. *Non sileas* (Hor. Sat. II, 5, 91), for instance, might be translated "you must not keep silent", instead of "you should not keep silent." The same objections may be urged against this use of "must" that I have already urged against other auxiliaries. The true translation seems to be "should" (see below, under "The should idea"), the auxiliary "must" representing what I have termed above an "equivalence of adaptability", rather than an "equivalence of meaning." It might be urged in support of the use of "must", instead of "should", that the participle in *-dus*, is used to express both of these ideas, and that this makes it natural to look for a similar state of things in the subjunctive uses now under discussion. But "must" should in strict accuracy very seldom be used in translating the participle in *-dus*, if "must" is intended to express the idea of absolute necessity. A glance at the examples in any one of our Latin grammars will convince anyone of this fact. For instance *obliviscendum est iniuriarum*, if used absolutely, does not strictly mean "one must forget injuries", as translated by Bennett, § 337, 7, *b*, because one need not do so unless he chooses; so *parcendum est uictis* does not, strictly speaking, mean "the vanquished must be spared" (as Gildersleeve-Lodge, § 251, translate it), because the victors may do as they please about it.

If passages are occasionally found where the participle in *-dus* clearly has the force of "must", that fact proves merely that a development from the idea of "should" to that of "must" is semasiologically possible; it falls short of proving that such a

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 211

development has actually taken place in the subjunctive mood. I have discovered no evidence to prove that the subjunctive ever has the sense of "must".

We now come to uses which are absolutely certain and indisputable, and first to that expressing

The "would" (first person "should")-idea.

It is customary to separate such expressions as *uelim* ("I should wish"), *dicas* ("you would say"), *nemo dubitet* ("no one would doubt"), from ordinary apodoses to "ideal" ("less vivid future") protases, as representing a somewhat different use of the subjunctive mood. The argument is that, while these expressions are undoubtedly akin to ordinary apodoses, no definite protasis is present to the mind, and that this absence of a definite protasis affects the force of the mood in the apodosis; that, in consequence of the fact that the protasis is indefinite, the force of the mood in the definite apodosis is left indefinite, and so may with propriety be translated by any one of the various auxiliaries ("may", "can", "might", "could", etc.) that may suit the taste of the translator. I confess that I can not appreciate the force of such arguments. I do not see how the vagueness of the omitted protasis justifies any change of translation in the expressed apodosis unless by "vagueness of protasis" is meant the absence of suggestion of any protasis whatever. If the form of expression does imply (however vaguely) a protasis, it seems clear to me that the apodosis of that implied protasis should be translated *as* an apodosis; the implied protasis, however indefinite it may be in other respects, could take only the present, or the perfect, subjunctive. No other construction for it could be inferred from the form of the apodosis. There is no instance classed under this use in which the implied protasis is more vague and indefinite than in *uelim*, "I should like", and *putem*, "I should think". These are very properly called "modest" forms of expression, but their modesty consists en-

tirely in the implication that the speaker is not *at present* bold enough to express his wish (*uolo*), or his opinion (*puto*), but would do so under certain circumstances. What the nature of these implied circumstances would be, no one cares, because they are only a pretense any way; still this implication, that is more or less prominently suggested by the form of the verb, is all that makes *uelim* and *putem* any more modest in tone than *uolo* and *puto*. No one ever thinks of translating *uelim*, *putem*, *dicam*, etc., by any other form of expression than the one used in translating apodoses to regularly expressed protases of the "ideal" ("less vivid future") type, viz., "I should like", "I should think", "I should say", (where "should" has merely the force that "would" has in the second and third persons). But is it not certain that *putes*, *dicas*, etc., represent exactly the same modal use as in the first person *putem*, *dicam*, etc.? There is the same indefiniteness of protasis—the conditions are absolutely identical, except that in one case we have the first person, and in the other the second. Is it not then the height of inconsistency to insist that *putem*, *dicam*, etc., must always be translated by "I should think", "I should say", and still to allow *putes*, *dicas*, to be rendered indifferently by "one would, may, or might think" "one would, may, or might say"? Does not the fact that *putem*, *dicam*, etc., must necessarily be translated by "I should think", "I should say", etc., prove that the only correct translation of *putes*, *dicas*, etc., is "one would think", "one would say", etc.? The fact that the protasis is omitted and is indefinite should not extend the license of the translator in the second person any more than it does in the first. Let us consider the bearing of the omitted protasis. If, instead of *uelim*, we had the expression *uelim, si possim*, would there be any real change in the force of the mood *uelim*? To be sure the whole thought is more definite, but it is made so only by the fact that, instead of many possible pretended protases that are implied in *uelim* when used alone, we now have a single definite protasis. I cannot feel that this absence of any definite protasis in *uelim* would, under any circumstances, justify any variation whatever in the translation of

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 213

uelim, and, so far as I know, none is ever made. It seems to me beyond question that the force of the mood of *dubitet* in *nemo dubitet quin Caesar dux magnus fuerit*, "no one would doubt that Caesar was a great leader", is exactly the same as that in *uelim*. There is the same absence of any definite protasis, the same softened tone, as compared with *nemo dubitat*, etc., that there is in *uelim* as compared with *uolo*. And still it is claimed that the absence of a definite protasis makes it possible and proper to translate *nemo dubitet* "no one can (or could) doubt" (a translation which no one would use in translating the same phrase in *nemo dubitet, nisi insanus sit*). If the mood in *uelim* has the same force as that in *nemo dubitet*, why does it not make sense when translated by "I can wish"? Does it not seem pretty certain that it is merely a matter of accident that some of these expressions are found to make good sense when "can" is used in translating them? And what is true of "can" is equally true of "may", "might", and "could".

The "should" ("ought to")-idea.

The discussion of the "should"-idea may be divided into two parts, (1) The range and frequency of this use, and (2) the origin and development of it.

1. The range and frequency of this use of the subjunctive.

The failure of grammars generally to recognize this use, in any distinct manner, makes it desirable to emphasize the fact that such a use exists beyond all possibility of doubt, and that it is common in all periods of the literature. In its interrogative form it is tacitly recognized by everyone in translating questions of the type *cur non laeter?*, *cur rogem?*, etc. Such questions clearly mean "why should I not rejoice?", "why should I ask?" Without any good reason, so far as I can see, and, in fact, in the face of serious objections, such questions are commonly classed under the general head of volitive subjunctive, as representing a development from a de-

liberative question. The objections to such a classification will be pointed out below. I wish here merely to call attention to the fact that everyone, by his translation of such questions as those quoted, distinctly recognizes the fact that the subjunctive in such questions deals *unmistakably and exclusively* with the ideas of obligation and propriety. For some reason (to me inexplicable) grammarians seem to think that the subjunctive cannot be allowed to have this force except in questions. And still, there are, outside of interrogations, numerous instances of the subjunctive that cannot possibly be understood, it seems to me, except by supposing the mood to denote mere obligation or propriety. In fact, such uses of the subjunctive mood seem as common in assertions as in interrogations. The only difference is that, in interrogations, as stated above, the force of the mood is recognized at least in the correct translations that are vouchsafed for them, while in the case of assertions, the force of the mood is regarded as an unsolved problem, or else is explained by resorting to impossible theories. It will be convenient to divide the instances about to be given into two general classes, (a) interrogative sentences, (b) non-interrogative sentences. Many of the instances under each of these divisions cannot, so far as I see, possibly be satisfactorily explained, except by assigning to the subjunctive the force here claimed for it. I have, however, added a few others, for which different explanations might perhaps be insisted upon, were it not for the strong resemblance they bear to those which cannot be otherwise explained. I have made no systematic attempt to form a collection of the instances of this use. Those cited below are selected from such as I have incidentally come upon and noted down, while reading for other purposes. Many others will be found in various lexicons (*e. g.*, Merguet's to Cicero), in Hand's Tursellinus and elsewhere.

(a) *Interrogative sentences :*

These are extremely common. I cite only a few of the many instances. I have chosen, for the most part, those accompanied by negatives, as the negative *non* (*neque*), instead of *ne* (*neue*), shows that the mood is not felt by the speaker as involving any

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 215

feeling of volition. I have elsewhere (American Journal of Philology, Vol. XV, pp. 314-315) called attention to the fact that there is in Latin no such thing as a negative deliberative question.

The following are illustrations of questions that cannot possibly be explained, I think, except by recognizing in the subjunctive the idea of obligation or propriety.

Plautus: Stich. 52. Nequest *quor* [*non*] *studeam* has nuptias mutarier.

Pers. 620. *Qur* ego hic *mirer*, mi homo?

Poen. 152. *Cur* ego apud te *mentiar*?

Cicero: Cat. 4, 1, 2. *Cur* ego *non laeter*? "why should I not rejoice"?

Cicero: de senectute 19, 67. quid *timeam* si aut *non miser* post mortem aut beatus etiam futurus sum? "why should I fear, if I am going to be either not wretched after death, or even positively happy"?

ib. ad fam. X, 23, 6. Pro urbis vero salute *cur non* omnibus facultatibus, quas habemus, *utamur*?

ib. ad fam. XIV, 4, 5. Quid nunc: rogem te, ut uenias, mulierem aegram et corpore et animo confectam? *Non rogem*?

Plautus: Most. 454 (455). TR. Eho, an tu[te] tetigisti has aedis? TH. *Cur non tangerem*?

Cicero: pro Cael. 29, 68. at propinquis placuit. *Cur non placeret*, cum rem . . . a te ipsa compertam deferre diceres?

Cicero: in Vat. 2, 4. sed quaero te: cur C. Cornelium *non defenderem*?

Cf. also Ter. And. 103. Quid igitur obstat *quor non fiant*?

Fortunately the presence of the introductory word *cur* (or *quid*) in the above sentences makes it impossible to explain the mood by any other interpretation than that for which I am here pleading. But if *cur non laeter*? means "why should I not rejoice?", without a hint of any other idea than that of obligation or propriety, would it not be very strange if *non laeter*?, without *cur*, could not equally well mean, purely and simply, "should I not (ought I not to) rejoice?" A comparison of the questions without *cur*, about to be cited, with those above, must, it seems to

gard the instances below as belonging to the Subjunctive of Contingent Futurity. The translation of *uideas* will then be either "you may see (*i. e.*, it is permitted you to see)", or "you would see (if you should take the trouble to look)".

sat. I, 4, 86. Saepe tribus lectis *uideas* cenare quaternos,
E quibus unus amet quauis adspargere cunctos
Praeter eum qui praebet aquam.

sat. II, 2, 114. . . *Videas* metato in agello
Cum pecore et gnatis fortem mercede colonum,
"Non ego", narrantem "temere edi luce profesta
Quicquam praeter olus", etc.

(4) *To be translated as a subjunctive of deliberation :*

The speaker is here asking for directions, and the question belongs therefore to the volitive subjunctive :

Sat. I, 1, 63. Quid *facias* illi? Iubeas miserum esse, libenter
Quatenus id facit.

"What shall one do with a man of that stamp? Bid him be wretched", etc. Here *facias* belongs to the same general division of the subjunctive as the answer to the question.

These are the only passages from Horace that could tempt any one to the use of "can" in translating a subjunctive. We have found that each and every one of them may, easily and without violence to sense or construction, be interpreted according to other well established uses. And there is nothing in any other author, so far as I can find, that could afford any greater support to the advocates of a can-potential subjunctive than the passages we have been considering¹. Our verdict, then, regarding the

¹I may improve this opportunity to refer to what seems to me to be an erroneous interpretation of the passage in Cic. Leg. III, 1, 1. *Tu Platonem nec nimis ualde umquam nec nimis saepe laudaueris*. The Gildersleeve-Lodge grammar translates this (§ 257, 2) "you can't praise Plato too much nor too often." Although I have a very wholesome fear of differing from a scholar who is so seldom wrong as Professor Gildersleeve, I can not think that his classification of this *laudaueris* as a subjunctive is justified. There is more than one objection to such a classification. I try to show in these pages that the subjunctive never means "can." But if *laudaueris* in this passage were to be taken as a subjunctive, "can" seems to

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 207

claim that the subjunctive sometimes means "can", must be "not proven."

The "might (possibly)"-idea.

This use of the subjunctive rests upon the same kind of foundation as the supposed uses that have already been attacked. If those readers who have done me the honor to follow this discussion thus far will apply tests similar to those already applied to the "may-potential" and the "can-potential", the same verdict will be easily reached. I need not therefore go into any extended argument to prove that this use does not exist. I content myself merely with a few words regarding the various supposed instances of it cited in Latin grammars. The following are often cited in grammars as typical instances: *putes, putares; credas, crederes; uideas, uideres; cernas, cerneris*:

It is certain that in each of these expressions the imperfect tense is merely the present thrown back into the past, *i. e.*, *putares* represents the same idea as *putes*, but from a past point of view.

be the only auxiliary that yields good sense. At any rate any other interpretation seems awkward and forced, while in all indisputable instances of the subjunctive, *i. e.*, in those cases in which the form does not coincide with any indicative form, each one readily yielded to other interpretations. Furthermore, I have shown in the preceding pages that the perfect subjunctive referring to the future (except true future-perfects) always denotes unusual emphasis and energy. Every *bona fide* instance of the perfect subjunctive when accompanied by *nec* or *non* has been shown to be best translated by "nor would you for an instant", "you would not for a moment think of", or some similar expression. Such a translation of *laudaueris* would make no sense whatever. Indeed the translation "nor would you for an instant praise (or think of praising) Plato too much or too often", if it meant anything at all, would mean the exact opposite of what Cicero clearly intended to say. If *nec credideris* means "nor would you for a moment believe", *i. e.*, "you should not believe at all", *nec laudaueris* should mean "nor would you for a moment praise (think of praising)", *i. e.*, "you should not praise at all." No parallel instance can be cited for *nec laudaueris* as a subjunctive. There can, it seems to me, be no doubt that *laudaueris* is an instance of the *future perfect indicative*. The meaning will then be "you will have praised Plato neither too much nor too often", *i. e.*, "however much praise you lavish upon Plato, you will not have over overdone it."

plained like those just cited, as expressing obligation or propriety (but see p. 72) :

Terence : Phorm. 140. GE. In me omnis spes mihist. DA. Laudo. GE. Ad precatorem *adeam credo*, etc. "I suppose I'd better go to some intercessor", etc.

The following passages are exactly like those cited above, except that they are not accompanied by *opinor* or *credo*. The presence of *credo* and *opinor* in the former passages show that they are not volitive in character. The absence of these words in those that follow should not tempt us to forsake this natural interpretation and adopt, in its stead, one that involves a use, the very existence of which is admitted even by its advocates to be uncertain.

Plautus : Bacch. 1058. Tantas turbellas facio. sed crepuit foris :
Ecfertur praeda ex Troia. *Taceam nunciam*.

Here *taceam* seems to mean "I'd better (I should) hold my tongue".

Terence : Heaut. 273. Mane ; hoc quod coepi primum *enarrem*, Clitipho ; post istuc ueniam, "wait, I'd better tell first what I began to ; I'll come to that point later".

Cicero : Verr. 1, 51, 133. nam mehercule sic *agamus*.

Interesting and important in this connection are translations from the Greek in which *χρή* with the infinitive and other expressions of obligation or propriety are translated into Latin by the subjunctive. A collection of such translations would be very instructive, and it is hoped some one may be induced to make one. I have incidentally noted two such translations which are in themselves enough to prove that the subjunctive has the force which is here claimed for it :

Cicero : Tusc. disp. 1, 41, 98. *Ne uos quidem iudices mortem timueritis*.

This is Cicero's translation of the following sentence in Plato's *Apologia Socratis*, 33 : Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς *χρή*, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον. Here *ne uos quidem timueritis* is Cicero's rendering of *χρή* with the infinitive and is, beyond all dispute, used in the sense of "you should not (ought not to) fear".

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 219

Even if the Greek passage were not preserved to us, other considerations would make it wholly impossible to regard *timueritis* as a volitive subjunctive (see *American Journal of Philology*, XV, p. 320). Compare Ter. Hec. 342 Non uisas? *Ne mittas quidem uisendi causa quemquam*.

Cicero : de off. III, 21, 82. Nam si uiolandum est ius, regnandi gratia

Violandum est : aliis rebus pietatem colas.

This is a translation of the following passage from the *Phoenissae* of Euripides, vs. 524 : Εἴπερ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν χρὴ, τυραννίδος πέρι κάλλιστον ἀδικεῖν · τᾶλλα δ' εὖσεβεῖν χρεών. Here κάλλιστον ἀδικεῖν and εὖσεβεῖν χρεών are both expressions that come under the general head of "expressions of obligation or propriety". The first of these Cicero has translated by *ius uiolandum est*, the second by *pietatem colas*. The subjunctive *colas*, then, is used to express the idea of obligation or propriety conveyed by the Greek ; and, as if to make our case all the stronger, is used as a parallel to the participle in *-dus* (*cf. uiolandum est*), which everyone must admit has the force we are claiming for the subjunctive.

There are many other passages that should, it seems to me, be regarded as instances of the same use. I cite for the most part only those accompanied by a negative, because these are the most difficult to explain away :

Terence : And. 787. *Non te credas* Dauom ludere.

Cicero : pro Cluent. 57, 155. Quoniam omnia commoda nostra, iura, libertatem, salutem denique legibus obtinemus, a legibus *non recedamus*.

Horace : epist. I, 18, 72. *Non* ancilla tuum iecur *ulceret* ulla puerue

Intra marmoreum uenerandi limen amici, etc.

sat. II, 5, 91. . . . Cautus adito,

Neu desis operae, neue immoderatus abundes.

Difficilem et morosum offendet garrulus ; ultra

Non etiam *sileas*.

Catullus : 66, 91. Tu uero, regina, tuens cum sidera diuam

Placabis festis luminibus Venerem,

Vnguinis expertem *non siris* esse tuam me

Sed potius largis adfice muneribus.

Here *non* is certainly the correct reading instead of *ne* (see *American Journal of Philology*, Vol. XV, p. 319).

Cicero: ad Att. XIV, 13A. Patere, obsecro, te pro re publica uideri gessisse simultatem cum patre eius: *non contempseris* hanc familiam.

Ovid: aut *non tentaris* aut perfice.

This may mean "you should either not try, or (if you do) effect your object." The use of the imperative *perfice* does not make it necessary to regard *tentaris* as volitive.

Seneca: q. n. 1, 3, 3. *non dubitaueris*.

ep. 99, 14. *non imperemus*.

Rutilius Lupus: II, 9. *non credideris*.

Velleius: 1, 13, 5. *non* tamen *dubitetis*, quin, etc.; 2, 12, 6 *non* tamen huius consulatus *fraudetur* gloria; 2, 26, 3 *non perdat*, etc.

Quintilian: 1, 1, 5. *non assuescat* ergo sermoni, qui dediscendus sit; 2, 16, 6 *non fabricetur*; 7, 1, 56 *non desperemus*.

See other instances of this use of *non* cited in Hand's *Tursellinus* IV, p. 265 f. and in Draeger's *Hist. Synt.* I, pp. 312 ff.

The subjunctive is also used to state the existence or non-existence of an obligation in the past:

Plautus: Trin. 133. CA. Non ego illi argentum redderem? ME. *Non redderes nec* qui deterior esset *faceres* copiam, "ought I not to have given him the money?" (*i. e.*, was that not the proper thing to do?) ME. "You ought not to have given it to him", etc. (*i. e.*, it was not the proper thing to do).

Terence: Phorm. 468. Nam utut erant alia, illi certe quae nunc tibi domist *consuleres*, "however other things were, you ought at least to have looked after the interests of that girl", etc. Cf. Phorm. 297; 299.

Similar passages are found in Cicero, with *neque* (*nec*) as a negative. As *neque* (*nec*) is, in all probability, never used in Cicero with a volitive subjunctive of any sort, and certainly not in prohi-

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 221

bitions (see a full discussion of this question in Part II of *The Latin Prohibitive*, *American Journal of Philology*, XV), these passages may also be classed here, though many of them are hardly distinguishable from the subjunctive of contingent futurity (translated by "would"), in which the use we are discussing seems to have had its origin (see p. 222 ff.).

Cicero: de re pub. I, 2, 3. Et quoniam maxime rapimur ad opes augendas generis humani studemusque nostris consiliis et laboribus tutiorem et opulentiorē uitam hominum reddere . . . teneamus eum cursum, qui semper fuit optimi cuiusque *neque* ea signa *audiamus*, quae receptui canunt, ut eos etiam reuocent qui iam processerint.

On this passage and others of a similar nature, see *American Journal of Philology*, Vol. XV, pp. 313 ff.

de re pub. IV, 6, 6. *Nec* uero mulieribus praefectus *praeponatur* . . . sed sit censor, qui uiros doceat moderari uxoribus.

pro Planc. 6, 15. *cedat* consulari generi praetorium, *nec contendat* cum praetorio equester locus.

With this passage compare Cic. pro Murena 14, 30 *cedat* opinor . . . forum castris, where it is impossible to regard *cedat* as a volitive (see note on p. 72).

Acad. 2, 46, 141. *nec putaueris*; de fin. 1, 7, 25 *nec dixeris*; pro Sull. 8, 25 *neque dixeris*; Brut. 87, 298; *nec dixeris*; de re pub. 6, 23, 25 *neque dederis nec posueris*; ad Att. 12, 23, 3 *nec pertimueris*; *ib.* 13, 22, 5 *nec indicaris*; *ib.* 15, 27, 3 *nec praeterieris*; ad fam. I, 9, 19 *nec pertimueris*; ad Att. 10, 18, 2 *nec exspectaris*.

This use is also common in many poets who never use the perfect subjunctive in prohibitions. See the article above referred to.

Finally, it is interesting to note that *oportet* (with the infinitive) and the subjunctive seem to be used sometimes side by side as practical equivalents, *e. g.*,

Plautus: Pers. 123-125 Cynicum esse (e)gentem *oportet* parasitum probe:

Ampullam, strigilem, scaphium, soccos, pallium,

Marsuppiū *habeat*, "a parasite ought to be a needy Cynic out and out: he ought to have a flask, a strigil", etc. Cf. Liv. 45. 37. Non triumphum *impedire debuit*. . . sed postero die nomen *deferret* et legibus *interrogaret*.

Terence: Phorm. 242-246. *Meditari* secum *oportet* quo pacto aduersam aerumnā ferant:

Pericla, damna, exilia peregre rediens semper *cogitet*;

Quicquid praeter spem eueniat, omne id deputare esse in lucro.

This *deputare* is commonly explained as being in the same construction as *meditari*, and depending upon *oportet*, but the intervening *cogitet* has caused a good deal of trouble among the commentators, because it has been regarded as a volitive subjunctive. It will seem less strange if regarded as a subjunctive of obligation or propriety, equivalent to *cogitare oportet*. Then all three expressions (*meditari oportet*, *cogitet*, and *deputare (oportet)*) will be of the same character, and the idea of *oportet* will remain sufficiently prominent throughout the passage to make it natural enough to make *deputare* depend upon it.

Important in this connection, too, is the fact that a question of obligation or propriety is answered sometimes by the use of the subjunctive, sometimes by the use of *oportet* with the infinitive; cf. Plaut. Trin. 133. CA. Non ego illi argentum *redderem*? MĒ. Non *redderes*; Ter. Adelph. 214. SA. Quid facerem? LY. Adulescenti morem gestum *oportuit*. (Cf. Liv. 42, 41. Quid me *facere decuit*? *Quiescerem*? etc.)

The use of *oportuit* in the answer distinctly implies that the question is concerned merely with the proprieties.

2. The origin and development of this use.

The expressions we have just been considering are commonly classified by syntacticians under the volitive subjunctive as involving, or originating in, expressions of the will. I cannot but regard such a classification as unjustified. Let us consider, as impartially as possible, the points that may be urged in favor of

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 223

the common theory of a volitive origin, and then those in favor of an origin in the subjunctive of contingent futurity.

A. Points in favor of a volitive origin.

(1) It might be claimed that questions of the type *cur non laeter?* "why should I not rejoice?", *quid rogem?* "why should I ask?" look, on the face of them, as though they were closely connected with questions of the type *quid faciam?* "what shall I do?" But any student of language should feel the superficiality and worthlessness of any argument based upon such appearances, if unsupported by real evidence and if such appearances are equally favorable to other hypotheses. In meaning, the questions of one sort are as different as possible from those of the other. In the questions *cur non laeter?* and *quid rogem?* (in the sense of "why should I ask?") the will is not involved in the remotest degree, nor is there a particle of evidence that they were in their origin in any way connected with the will. On the other hand, there is distinct evidence to show that the will was never in any way involved: *the negative is from the earliest times to the latest invariably non*, never *ne*. Furthermore these questions, so far as they expect any answer at all, expect that answer to be some expression of obligation or propriety, which will not involve the exertion of anybody's will. But *quid faciam?*, when it means "what shall I do?" asks for directions from some source, *i. e.*, is volitive in character and the answer will be a command. (One should here bear in mind the familiar principle that "The mood of the question is the mood of the expected or anticipated answer"; see Gildersleeve-Lodge, § 462). I say when it means "what shall I do?"; for the fact that such questions are sometimes answered by expressions of obligation or propriety (see above) makes it probable that *quid faciam?* sometimes means "what should I (ought I to) do?". Nor can it be argued from the fact that *quid faciam?* may mean either "what shall I do?" or "what ought I to do?", that one of these meanings is probably developed from the other. Any one who would upon such grounds form such conclusions, would, to be consistent, have to argue that the volitive subjunctive was

developed from the subjunctive of contingent futurity (or *vice versa*) on the ground that *quid fiat?* may mean either "what shall be done?" or "what would be done?", or that *dicas* may mean either "tell me!" or "you would say." There is no objection to supposing that *quid faciam?* may be used in both senses representing at different times entirely distinct uses of the subjunctive mood.

(2) It might be claimed that it is reasonable to suppose that this expression of obligation was developed from a volitive expression, since we have an illustration of such a development in the word "shall" in English. This word originally (in Anglo-Saxon) expressed the idea of obligation and came later to be used in expressions of the will like "you shall (he shall) do as I bid you (him)." But this is not a parallel. The development claimed for the Latin is from an expression of the will to one of obligation, while the development in the meaning of "shall" is in the opposite direction. But even if it were in the same direction, it would merely show that such a development was possible; it would by no means prove that it had actually taken place in Latin. In fact, any presumption of this sort, based upon the development in the meaning of "shall", would be completely nullified by the fact that "should" proves with equal clearness the close relation existing between the idea of contingent futurity and that of obligation or propriety. The sentence "I should make the attack, if my commander should give the order," may, if stress of voice be put upon "should", mean "I ought to make the attack" under those circumstances, or it may, without such stress, mean merely that the act *would occur* under those circumstances. This same transition of meaning is further illustrated in certain other expressions both in Greek and Latin, as will be pointed out below under "*B*". So, even if we grant that any evidence can be recognized in the fact alluded to, that evidence is outweighed by the evidence in favor of an origin in the subjunctive of contingent futurity.

B. Points in favor of an origin in the subjunctive of contingent futurity.

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 225

(1). This use of the Latin subjunctive seems more naturally developed from the idea of contingent futurity than from the volitive idea. A development, for instance, from the idea of "do so and so!" to that of "you ought to do so and so", seems rather difficult and unnatural. One may be, and very frequently is, ordered to do what he really ought not to do; and it very seldom happens that a command, or an entreaty, contains any prominent implication of obligation. But expressions of contingent futurity, *e. g.*, "you would not expect to find, etc.", "no one would believe so manifest a falsehood", distinctly and prominently imply, and would easily come to be identified with, the ideas "you ought not to expect to find, etc.", "no one should believe so manifest a falsehood." Even in questions (in which class of expressions this use is commonly supposed, but without good reason, to have had its beginning), it seems as natural to connect the usage with the contingent future idea as with the volitive. The use of *laeter*?, in the sense of "ought I to rejoice?" would develop as naturally from the idea "would I (or anyone) rejoice (under such circumstances)?" as from "shall I rejoice? (*i. e.*, is it your will that I rejoice)?"

(2). The negative in such expressions is from the earliest times to the latest invariably *non*, and not once *ne*.

(3). The word "should" in an English sentence like "I should attack", may, as pointed out above, be used either as an expression merely of contingent futurity, or one of obligation or propriety. And it is clear that, in this case, one of these meanings was developed from the other (though the idea of obligation here seems to have been the original one).

(4). In Greek the potential optative, representing an expression of contingent futurity, is sometimes used as an expression of obligation or propriety, *e. g.*, Hom. Il. II, 250 τῷ οὐκ ἂν βασιλῆας ἀνὰ στόμ' ἔχων ἀγορεύεις "you should not take kings upon your tongue and talk". Such an expression as οὐκ ἂν—ἀγορεύεις clearly starts with the idea "you would not talk (*i. e.*, if you should observe the proprieties)"; cf. Goodwin's Moods and Tenses, § 237.

(5). The word *χρῆ* (with the infinitive) and equivalent expres-

sions are in Greek sometimes used in apodoses of "ideal" ("less vivid future") conditions, to take the place of an expression of contingent futurity; see, for instance, Goodwin's *Moods and Tenses*, §§ 502 and 555.

(6). In Latin, the indicative with the participle in *-dus*, which denotes obligation, sometimes takes the place of the subjunctive of contingent futurity in the apodosis to an "ideal" ("less vivid future") condition, *e. g.*, Cic. ad fam. IX, 16, 3 *effugere autem si uelim nonnullorum acute aut facete dictorum famam, fama ingeni mihi est abicienda.*

(7). The pluperfect subjunctive is occasionally found in Latin where the sense requires the idea of obligation or propriety, but where the temptation is irresistible to connect the form of the verb with the idea of an apodosis, *e. g.*, Cic. pro Sestio XX, 45 *Vnum enim mihi restabat illud quod forsitan non nemo . . . dixerit: Restitisses, repugnasses, mortem pugnans appetisses.* Here the meaning is distinctly "you should have resisted", etc., and this meaning seems to be due to an ellipsis of the protasis, the thought, when fully expressed, being "you would have resisted, if you had done your duty". *Restitisses* cannot be volitive in character, because that would imply that a corresponding *restiteris* could be used as a volitive from a present point of view and that this *restitisses* represented such an expression thrown into the past. In this respect it is on an entirely different footing from the *ne poposcisses* in Cic. ad Att. II, 1, 3 and the *ne emisses* in Cic. Verr. II, 3, 84, 195. It is quite possible that both of these last-mentioned curious expressions are corrupt. If they represent the correct reading, they must be regarded as representing *ne poposceris* and *ne emeris* from a past point of view. See *American Journal of Philology*, Vol. XV, pp. 315-316, note.

(8). Expressions of the type *nec* (or *non*) *putaueris*, *nec* (or *non*) *dixeris*, are freely used by many writers to whom expressions of the type *ne* (or *neue*) *putaueris*, *ne* (or *neue*) *dixeris*, are wholly unknown (see Part II of *The Latin Prohibitive*, *American Journal of Philology*, XV). Nothing is more certain than that they were felt as distinctly different uses of the subjunctive mood.

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 227

But nothing is more certain than that the perfect subjunctive with *ne* (or *neue*) is a volitive subjunctive used in a prohibition. What, then, is this other subjunctive the negative of which is *non* (or *neque*)? No one, so far as I know, claims that a prohibition with *ne* ever developed into an expression of obligation with *non*. Those who believe that a volitive expression developed into an expression of obligation base their belief solely, so far as I know, upon the phenomena presented by interrogative sentences of the type *cur laeter?* No idea of obligation or propriety is commonly recognized by them for non-interrogative sentences. (For *ne poposcisses* and *ne emisses*, see p. 226, with the references there cited). Even in such expressions as the *non tentaris* of Ovid, the *tentaris* has been regarded as a volitive subjunctive, the *non* being looked upon as a strange and late use of *non* for *ne*; but this use of *non* is neither late nor strange, nor is there any reason to suppose that it was used for *ne*. It is found long before the time of Ovid, though editors have often done their best to get rid of it. The true explanation of this subjunctive with *non* (or *neque*) seems to be found in Cicero himself. No one can deny that Cicero, in his translation from the Greek (cited above), used the perfect subjunctive as an expression of obligation or propriety to represent the $\chi\rho\eta$ with the infinitive of his original Greek; and no one who examines all the instances of a similar type in Cicero (collected in the article previously referred to) can deny that, in translating them, the only choice lies between the use of "would" and "should". In view of the fact that several different languages illustrate the ease with which one of these ideas comes to do service for the other, it seems to me extremely probable that we should regard the subjunctive of obligation or propriety as originating in that of contingent futurity.¹

¹ Since the above was written, Delbrück (*Vergleichende Syntax*, II, p. 389) has accepted my conclusions reached in *The Latin Prohibitive*, that questions of the type *cur ego non laeter?* *hunc ego non diligam?* represent a development from the Indo-European Optative, and are, therefore, not remotely connected with the volitive subjunctive.

General Conclusions.

It is of course possible that there are facts, presented by Latin, Greek or some other language, which I have not duly considered in discussing the various points I have taken up. Such facts may modify some of the conclusions reached. But if my point of view is correct and if my conclusions are in the main sound, then the subjunctive is not used to express the ideas of "may (possibly)", "can", "might", "could" or "must." If this is true, then the term "potential subjunctive", which can properly be used only of the ideas of ability and possibility, should be dropped altogether from Latin grammars. It will not do to defend the application of the term "potential" to the subjunctive used in the sense of "would", on the ground that such an expression as "he would do it" *implies* the ability to do it and involves, therefore, "potentiality." Any one who would class "he would do it" as potential on such grounds, must class "he will do it", "he is doing it", etc., also as potential expressions; for these latter expressions *imply* "potentiality" even more vividly than the former one. As I have remarked on a former page; when one has translated such uses of the subjunctive as in *quis dubitet?*, *putes*, etc., by the use of the auxiliary "would", *he has told the whole story that the Latin tells, with all its implications.*

In the place then of the usual section in our grammars headed "Potential Subjunctive", with sub-divisions treating of the various ideas "may", "can", "might", "would", etc., I would, without sacrificing any detail essential to the full understanding of the Latin, have a much simpler, and at the same time a more comprehensive, section which would read somewhat as follows:

Subjunctive of Contingent Futurity.

I. Original Type: This subjunctive represents a future act or state conceived of as contingent upon some condition expressed or implied. It is translated by the use of "would" (first person "should"). The negative is *non*. Thus:

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 229

1. With protasis expressed.

dies deficiat, *si coner enumerare causas* "time would fail, if I should attempt to enumerate the reasons."

2. With protasis not expressed, but more or less distinctly implied.

Frequently, as in *uelim*, etc., the protasis implied by the form of expression is nothing more than a pretense, adopted to soften the tone:

quis crediderit?¹ "who would (for an instant) believe?"

quis dubitet? "who would doubt?"

putes, "you (one) would suppose."

¹ Such questions as *quis crediderit?* are sometimes classed as "deliberative", as though they were similar to *quid agam?* "what shall I do?" The term "deliberative question" should be confined to questions that ask for directions as to a course of action, and that anticipate some expression of the will in reply. It would perhaps be possible to extend the term "deliberative" to cover such questions as *quis crediderit?* (as, for instance, in Allen and Greenough, § 268), but, if that is done, we should, to be consistent, have to make several distinct classes of deliberative questions, *e. g.*, (1) those involving the will, *e. g.*, *quid agam?* "what shall I do?"; (2) those with the subjunctive of contingent futurity, never in any way connected with the will, *e. g.*, *quid sit optimum?* "what would be best?"; (3) such uses of the indicative as in *quid est optimum?* "what is best?", *quid erit optimum?* "what will be best?" etc.

Such questions as *quis crediderit?* are sometimes called "dubitative questions", questions of "doubt", or of "indignation." This seems a good opportunity to emphasize the fact that there is no such thing as a "dubitative subjunctive." No instance of a subjunctive can be found where that mood is due to any idea of "doubt" or "indignation." Those ideas are often present in questions that have the subjunctive, but they are not involved in, or even remotely implied by, the mood itself. Such questions as "who are you?" "do you know you are making a fool of yourself?" imply just as much "doubt" and "indignation" as do the questions "what shall we do with the scoundrel?" "would you make a fool of yourself?" Questions of the former type take the indicative, those of the latter types the subjunctive, and the former type is as common as the others. As far as the explanation of the mood is concerned, one might as well say nothing about a question as to call it a "question of doubt, or of "indignation", because such terms are as appropriate for the indicative as for the subjunctive.

dicas, "you (one) would say", *i. e.*, if he should hear my words, (or the like).

uix ueri simile uideatur, "it would seem hardly likely."

paene dicam, "I should almost say."

uelim, malim, nolim, "I should wish (like), prefer, etc."

a. Such expressions as **crederes, uideres, cerneres, putares**, "one would have supposed", "one would have seen", etc., represent the same use from a past point of view.¹ The imperfect, however, occurs only in the second person singular of a few verbs.

II. Developed Type: From an ellipsis of some such protasis as "if you should do the proper thing", this subjunctive gained the power of expressing the idea of obligation, propriety and the like. This type is translated by the use of "should", "ought to", or some similar expression:

non sileas (Hor. Sat. 2, 5, 91), "you should not keep silent."

sed opinor quiescamus (Cic. ad Att. 9, 6, 2), "but I think we should keep quiet."

quod si ita est, cedat opinor forum castris, etc. (Cic. pro. Mur. 14, 30), "if this is so, the forum should, I think, give way to the camp", etc.

non recedamus (Cic. pro. Cluent. 57, 155), "we should not withdraw."

non siris (Catull. 66, 91), "you should not (for an instant) allow."

non contempseris (Cic. ad Att. 14, 13 A), "you should not (for an instant) scorn."

cur non laeter? (Cic. Cat. 4, 1, 2), "why should I not rejoice?"

(te) non rogem? (Cic. ad fam. 14, 4, 5), "should I not ask you?"

a This subjunctive may also be used from a past point of view, either interrogatively or declaratively:

¹ It may be that *uideres*, for instance, is sometimes a subjunctive of permission representing *uideas*, "one may see (if he will)", from a past point of view.

III. The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive. 231

cur non tangerem (Plaut. Most. 454)? "why should I not have touched it?"

non redderes (Plaut. Trin. 133), "you should not have given it up to him."

Such a section would at least have the merit of meaning something definite and would not, as the corresponding sections of our Latin grammars at present certainly do, lead students into a wilderness of ideas where they are sure to get lost. For that they do get lost, every teacher of Latin has learned to his cost. What teacher of Latin composition has not spent many a tedious hour correcting *faciat*, *pluat*, *faceres*, and hundreds of similar expressions, into *facere potest*, *pluere potest*, *facere posses*, etc., and in trying to drill into his students the truth that "can" and "may", etc., must not be so freely translated into Latin by the use of the subjunctive mood? The grammars do, to be sure, throw out a caution against a too extended use of this class of subjunctives. But the general tenor of the sections on the "potential subjunctive" amounts to a full and free recognition of such uses. The fact that most students enter college with perverted ideas regarding this supposed use is distinctly traceable to the precepts and the translations found in grammars and other text-books. No student whose vernacular is English would, if left to himself, ever think of translating "may" or "can" by the subjunctive, because there is nothing in his own language that would be likely to suggest such a procedure. His own language expresses these ideas by separate words. If left to himself and his lexicon in trying to reproduce these ideas in Latin, he would naturally seek for and find the Latin equivalent. But grammars say very little of *potest* while they devote whole sections to impressing upon the student that the subjunctive may express any one of the ideas represented by "may", "can", "might", "could", "would", and "must". If the section suggested above were to be substituted in our grammars for the sections on the "Potential Subjunctive" now found there, I should confidently predict that students would enter our colleges with clearer and juster ideas of the possibilities of the Latin subjunctive.

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